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A C K N O W L EDGMENTS

This dissertation had a complicated genesis in the
realms of mind before it ever acquired a physical habitation
and a name on paper, and in writing it I have accumulated a
special set of debts.

The idea for this project occurred to

me in a seminar with Lewis P. Simpson as an extension of an
earlier study of Emerson's conception of the Logos.

My

greatest scholarly debt in life is to Professor Simpson, who
first acquainted me with the problems of consciousness,
modernity, and language that I have begun to address here
merely as a footnote to his own monumental achievements as a
latter-day humanist and man of letters.
Other debts to my teachers at Louisiana State
University are of scarcely less weight.

James Olney helped

me frame my ideas about the evolution— or perhaps
dissolution— of the idea of the autonomous self in terms of
the traditional canon of life-writing, and has lent both
useful admonitions and support to me during the composition
of this piece in an infinite variety of ways. His
investments, particularly of time and energy as I shaped and
edited this project, have ranged far beyond what any student
could ask of any teacher. I first tackled the issue of
medieval nominalism and the flowering (or blight) that it
engendered as it became internalized in the intellectual
life of the Reformation, and in Restoration and eighteenthcentury English literature with John Fischer, and later
iv

explored these questions with Aubrey Williams, Professor
Emeritus of English at the University of Florida.

I am

immensely grateful to both for their insight and for their
endless willingness to explore ideas on these and other
topics in conversation. Such exchanges are the breath of
academic life, and without them we find ourselves lapsing
into the silences of the solipsism that terrified Henry
Adams. John R. May first introduced me to the work of Walter
Ong, and with Professor May I explored the relationship
between the technology of print culture and book-making, and
the emergence of modern self-consciousness that is the focus
of Adams's view of western intellectual history.

Professor

May has also been of immense value as a tireless liaison
with the Graduate School and the Department of English at
LSU since, as Henry Adams tended to be, I am frequently
absent instead of present at designated points in physical
space and time.

Joseph V. Ricapito offered me insights on

the picaresque which have informed my own discussion of
Adams's mode of narrative in The Education of Henry Adams.
Other professors from outside the community at LSU have
also been generous with their time and advice. James M. Cox,
Avalon Professor of English Emeritus of Dartmouth College,
listened as I talked my way toward a shape for my argument
at a succession of MLA meetings, and was a continuing source
of enthusiasm and inspiration, as well as an example of
courage and intellectual integrity.
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His view of Henry Adams

has colored my own thinking and writing as certainly as his
view of teaching and learning has altered my understanding
of the life of the scholar.

Thanks are also due to

Professor Kenneth Surin of the Program in Literature at Duke
University for his unfailing generosity with his time, and
for his persistent and probing questions which, while
daunting, made it easier for me to grapple with the problems
of modernity, postmodernism, and the idea of a trans
personal concept of identity.

Professor Ronald G. Witt of

the Department of History at Duke helped me chart a path
through the complexities of the diffusion of the nominalist
view of language in medieval and Renaissance Europe in an
NEH summer seminar in 1993.

His assistance was invaluable

as I picked my way through the tangled history of the view
of language that Henry Adams believed to be at the heart of
modernity.

While we do not always read the Renaissance in

identical ways, Professor Witt's rigor and his insistence on
precision have helped me clarify my views on any number of
issues in early modern intellectual history.
Differing from these debts to my teachers, but no less,
is my debt to Gregory Boyce Lyon, my former student, who is
now a graduate student himself in early modern history at
Princeton University.

I first read Gilles Deleuze's The

Logic of Sense in his company, as he first read Ficino's
commentary on Plato's Symposium in mine, and I have found
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that the greatest reward of teaching is that our students
become our teachers.
Finally, I would like to thank those who supplied help
in more material ways.

Virginia S. Wilson and William

Youngblood, of The North Carolina School of Science and
Mathematics, were a unified source of unfailing
encouragement and of release time for trips back to LSU in
the early days of my writing and research. Marcelline
Barron, Dean of Academic Programs and Research at the
Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, awarded curriculum
development grants and travel money which facilitated my
research and allowed me to explore my ideas by teaching them
in non-traditional courses.

The staff at the Massachusetts

Historical Society allowed me remarkable freedom of access
to Henry Adams's personal library and papers in the summer
of 1984.

Many of the volumes in his library are extensively

annotated, and some are mentioned here.

Adams's copies of

William James and Henry Maudsley and Karl Marx, as well as
his readings on the emerging science of entropy were of
crucial importance as he formulated the views of self and
history that are the subject of my own study. Reading his
annotations in the actual bodily artifacts of his books
rather than on microfilm invested my time at the Historical
Society with his (appropriately) ghostly presence.
Perhaps greater than all of these debts which have to
do with the public world and public life are those private
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and nameless ones that I owe to my parents, whose kindness
and integrity, and whose generous support have made this
rather extended project possible.
While living in exile on his farm, Machiaveili once
wrote that his greatest pleasure in life came at the moment
when he could strip off the muddy clothes of laborer and
exchange them for metaphorical robes of state. In this
'•graver dress," he wrote, he could enter his study, and
visit the "antique courts of the ancients" where he could
taste at will the food of mind that seemed to him, as he
roamed the historicized and secularized versions of
Augustine's courts and palaces of memory, to be his alone.
My own greatest pleasure has been less that of the isolated
consciousness in communion with the simulacra of thinkers
conjured in the private spaces of mind than it has been the
experience of communing with the extraordinary group of men
and women whom I have mentioned here.

Their gifts of mind

and spirit and their wisdom have made my writing— indeed, my
own education— a pleasure that will always be present to my
memory.
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PREFACE

This dissertation was produced over a very long period
of time. It began as a fairly straightforward exercise in
the history of life-writing. I intended to place Henry Adams
in the usual line of thinkers— Augustine, Montaigne, and
Rousseau-— and I planned to show how he anticipated the
autobiographical experiments of Gertrude Stein and Samuel
Beckett. That route would have been an easier one and, had I
followed it, this project would have been completed long
ago, but as I worked with Adams, and discovered his links
with the Pre-Raphaelites and with Swinburne and William
Story as a young man, and his subsequent patronage of
Auguste Rodin, Augustus Saint-Gaudens, and Henri Bergson in
later life, I became aware of how passionately involved he
was with the articulation of a modernist aesthetic of self
representation.

I also came to realize that, in his

autobiography and his essays, Adams was in search of a world
founded in something other than historical reason and
represented through something other the agency of the
personal self. My way was, at first, fraught with paradox,
if not outright confusion. I could not, for example, decide
exactly why Adams had found it necessary to destroy his
personal diaries, and, symbolically, his youth as he
finished his painstaking history of the United States.

And

then there were the religious dilemmas of the pseudonymous
novel } -her, which was written at about the same time as
ix

the History of the United States. The works that most people
know— Mt. St. Michel and The Education of Henry Adams— were
equally confusing, especially since Adams had claimed that
they were the first two installments of an autobiographical
enterprise that he equated with suicide, just as he equated
biography with murder. I was thus fairly sure, that when
Adams wrote of a "scientific" history he meant something
other than what most people had assumed he had meant, or at
least, that his ideas about it changed between the 1880s and
the first decade of the twentieth century.
Adams became something like the hound of heaven for me,
except that I pursued him rather than his
notably through the mazes of

pursuing me, most

streets that lead through

Washington to Rock Creek Church Cemetery, which because
Adams habitually referred to it simply as "Rock Creek
Cemetery," I had some difficulty in locating. When I finally
did get to the cemetery, the

day after Christmas, just

before the annual meeting of

MLA

in 1984,I found that the

landscaping that Adams had commissioned made locating the
gravesite with its famous statue by St. Gaudens impossible
without a map. I also learned that Adams had insisted that
no "verbal markers" identify the grave, and that the statue
remain nameless. One of the most famous statues in late
nineteenth-century American sculpture is thus hidden from
any but the most tenacious seeker by tall evergreens. One
could pass the monument on all but its northern side and
x

believe that it was a clump of trees. Having obtained my
map, I found myself standing before the statue that Adams
claimed had said everything he had to say. Like everything
else about Adams, however, the statue was only another
unfolding of a Chinese box of self-representations. That
late December afternoon, in a blaze of sunlight, I found
myself face-to-face with the most enigmatic statue I had
ever encountered. It was both male and female, both powerful
and vulnerable, both anguished and at peace, as Adams had
intended it to be. The statue was the wordless metaphor— the
perfect silence— which in its stillness communicated all
that

Adams had meant by "education” and

all the ways of

seeing and being that lay outside the realm of rational
discourse. The statue did indeed have the power to tell me
everything I was to learn about Henry Adams's personal
odyssey, but at the time I felt more like Browning's Childe
Roland, and the statue looked more like a ruined and gutted
chapel than any legitimate source of revelation. I was like
the tourists that Adams himself liked to watch from the
vantage point of the Egyptian marble benches that surround
the statue. He enjoyed his role as unnoticed observer then,
and I suppose he would have enjoyed watching me as I, like
the pilgrims of two generations before me, read the
hieroglyph of my own condition in the impassive face before
me without knowing that I was beholding a simulacrum of my
own dilemmas.

What I gradually realized, after a summer among Adams's
books and papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society,
was that the statue, like the Education, which Adams claimed
shielded a core of meaning hidden from all but the most
determined readers, was a sort of Augustinian emblem of
reading. The idle passerby would simply pass by— and be
rewarded with a husk of meaning. Adams's real audience would
persist, and be rewarded with a kernel of meaning that was
nevertheless and necessarily indecipherable. The unmarked
statue haunted me, especially since Adams had also demanded
that no illustrations accompany the Education.
Suddenly one day, as I was thinking about Adams's
fondness for Pope, I realized that Adams had centered his
ideas about the possibility of meaning in history in the
problem of language for some of the same reasons that Pope
had written the Dunciad. Pope had feared the linguistic
legacy of the philosophic via moderna. and Adams's work was
a sort of self-consciously final exemplum of it. I thus
began another journey, and this one led me through mazes of
mind that made the streets of Washington seem like models of
clarity as I retraced Adams's personal intellectual history.
Adams may have begun with Gibbon and Hegel, but his own
path, as my own did, carried me to the Reformation— which
Adams saw as the crack between the medieval and modern
worlds— and to the nominalism of Scotus and Ockham that
Adams believed had been its place of origin. After a year of
xii

such endeavor I understood that Adams had indeed extended
the modernizing project of Scotus and Ockham, but had done
so not by embracing its logical outgrowth in enlightenment
thinking, but by rejecting it. Most specifically, Adams
sought, with Nietzsche, to reject the doctrine that mind and
consciousness are the world. He became fascinated with
philosophic vitalism late in life, and saw it as a
counterpart to the explosive new work in theoretical physics
that preoccupied him in the first years of the twentieth
century.

Seen in this light, Adams's claim in some of his

letters that the Education had represented an exploration of
Bergsonian doctrines about identity made more sense. I saw
that Adams, who was born in 1838, but, as he insisted, had
also been born in the twelfth century with Abelard, and
reborn in new form every time he finished writing a new
book, was most properly seen, as he himself claimed, as a
theorist and historian of historiography.

His proper

company in the history of ideas was indeed provided by
Augustine and Montaigne, and Rousseau, but also by Petrarch,
Ockham, Althusser, and Deleuze.

My own study has thus taken

unexpected turns, and as it has turned, I have turned; in
the process, the boundaries between Henry Adams and me, and
the text about Henry Adams that I have written into being
have become progressively more blurred.
This is not a traditional dissertation. I have not
included the usual overview of scholarly texts about Adams,
xiii

and there are few citations from them because most scholars
have read Adams from either a more literary or more
historical point of view than I have.

There are works like

Robert Vitzhum's The American Compromise or Lois Hughson's
From Biography to History, in which Adams is primarily an
historian and biographer. Then there are more literary
treatments— like William Decker's The Literary Vocation of
Henrv Adams, or John Carlos Rowe's Henry Adams and Henry
James, or Carolyn Porter's brilliant discussion of Adams in
her Seeing and Being; The Plight of the Participant Observer
in Emerson. James. Adams and Faulkner.

These, and others

like them, are excellent and useful studies, but I felt that
if Adams saw his letters and essays, biographies and
autobiographies as pieces of fractured whole that was both
representative of himself and of a modern consciousness of
history, then he needed to be represented in those terms.
have thus chosen to consider Adams as he himself considered
himself— as a social theorist and historiographer. Thus
Foucault and Hans Blumenberg, Gilles Deleuze and Georges
Bataille have replaced the more expected names from the
realm of American Studies.
My work is intended as a series of views of Adams, a
kaleidoscope of perspectives. It is not intended as a final
reading of his work, but rather as what Harold Bloom once
called a "map of misreading"— the kind of reading that
necessarily leads us to a renewed and more vital response.
xiv

I

As a student of Adams, I have sought to emulate the role he
assumes as guide in his Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. I
cannot claim to point the reader toward the truth of the
texts we will encounter, but I can promise to give him a
tour around their periphery.
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ABSTRACT

This study traces Henry Adams's evolution from an
enlightenment historian to a prescient postmodern theorist,
and explores how he came to regard his own intellectual
history as paradigmatic of the arc of subjectivity in the
West from the Middle Ages to Nietzsche and Bergson. Adams
was a self-conscious philosophical nominalist, and he
believed that his radical doubts about the capacity of
language for embodying meaning had their origin in medieval
nominalism. Adams found the seeds of modernity and the
problem of subjectivity which were the focus of his own
musings on the nature of the self and history in Abelard and
Ockham. Nominalism was, in Adams's view, the only tenable
position for the self-imprisoned subject of modernity.
Adams's view of language and its powers also anticipates the
view of the relationship between self and identity, and self
and world in later thinkers like Louis Althusser and Gilles
Deleuze. Partly because of his conception of the de-centered
Word, the act of writing enjoys a special status in Adams's
work. Adams's eloquent and rapacious "I" consumes all of
universal history. His "I" is a self-creating and fluid
entity constituted within a verbal matrix. Adams is thus not
only Adam^, but all of his models from Augustine to Petrarch
to Bergson.

Adams believed that the model of world grounded

in consciousness was one that condemned the perceiving
subject to a terrible isolation; his final efforts at selfxvii

representation in Mt.St. Michel and Chartres and The
Education of Henry Adams, and in the historical essays that
he claimed were addenda to his autobiography are efforts to
murder the personal self in order to escape it. Adams's
infamous claims that biography was murder and autobiography
suicide become explicable in this context. Adams's many
versions of self in textual form— whether his personae
appear as biographical or historical characters or as
figures in his parodic version of autobiography— are all
founded in written texts which become the ground of his
communication with the world.

xviii

CHAPTER 1

SUBJECTIVITY,

W O R L D PICTURES, A N D THE P R O B L E M
OF LANGUAGE

Toward the end of his life, Henry Adams came to speak
of his long and varied writing career as a quest for "form"
that had found its fruition in "failure."

In trying to

define what he meant, we may think of Adams's "failure" as
embodied in the works for which he is best remembered— M t .
St. Michel and Chartres and The Education of Henry Adams—
which

Adams regarded as a single effort that had been

extended and completed in his essay "The Rule of Phase
Applied to History."

He wrote John Franklin Jameson that

the "Rule of Phase" was merely a "supplementary chapter" for
the Education. Adams implied that, taken together, these
three works constituted his autobiography.

Adams's avowed

purpose in all three writings had been to "suggest a reform
of the whole University system, grouping all knowledge as an
historical stream to be treated by historical methods."

He

wrote that he had invented a new form for the three works,
and that his innovation would enable him to construct an
autobiographical survey of the "stream of knowledge" from
the twelfth century to the twentieth

that was "literary and

not technical."
Adams's claim that a work on architecture and stained
glass and an essay on the processes of history were part of
his own life story is startling.

Although we know that he

2

had predicted that in the future all history would have to
be autobiographical, difficulties arise when we attempt to
press Adams's use of the word ’’form."

Adams was a man who

adopted many masks, and his quest for aesthetic form was
itself but another of Adams's many personae, one which was
synonymous with his quest for the shape of personal
identity. Both quests seem at some point to have merged in
his mind with the "historical stream [of knowledge] from the
12th century till today."
Explicitly, Adams believed that his identity was
inseparable from, and perhaps synonymous with the patterns
of intellectual history from the late Middle Ages to the
twentieth century.

He chose to engage in a species of life-

writing that allowed him to use himself and his own
intellectual evolution as a paradigm for western
intellectual history.
and paradoxical.

This enterprise was both enigmatic

As his niece Mabel LaFarge explained,

Adams "loved to hide himself and invented every possible
means for doing so."

At the same time, he lived as though

he were continually on stage in the theater of history.

The

persona he adopts is not unlike that of the picaro, and his
mode of autobiography is closer to the first person— and
presumably fictional— narrative of a picaresque novel than
it is to that of John Stuart Mill.

Whether he was

destroying his diaries and announcing that he had destroyed
six years of his life in the process, or writing

pseudonymous novels, or merging his own identity with

the

Queen of Tahiti's in a joint memoir, he was always engaged
both in self-creation and in the analysis and ironic
exposure of the fictions and myths of the idea of personal
identity which he recognized as having informed the primary
notions of order in western society.

This was equally true

in the case of his histories and biographies.

Like his

other experiments in narrative, these more conventional
works tended to deal explicitly with the failed promises of
republics and individuals, while at the same time providing
Adams with yet more surrogate selves.
In all of his literary experiments Adams was in search
of an appropriate monument for his existence. Believing with
Hegel that he inhabited an "age of prose,"1 Adams wrote
primarily

in the narrative mode.

He described narrative as

a "ruling mode of perception," a "style of comprehension" in
the modern world. However, Adams's novels, histories,
biographies, and autobiographies are all somewhat oblique
explorations of the boundaries of the personal self.

Like

many thinkers of his day, Adams was profoundly aware that
the self is the creature of its perceptions. The route of
his quest for a model of self-representation that would
reflect the chaos of modern life rather than an organic
notion of order led him to adopt and abandon the generic
forms of novel, narrative history, and biography.
his narrative quest is a kind of charnel house,

In fact,

littered

with exhausted forms and selves, and unified and mediated by
the extraordinary body of his letters, which run to six
volumes. Adams's autobiography, the presumed formal apex of
his career,

is an exercise in which he legitimizes his

radical rejection of the concept of identity as a viable
organizing principle for the definition of his being.

In

order to reveal the great hoax inherent in the notion of the
personal self, Adams had to deconstruct even the
conventional forms of autobiography, and our experience of
reading his own efforts at self-representation is the
experience of stripping off the layers of autobiographical
texts that precede and determine the shape of Adams's
narrative.

Indeed, if it can be said that his writing as a

whole involves a quest for form, it must also be said that
it also and equally involves a quest for simultaneous self
definition and annihilation.

Adams's autobiography echoes

and underscores Rilke's anguished recognition that, for the
subject of modernity,
within."2

"nowhere will world exist but

In "The Rule of Phase," Adams wrote that "the

mind has always figured its motives as reflections of
itself...and this is as true in its conception of
electricity as in its instinctive imitation of a god."
"Always and everywhere," he continues,

"the mind creates its

own universe and pursues its own phantoms."3 Adams was not
Emerson, exulting in the possibility that "mind creates the
world...and that at last all matter is dead mind."

Rather,
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he envisions the self and the subjectivity which governs its
perceptions as a permanent prison-house.

In the Preface to

the Education he says that the work, like the Henry Adams of
the title, is the product of a "shrunken Ego."
Appropriately, the Education is written in the third person.
Alienated even from himself, Adams cannot be sure that the
self that pens its own life story has any existence.
...I am trying to persuade myself that
there is any such thing as me. More and
more I am forced to admit that the whole
show is a piece of idiocy...but I wrote
all that ten years ago as education...4
Annotating his copies of the works of William James some
twenty years earlier, Adams was already thinking of the self
in terms that were beyond modern.
Is thought a stream? Has it a starting
point or an end? Why not call it an
ocean with streams in it? Or the inter
reflections of mirrors?...Or a magnet,
with lines of force? Or a condition,
like time and space? Does thought think,
or do I think, or does the earth-worm
think?5
Throughout his copies of the James volumes, Adams's
annotations reflect his obsession with the problem of
consciousness and its engulfment of world.
The soul in philosophy is the eg o . The
phenomenon is not e g o , but the
consciousness of the ego. 'Cogito ergo
sum,' the old, old formula! But what am
I? All this is to return to the old
dispute without answering the old
question.6

Elsewhere, in another annotated volume in his library,
Henry Maudsley's Body and Wil l . Adams marked a number of
passages that suggest that the supposition that there is any
world external to our own consciousnesses is no more than a
useful working hypothesis.

In his extensive annotations to

Maudsley, Adams wrote that it is "futile ingenuity" to
"think anything outside of human consciousness."7 If Adams
was uncertain about the nature of consciousness and the
existence of the world outside the self, he also despaired
of attaining to any sort of knowledge through introspection.
Of all studies the one he would rather
have avoided was that of his own mind.
He knew of no tragedy so heart-rending
as introspection...Nearly all the
highest intelligence known to history
had drowned itself in the reflection of
its own thought and the bovine survivors
had rudely told the truth about it
without affecting the intelligent.
Adams's fascination with the problem of consciousness led
him back

to metaphysics and to the reconfiguration of

history of philosophy as a history

the

of subjectivity which

would end in a science of chaos.
He got out his Descartes again; dipped
into his Hume and Berkeley, wrestled
anew with his Kant, pondered solemnly
over his Hegel and Schopenhauer and
Hartmann; strayed gaily away with his
Greeks-— all ...to ask what Unity meant,
and what happened when one denied it.8
His studies led him to conclude that as "bottomless" as
nihilism and pessimism seemed, the western philosophic
tradition

had been content to collapse the "universe of

contradictions" into "the human thought as one Will" and
"treat it as representation."

Adams was not satisfied with

the idea of treating the universe as a "motion of mind."

At

the same time, he feared that one could know the universe
only "as oneself; it was psychology."
Because Adams framed his philosophic difficulties in
the way that he did, any study of Henry Adams is necesse-rlly
concerned with Adams's oddly prescient articulation of the
twin problems of modernity and subjectivity.

Long before

the time of postmodern theorists, and even before the time
of Heidegger, Adams was addressing the problem of what it
means to be a splintered subject who both constructs and
inhabits the mental landscape that we know as modernity.
Adams claimed that the Chicago Exhibition of 1893 had
shattered his sense of historical continuity, but as early
as 1882 he had begun to ask what it means to be a subject
thinking in a privately constituted world that it
conceptualizes in representational terms.

All of his late

work is about what it means to be an isolated self
conceiving of the world in terms of a construct as
artificial as that of modernity on the one hand, and about
the ages that came before it in terms of what Heidegger
called their alternative "world pictures" on the other.
Though he began by assuming with most Victorians that
history was a mirror which could provide both the individual
and his age with meaning and a map of the future he ends by

questioning the very possibility of producing even
subjectively grounded meanings in history.

He may have

claimed to have found a ground for his being in the twelfth
century and the sense of unity that he found there, but he
also came to believe that this was both a curiously
artificial and a curiously modern way of reconstructing the
past as a simulacrum of self.
Adams was one of the first self-conscious students of
modernism, and he found a focus for his fascination with the
alien entity that was modern man in the phenomenon of
machines and the universe of force which they seemed to
emblematize.

The theory of history which he developed in

the first decade of the twentieth century uses the machine
as a symbol of the triumph of a conceptual and impersonal
series of forces which he saw as having replaced the
principle of identity and order with a vision of mappable
chaos.

Implicitly, then, Adams's late work is not only

about modernity and subjectively constituted worlds.

It is

also about the advent of the formless formulae and the antiselves that mark the embrace of difference and exteriority
in post-modern thought. Adams's critique of identity in fact
helps explain his recognition that the concept of personal
identity with its dependence on the existence of substantive
constructs like "god" and "self" and "world" is not the only
one for organizing experience.9

Adams recognized in the

first decade of the twentieth century that what was at stake
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in modernity was the emergence of a subject which would
arbitrarily "picture" both history and the self as
constructions of mind.

Adams also knew, however, that the

Cartesian model of consciousness was not the only one for
the perceiving subject, and that the modern self was not a
single entity at all, but rather the product of
"multiplicity," a term that Adams uses idiosyncratically as
a sort of shorthand for his sense of the fragmentation of
modern intellectual life.

Subjectivity itself is a

condition which determines the self-conscious fascination
with the power to conceive a world picture, but the subject
is multiple, an entity simultaneously beset and determined
by what Anthony Cascardi calls "a field of conflicting
discourses"— the often contradictory modes of self
conception and expression
of philosophy,
modern world.10

that characterize the discourses

literature, religion and psychology in the
In this view, the self is a compilation of

multiple voices, a production founded in language. Thus,
Adams can legitimately claim that he is equally present in
his Education, his biography of John Randolph, and in his
history of the Madison and Jefferson administrations through
his articulation of these entities through words.
As I have suggested, Adams couched his own meditation
on modernity and a prophecy of post-modernity in his letters
and in the series of texts he called his autobiography— M t .
St. Michel and Chartres, The Education of Henry Adams, and

"The Rule of Phase Applied to History." His resulting forays
into the history of consciousness and self-consciousness and
the problem of subjectivity required him to center his
discussion in a consideration of modern man's dependence on
language and its adequacy as an instrument for connecting
him to the uncertain world that lies beyond the perceiving
self.

Adams revisits the ancient question of realism and

nominalism in language, a question that was apparently much
on his mind in the first years of the twentieth century as
he finished Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and began writing
the Education.

In his annotated copy of Alfred R. Wallace's

Man's Place in the Universe. Adams articulated his perennial
fascination with the "multiplicity of the modern world" in
terms of nominalism and realism.
'Unity' means to be one in regard to
mechanical, physical, and chemical laws.
This one-ness constitutes a unit.
Therefore fishes constitute a unit.
Water is a unit. Space and time are
units. The old question of Realism and
Nominalism alive as ever.11
Gilles Deleuze locates the origins of nominalism in the
thought of the Stoics,12 and Adams claimed to be fascinated
by Zeno, at least, but his questions about the limits of
language are more reflective of Plato's Cratvlus. and the
self-erasing impulse of the Parmenides than they are of the
works of Zeno.

Moreover, Adams focuses on medieval

nominalism rather than its classical antecedents as a
manifestation of western man's fascination with the power of
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will and the phenomenon of force.

Adams believed that the

nominalists and their via moderna had begotten a universe of
subjectivity in which language was specially privileged.
For Adams, modernity and subjectivity were monstrous doubles
of one another, the twin fruits of the displacement of God
and the Locos by man and the fragile and tentative words
that he employs as vehicles for transmitting meaning.
Adams's fear of words and his fascination with their power
seem to have crystallized along with his doubts about the
possibility of producing an objective, scientifically
determined version of history. He saw in nominalism the
roots not only of the fragmented sensibility of the modern
world, but also of its faith in science and in the
possibility of naming a new heaven, new earth into being
through the right use of reason.
Adams's fascination with language was hardly unique;
other late nineteenth-century writers were aware that at
least from the time of Descartes, the power of language had
been determined by the "I" which uses it. Adams's innovation
was his replication of Pope's location of the origins of the
fragmentation of an ideal of community founded and
reinforced through a universal language in medieval
nominalism.

The "I" of the Cartesian coqito both

constitutes and determines its world because of philosophic
innovations that preceded the Discourse on Method by
centuries.

Adams realized that Descartes was not interested

in the nature of the hats and cloaks that passed for people
in the streets beneath his windows.

Rather, both Descartes

and Adams after him, helplessly following in the paths of
the via moderna. were concerned with how their own "personal
'I'" was manifested in the hats and cloaks or any other
objects that came before their field of vision.
Subjectivity is triumphant in Descartes' Meditations. and
becomes the primary term of existence in the modern world at
the same time that personal identity, with language as its
mouthpiece,

is necessarily explicitly privileged and

empowered.

In such a world, the words that we use to

connect ourselves to the world outside the self assume
deific capacities. For the subject of modernity, words are
the primary indicators of being.
Adams's view of language is best understood in the
context of Ockham's fourteenth-century versions of
nominalism and the resurgent, but sometimes unconscious,
nominalism of the late nineteenth century.

Adams's ability

to create and abolish selves through narrative, and his
belief that his biographies were really about himself echoes
Nietzsche's claim that "every name in history is 'I.'"
Deleuze sees Lewis Carroll as a central figure in
nineteenth-century nominalism.13 The pseudonymous Carroll,
himself a double and renaming of Ernest Dodgson, can have
his heroine, Alice, go on a quest where she has a revelation
that causes her to misplace her sense of personal identity.

13

Afterwards, Alice experiences life as it is defined by an
alien sense of the order of things, a world in which

Humpty

Dumpty says that when he uses a word it means exactly what
he decides it will mean.

Alice as a subject of modernity

thus reverses the experience of epic heroes, whose quests
were crowned by a revelation of meaning.

Meanings confirmed

from outside the universe of subjectivity are lost in the
seas of modernity.
There is a little of Dodgson, of Lewis Carroll, and of
Alice in Henry Adams.

Adams embarks from the vantage point

provided by the enlightenment sensibility on a quest for
education, one which he thought would have predictable ends.
His quest is memorialized in acts of life-writing that are
also a succession of literary funerals.

He projects his own

linguistic anti-self into a textual entombment through a
self-proclaimed "suicide in print."

Adams thus represents

the triumph of a view of language that both empowers and
buries the personal self of the writer.
There are two tendencies implicit in the view of
language that accompanies the emergence of the modern world.
On the one hand, the Ockhamist, and, later, the Cartesian
vision suggests that the world beyond the hats and cloaks is
still available.

It is the locus of reality that has

shifted, not its final composition.

God is dependent on the

perceiving self's consciousness of God. World is contingent
on the perceiving self's constitution of it as world.

God

and Self and World remain intact in this vision, and
language retains its capacity to embody meanings that
reasonable individuals can not only agree upon, but which
they can use as a route of access to the realm of the
transcendent.

The other vision, that of Ockham; of Swift's

"Modern Author" in A Tale of a T u b ; of Lewis Carroll in
Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass;

and of

Henry Adams in his late work, suggests that words are
arbitrary designations which,

like the self that articulates

them, create a chasm as much as a bridge between self and
world.

In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres

Adams writes that

linguistic realism was the Roman arch that presupposed unity
between this world and another more permanent one.

As he

wrote again and again, the "attempt to bridge the chasm
between multiplicity and unity" was "the oldest problem of
philosophy, religion, and science."

Adams demonstrates in

Mt. St. Michel that nominalism is the necessary stance for a
modernist, but he also says that it offers "no cover at
all."

There is thus a profound tension in Adams between the

longing for unity and the embrace of multiplicity.
Adams, medieval nominalism began with

For

Abelard's notion of

concepts. This doctrine, Adams writes, was like a "false
wooden roof" concealing a flawed construction.

Despite his

skepticism, Adams nevertheless retains a faith in "an energy
not individual" that is "hidden" somewhere.

His faith

allowed him continue to question the possibility of the
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availability of some universal fountain of meaning, while
balancing his linguistic doubles on the edge of the abyss of
meaninglessness. Thus, his "Prayer to the Virgin of
Chartres" co-exists with the ever-multiplying levels of
narrative voice and self in the Education.
Adams seems to have actively sought release from the
"sea of introspection" in an arena beyond the realm of
personal identity which was available to him through
writing.

His Education records his embrace of a dimension

of being excluded by the whole concept of identity.
Deleuze, who places himself, much as Henry Adams did, in the
company first of the Stoics and then of Ockham and his
nominalist followers, calls this arena the "realm of sense."
Deleuze defines the realm of sense as a region of pure
event, and sees it has having been recaptured in Nietzsche's
desire to reverse Platonism as well as in the linguistic
studies of late nineteenth-century linguists like Meinong.14
It was this region, in radical rejection of his past and
what he regarded as the discontinuity of being that it
engendered, that Adams

sought to figure for

his readers in

his autobiography and later essays.
As it is represented in his tri-partite autobiography,
and as he had planned, Adams's thought recapitulates and
mirrors the intellectual history of the modern world. He
begins his account of himself in the last three chapters of
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres.

There, Adams discusses the

problem of medieval nominalism in language that anticipates
Deleuze's description of the world of sense, that realm that
freed the Stoics from the necessity of reflection and the
prisonhouse of what would later be called historical selfconsciousness.

For Adams, the roots of his own identity

were implicit in the linguistic dilemmas of the thirteenth
century.

Adams's language in

Mt. St. Michel

anticipates

the cadence of the self-erasing sentences of the Education.
As he explained repeatedly, the first part of his
autobiography, Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, was an attempt
to "realise the Unity of Thought in the Thirteenth Century."
The Education. he claimed, was an attempt to "Realise the
Multiplicity of Thought in the Twentieth"
117).

(Letters. VI,

Adams claims that he chose the thirteenth century as

a point of unity, but, in fact, he believed that "unity," at
least as he understood it, had been lost in the twelfth
century.

And, as Hans Blumenberg has suggested half a

century later, and Adams already knew in 1903, the roots of
modernity actually lie in late medieval nominalism's
conception of a deus absconditus who was far removed from
man, but who had given man language and will to allow him to
construct a shared sense of a world peopled by individuals
who exist only as discrete entities.

Our concepts of world

in Ockham's view are acts of mind, and it is only through
them that we attain to any knowledge of self or world.
Adams saw in the nominalists' focus on the relationship
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between language, logic, and reality, and their emphasis on
man's power for interpreting texts the seeds of the
subjectively generated universe that would flower in the
historical consciousness of a Petrarch, and begin to selfdestruct in the Reformation's efforts at radical
enlightenment for the faithful through the reading of
individual texts.

For Adams, the project of religious

enlightenment which would reach its secularized apotheosis
in the invention of America as a scientific project was
conceived in the academy of the late Middle Ages.
The works which make up Adams's autobiography are a
sort of twentieth-century version of a Jonathan Swift's Tale
of a T u b , and, as in their great original, false prefaces
and self-deconstructing assertions contrive to entrap and
confront the reader with all of his preconceptions about the
capacity of narrative to contain meaning.

Because Adams

chose to frame his narrative of his existence in this way,
any study of him, in a perverse sense, can only incidentally
be a dissertation about Henry Adams.

Seen as an infinite

and echoing hall of mirrors, the entire corpus of Adams's
work is nevertheless finally empty of whatever it was that
was Henry Adams.

As he had promised in letters that

antedate his "autobiography" by twenty years, he erases
himself in print.

To study Henry Adams's work is to study

not the man himself but the context which created his vision
of the world he inhabited and his vision of the world that
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would come after him.

Adams would have approved the idea of

his being only incidental to a study whose title features
his name prominently.

His way of conjuring a self by

representing its absence allowed Adams to effectively
realize his own erasure and the suicide of at least his
literary selves in print.
Adams doubted the adequacy of the perceiving self as an
sufficient narrating principle for his own autobiography,
much less as a source of order in a narrative about an
individually experienced but nevertheless collective
cultural past that we still call history.

By the early

years of the twentieth century he was writing that he
doubted that there was any such thing as Henry Adams at all.
At the same time, and perhaps more than any other single
figure in western intellectual history, Henry Adams is an
appropriate focus for a study of the fabrication and
simultaneous fragmentation of the subject amid its various
avenues of expression in discourse.

In his three-part

autobiography— Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The Education of
Henry Adams, and "The Rule of Phase Applied to History"—
Henry Adams self-consciously writes a coda to the centuries
of self-referential discourse that followed Montaigne's
location of the self in the processes of narrating his
perceptions, and Descartes' definition half a century later
of man as a "thing which thinks."

Adams is also an

appropriate focus for a study of the fate of the
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enlightenment project, which I, following Jurgen Habermas,
have called the "project of modernity."15 Adams saw his
intellectual odyssey as not only a focal point for such a
discussion, but as its embodiment.

In dispassionate fact,

Adams's career does epitomize in small the progress of
western intellectual history and the idea of selfconsciousness from, as he says, at least the eighteenth
century to the present, and perhaps, as he believed, from
the twelfth century to the present.
The enlightenment project as it is usually understood
originated in the eighteenth century, and accounts for
Adams's otherwise peculiar and always misunderstood claim
that his was initially an eighteenth-century sensibility.
The "project of modernity" encompasses the primary aim of
the Enlightenment, with its faith in Condorcet's belief that
there was one universal law and one universal language.
Implicit in this claim was the corollary notion that history
was single and universal, and that it chronicled man's
progress toward the sacralization and demystification of
nature and man's knowledge of nature alike.16 The adherents
of the project of modernity recognized that change and
transitoriness were apt to intrude in the gradual
realization of enlightenment, but they believed that these
were temporary states which would be overcome as science
replaced mystery in all areas of human endeavor, and the
modes of discourse which accompanied them were examined,
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honed, and perfected.

The power of the enlightenment's

vision of man derived from its faith in the value of the
individual, or more exactly, of the personal self.
Adams began with this faith, but like a single thread,
unifying the myriad modes of discourse which comprise the
body of Adams's work is the single theme of the crisis and
eventual failure of the enlightenment project as it was
manifested in the ideas about the individual's capacity to
know himself and his world. The Ockhamist project, which
Adams saw as the ancestor of the enlightenment project, had
sought to derive an ahistorical truth available to all men
based on reason and experience and articulated in the shared
signs of a common language.
Adams's autobiography.

Ockham's hopes explode in

Ockham had insisted that meaning

would emerge as man analyzed the phenomena of his world.
Adams finds not meaning, but only an infinity of
disconnected signs.

He ends not as a modernist at all, but

as a postmodernist whose suspicion of the enlightenment
project rival that first of Nietzsche and Weber, and later
that of figures as diverse as Adorno and Althusser, Habermas
and Deleuze. Adams may have called himself everything from a
eighteenth-century man to a "conservative Christian
anarchist" to a Hegelian and, by implication in his letters,
a Marxist, but whatever name he assigned himself, he
believed that his intellectual experience was the type or
figure of the progress of western consciousness and self-

consciousness from the "seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries"

(Education, 723) and "tastes founded on Pope and

Dr. Johnson"

(Education. 752) to a new world picture whose

lineaments were determined by Marx, Nietzsche,

and Freud.

Turn the dilemma as he pleased, he still
came back on the eighteenth century and
the law of Resistance, of Truth; of
Duty, and of Freedom. He could under no
circumstances have guessed what the next
fifty years would teach him, but
sometimes, in his old age he wondered—
and could never decide— whether the most
clear and certain knowledge would have
helped him...would he have quitted his
eighteenth-century...his abstract
ideals...to perform an expiatory
pilgrimage to State Street and ask for
the fatted calf of his grandfather
Brooks...
(Education. 740)
Nowhere is Adams's transformation into a postmodernist
more apparent than in his shifting attitudes toward the
problem of language. If the unifying thread in Adams's
personal project is that of the gradual erosion of faith in
the enlightenment project and its replacement by a new
vision that was essentially postmodernist in design, the
unifying thread in my own meditation is Adams's fascination
with the power of language. Implicit in the enlightenment
project is the notion that there are single answers to
multiple difficulties.

If we could represent the world

accurately— picture it accurately and objectively— and, by
extension, assign it accurate names through language, we
could control and order it.

Adams and others of his
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generation still

felt this to be as true of the writing of

history as it was of the projects of the natural sciences.
And, as David Harvey points out, this was a way of thinking
about language and about the world that it represents that
united thinkers who were otherwise quite different from one
another.

Voltaire and Diderot, Condorcet and Hume, Adam

Smith and Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Matthew
Arnold shared a sense that a "single, correct mode of
representation"17 was possible. Among these, however, at
least Matthew Arnold, and, more profoundly, Henry Adams,
came to feel quite differently about language.18

As the

previously cited annotations to William James suggest, Adams
wrote that all the new philosophy did was to revisit the
endless debate between nominalism and realism.
Adams's most explicit discussion of the problem of
language is couched in the imaginary journeys that make up
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres; A Study in Twelfth-Centurv
Unity.

As readers, we accompany him in search of a vision

of unity, but, with Adams as a unreliable guide, we founder
on the rock of the uncertainties implicit in nominalism at
the same time that we see in them the reflection of our
doubts about the nature of language.19

Adams believed that

he was part of what later thinkers have called a paradigm
shift, and that he had found the roots of modernity and the
roots of his own epistemological difficulties in the late
Middle Ages and the growing denial of the capacity of man to
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attain to a knowledge of universals. Adams thus dramatizes
the ancient conflict between linguistic nominalism and
realism, and writes his own version of the phenomenon of
resurgent nominalism which characterizes the philosophical
discourse of modernity.
From the time in the 1860s when he discovered John
Smith's falsification of autobiographical episodes in
history of the Virginia colony, Henry Adams seems to have
feared the power of the word at the same time that he
celebrates it with a sensibility akin to that of Derrida.
Like everything else about Adams— who described himself at
the age of twenty as hopelessly dualistic— his attitude
toward language remains paradoxical.

In the years between

1903 and 1915, when he adopted what I am calling his stance
as a postmodernist, Adams makes himself the god of his
narrative universe and experiments with the randomness of
linguistic descriptions at the same time that the very
existence of his autobiography reveals his old terror of the
usurping power of words.

Far from reflecting a sense of

linguistic plenitude, Adams's work reflects his everintensifying belief that words had no referent outside
themselves, that they were echoes and shadows of the
perceiving subject which articulates them. Thus, Adams
invents an audience for his imaginative journey through the
Middle Ages in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, but he must also
destroy his diaries lest they be left to "gibbet" him.

Adams seems to have believed that, once articulated, verbal
constructs had the capacity to incarnate linguistic doubles
whose reality was as certain as that of their maker. Adams's
ideas about language reflect the enlightenment project's
obsession with articulating the power of words.

In the

early years of the century Coleridge and even Emerson seemed
to cling to a belief that there was an essential
correspondence between mind and nature and between words and
the things they named.20

Coleridge, for example, had longed

to write a volume on "Logos, or the communicative
intelligence in nature and Man."21

As David Riede has

shown, the Romantic certainty of a correspondence between
self and mind and world and the words that mediate between
them gives way to another view— that espoused by the
emerging scientific agnosticism of thinkers like Thomas
Huxley or Robert Chambers. Chambers, in fact, suggested as
early as 1844 that language was not of divine origin at all,
but rather a set of signs and gestures which represented
man's somewhat limited improvement over animals.22 An
intense conflict raged in Adams's day between proponents of
the emerging sciences of man and the physical world alike,
who believed that there might be no God, and the advocates
for religion, who believed that God had created the world
and given man speech as a means of bridging the endless
distances between the visible and intelligible universes.23
Adams reflects the tendencies of both sides. When he

destroyed his own diaries while he was reading the
publishers' proofsheets for his monumental "scientific
history" of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations, he
claimed to be destroying himself. A decade later, Adams
refused to assist his brother Brooks in a preparation of a
biography of their father in fear that if he failed to call
his father and his grandfather, or John Randolph or himself
by the right names they would vanish.
Adams's longing for a belief in a time when words still
had meanings of their own places him among the Romantics.
His certainty that meaning was constructed and artificial
places him in a different line of thinkers from Coleridge
and Wordsworth, and even from Chambers and Arnold. His
radical doubt about that plenitude of language which made it
possible for Wordsworth and Coleridge to traverse a sea of
imagination into a more unified vision of being moves him
backward toward Abelard and Ockham, and forward toward
Deleuze. Adams thus should be considered as the intellectual
companion of Nietzsche, not as a descendent of Gibbon and
the other eighteenth-century icons of order he had admired
in his youth. At the same time, Adams demands that his
readers embark on the same journey through seas of
imagination that his romantic predecessors made.

All the

while warning us that such a journey is not possible, Adams
borrows the informing symbol of the opening section of the
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres from Section IX of Wordsworth's
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"Intimations” Ode.

As we discover, the journey miscarries

even in the conception.
Adams's obsession with language and with the subject
that represents world in speech is also reflective of his
sense as an historian that the essentially fictional device
of narrative is the historian's only means of recovering and
translating meaning within the matrix of an historical
continuum.24

After his history of the Madison and Jefferson

Administrations is completed Adams no longer believed that
the past can be recovered.

Paradoxically, he retains his

old belief, derived from George Bancroft, that
quintessential Enlightenment historian, that the province of
the self is duplicated and can be represented through the
processes of history.

What interests Adams is the act of

creation that enables him to assimilate the past by
narrating it. Through radical acts of naming Adams thus
invents not only an audience for Mt.St. Michel and Chartres
but the whole of the medieval past as a form of
autobiography.

Through even more radical acts of

nomination, he creates a double for himself in The Education
of Henry Adams and merges with the forces of a Marxist
vision of history in his "Letter to American Teachers of
History" and "The Rule of Phase Applied to History." By
extension, his own audience is asked to engage in similar
kinds of nomination, and Adams is deeply aware that in
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reading his works we are reading him, recreating both his
texts and the pasts they conjure in a multitude of ways.
Adams's self-conscious awareness of the subject's selfenclosure was also an awareness of his own entrapment in the
prison-house of language. Adams wrote late in life that his
letters were "really to [himself]."

We might say that Adams

and the post-modern theorists whose work he anticipates are
failed nominalists whose rightful antecedents are Abelard
and Ockham and Duns Scotus.

Adams exemplifies a belief

which he shares with his medieval predecessors and his post
modern children of mind in a sort of linguistic plenitude
that nevertheless permits the radical doubts of a thinker
like Robert Chambers.

Adams believed that language could

lend coherence to either one's own experience or that of
other individuals or nations, but he also believed that the
account of one's self in autobiography or of others in
biography or of entire cultures in history was necessarily a
subjective one.

He believed that in naming things we

redefine them and transform them into extensions of our
consciousness, destroying their essential identity in the
process and producing linguistic doubles. These doubles not
only rival their maker, as I indicated earlier, but they
take on a life of their own in the minds of the reading
audience as well as in the mind of the narrating subject
himself.
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In attempting to restore Adams to the historical
framework whose existence he denied and yet saw affirmed in
the canon of his own work, we may find a map for reading the
later works of Henry Adams— which are creations fraught with
the disease of historical self-consciousness— as well as a
model for reading the earlier histories, essays and
biographies which, with his two novels, make up a
significant body of material. The later Adams, as I have
suggested, was primarily interested in the residual power of
language in a subjectively conceived world made up of
nameless, faceless forces.

In his belief that he was living

in an age which would chronicle the dissolution of the
autonomous self as an adequate narrating principle, Adams
prefigures Theodor Adorno. Adorno believed that the rise of
the bourgeois individual in the Renaissance is also the
moment that marks its gradual erosion and prefigures its
eventual annihilation. As Adorno points out in Minima
Moralia. "the self, its guiding idea, and its a priori
object has always, under its own scrutiny, been
rendered. . .nonexistent.1,25

At the point where the principle

of human domination becomes absolute, the self as a knowable
entity begins to disintegrate.

As we have seen, Adams

himself expressed similar sentiments more poetically in his
annotations to William James and Henry Maudsley, as well as
in his letters.

Our study, however, begins at a point in Adams's career
long before Adams's reading of James and Maudsley.

Adams

began to muse on the possibility of writing history in

the

Berlin of the 1850s. We will begin with Adams's early essays
and his attempts to rectify the chronicle of history. Adams
seems to have shared in the Enlightenment vision of a
unified language and in the faith in scientific history as
it was understood by Gibbon. In this light, we will examine
the biographies of John Randolph and Albert Gallatin which,
in a Montaignesque stance, Adams later regarded as
experiments with his own being.

Adams's primary attempt to

write scientific history, however,

is his History of the

Madison and Jefferson Administrations, and we will examine
the assumptions about the recuperable capacities of language
in these volumes, while at the same time noting that it is
during the production of this multi-volume study which is so
much an expression of the aims of the Enlightenment project
that Adams's theories of biography as murder and
autobiography as suicide and his lingering sense of "nausea"
at the panorama of history seem to have emerged.
When Adams first began to think about writing history
in the late 1850s, self and destiny seemed solid, if dual,
and the imitation of Gibbon and filial piety seemed
sufficient to determine his own choice of life. He went on
to write essays which justified John Quincy Adams's choices
and which seemed to rectify the chronicle of history so that

it reflected the complexity of the earlier Adams's choices
more accurately. His sense of the mission of the historian
may already have been ironic, but he still believed in the
possibility of conjuring meaning from and for the past
through language. The chronicle of history seems to have
been as rock-like in those early days as the certainty of a
self that seemed substantive. All the promises of
Enlightenment conceptions of historiography seemed to lie
before him, if not in the realm conjured by the five senses,
then in some realm conjured by the world picture replicated
by scientific historians.
The chronicle of history was not enough for Henry Adams
by the time he finished his biography of John Randolph in
the 1870s.

It was at that time that he seems to have begun

to think of the writing of history and biography as
necessarily autobiographical and solipsistic. Adams's doubts
about the possibilities of language and the fragmentation of
the perceiving subject are first apparent in his account of
the history of the life of the Queen of Tahiti, who, in
fact, gave him a Tahitian name and whose identity he shares
in the volume that bears her name and his own.

The new

vision of language emerges full-blown, however, only in the
self-deconstructing sentences of Mt. St. Michel and Chartres
and in the two prefaces to The Education of Henrv Adams. As
I have noted earlier, Adams's vision of a subjectively
generated "order running through chaos" came to him as a
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vision of history. In Chicago for the Exposition of 1893,
Adams claimed that he had been forced into an awareness that
the old vision of a scientifically created history was an
illusion.
Here was a breach of continuity
a
rupture in historical sequence.
Was it
real, or only apparent? One's personal
universe hung on the answer, for if the
rupture was real and the new American
world could take this sharp and
conscious twist toward ideals, one's
personal friends could come in at last
as winners in the great American
Chariot race for fame.
(Education.

1032)

Like so many sentences in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and
The Education

the faulty logic of the sequence suggests a

profoundly ironic stance which reflects Adams's belief that
historical sequence was an illusion.

While it is true that

a breach in historical continuity has profound implications
for one's personal universe, such a breach does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that one's friends will
become winners in the race for fame.

Fame is a value

associated with the old world, where sequence mattered, and
where one's identity was rock-hard and substantive like the
concepts of God and world which coexist with the idea of
identity. And that vision is precisely what Adams had seen
in symbolic splinters on the shores of Lake Michigan. The
kingdom of force and sense confronted the old kingdom of
myth, and Adams found that his education had not prepared
him to confront what for him was chaos. He writes that he

had never encountered anything like this at Harvard. He
hardly means that Harvard in particular was inadequate, but
that the western intellectual tradition and the pedagogical
methods that had reinforced it were inadequate for dealing
with that vast and alien mystery that was and is the world
of sense.

The world of sense for Adams confronted the world

engineered by what Deleuze calls "state philosophy"— that
mode of representational thinking which depends on the power
of reason and the analogies that reason constructs between
the corresponding realms of the subject, the concepts it
creates, and the objects in the world to which the concepts
are applied.26
Of the Education's two prefaces, one was attributed to
Henry Cabot Lodge and one to Adams himself. The preface
which he chose to attribute to Henry Cabot Lodge, describes
the volume as a sequel to Adams's attempt to "measure" "man
as a force" from 1150-1250. The movement, he has Lodge say,
was to be studied as a problem in philosophy and mechanics.
Lodge explains that Adams intended to "complete St.
Augustine's Confessions.11 and at the same time explore his
"favorite theory of history." The exploration of theory
continued

in his "Letter to American Teachers of History"

(1910) and in his essay "The Rule of Phase Applied to
History." And, in a manner of speaking, Adams did fulfill
his ambition of completing Augustine's Confessions. The
Education, as "Lodge" notes moves toward dissolution and
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fragmentation— the hallmarks of modernity. The Confessions
move toward the stillness of the unity Adams sought but
disbelieved.
In the preface to the Education that he claimed as his
own, Adams proposes to provide a guide to replace the last
valuable one he knew— Rousseau's Confessions. which he
called a "monument against ego."

Since Rousseau, and partly

thanks to Rousseau,that "very great educator in the manner
of the eighteenth century," Adams says, the ego has
"steadily tended to efface itself," so that it is in Adams's
own time a "manikin" upon which the "the toilet of education
is to be draped to show the fit or misfit of the clothes."
The garments are the object of study, he says, and the
tailor must adapt the manikin to his patron's wants. His aim
as tailor, Adams says, is to "fit young men in Universities
or elsewhere to be men of the world, equipped for any
emergency." At the same time, he seeks to reveal "the faults
of the patchwork fitted on their fathers."
The young man is not an "ego" at all in the last
paragraphs of this Preface.

He is rather a "form of

energy," and then a nameless construction, a "geometrical
figure of three or more dimensions" which can be used as a
"measure of motion, of proportion, of human condition."
While it must have an "air of reality" and be "taken for
real," it is nevertheless an artificial construct.
must be "treated as though it had life," and

While it

while it
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"perhaps” had life, it is nevertheless only an arbitrary
creation, a designated point in space.
Adams makes his point about the artificiality of his
creation by giving the manikin in question— -Henry Adams— a
new birthday, February 16, 1907. Adams's
February 16, 1838.

own birthday was

The date of the preface coincides with

the private distribution of the Education. and suggests a
new birth— this time for the linguistic double that is an
embattled Adornian self under scrutiny, receding and
diminishing with every word.

Ironically, everyone,

including his brother Brooks, called the book a species of
memoir or autobiography.

A new Adams is born in the

narration of the fate of the point of force otherwise
identified only as a nameless manikin.

That the name Adams

gives it is "Henry Adams" is an arbitrary choice, and, from
his point of view, Henry Cabot Lodge was as accurate a name
for the writer of the first preface as Henry Adams.

After

all, after reading Henry James's biography of William Story,
Adams wrote James that his was not the life of Story at all,
but "your own and mine— pure autobiography."

Adams's

straightforwardly held idea that the Bostonians of his day,
including Henry James, were "but one mind and Nature" and
that "the individual was a facet" of Boston anticipate his
adoption of the view of experience and language that mark
him as a Marxist, and paradoxically as a post-modernist, for
Adams like the Marxist accepts the concept of alienation.
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Adams transcends it, however,

in his total acceptance of the

fragmentary nature of experience and the necessity of
escaping the ideological construct of identity. In this he
is closest to Louis Althusser and his notion of the
interpellated subject which is created by its ideology at
the same time that it substantiates ideology. Adams realized
in the 1890's that he was essentially a Marxist, and his
late work is postmodern in both its rejection of the idea of
the subject as a naturally occurring entity and in his
desire to embrace what we now call a philosophy of
difference.

The final chapter of

this meditation will thus

be an exploration and definition of postmodernism and
Adams's place with a line of thinkers from Nietzsche to
Adorno, Althusser, and Deleuze.
Sometime during the 188 0s Adams came to believe that
the history of the future would be autobiographical because
we are prisoners of our perceptions. He also believed that
he could trace the intellectual progress of modernity from
the eighteenth century to the twentieth by writing his own
history and charting his own motion.

Beginning with Adams's

early essays and proceeding through a study of his
biographies of John Randolph and Albert Gallatin and his
history of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations we will
examine Adams's justifiable claim that he had begun as the
quintessential historiographer of the Enlightenment.
Proceeding to a study of Adams's letters from the mid-1880s,

we will chart his growing sense that he was to embody not
the success but the failure of the Enlightenment project.
The latter part of our study will deal with Adams's quest
for an historical theory that could act as an adequate
descriptor for the new world that was being represented
through new theories in physics and mathematics. Adams
believed that he had found such a theory in Marxism, but,
like the post-modern theorists of our time, he also believed
that Marx's theories must continually be rethought and
rewritten. Thus the end of our study points, as Adams
believed his life had, to a time seventy years after Adams's
death, just as its beginning is situated a century or two
centuries or even six centuries before his birth.
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CHAPTER 2

ADAMS A N D THE PROJECT OP M O D E R N I T Y

Say it to Father will you I will am my
fathers Progenitive I invented him
created I him. Say it to him it will not
be for he will say I was not and then
you and I since philoprogenitive1...
Faulkner, The Sound and the
Fury
...his very body was an empty hall
echoing with sonorous, defeated names;
he was not a being, an entity, he was a
commonwealth. He was a barracks filled
with stubborn back-looking ghosts still
recovering...from the fever which had
cured the disease... looking with
stubborn recalcitrance backward beyond
the fever and into the disease with
actual regret, weak from the fever yet
free of the disease and not even aware
that the freedom was that of impotence.2
Faulkner, Absalom. Absalom!
While Henry Adams may have ended his life sharing and
echoing Marx's sense that in the age of modernity
"everything solid melts into air," and believing that all
subjects are entities constituted within ideological
matrices, he began his study of history by embracing many of
the aims of other Enlightenment historians.3

Even the most

radical theories that he developed after 1894 reflect a
continuing desire to perfect a science of history which
would, with the other emerging sciences of man, form a
modern summa theoloqica— albeit in an ironic mode.

Adams

saw history as a form of narrative that was intimately
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related to the art of biography.

The lives of the powerful

individuals who had shaped history could be used as icons of
the past and help to
coherence.

reveal history's

essential, organic

The order thus revealed in history confirmed the

essential order in the mind of God, an order that for
Adams's self-proclaimed model, Augustine, had been available
to man through the agency of the Logos. For Augustine, the
articulation of words places us in direct communion with the
divine.4 For later thinkers,

less certain than Augustine

that words offered a sort of expressway to the mind of God,
the scripture of nature offered more tangible images of
order. In Adams's own time, in an age that found itself
increasingly alienated from the world of natural process and
language alike, man could sense the immanence of a
transcendent order in human experience only through the
mediation of the text produced by historians, who had
replaced the idea of the poet as vates. or mythic seer, in
the iconography of modernity. Thomas Carlyle, a primary
exponent of the idea of history as the sum of lives of great
individuals once described history as a sort of revered and
ubiquitous presence which was, like God, available to man in
all times and places.

The historian was a sort of

secularized priest, who afforded man access to this modernday divinity. Adams initially admired Carlyle's work, but by
1882, in the midst of the five-year period during which he
produced three biographies of his own, he wrote William

James that he had little patience with "hero worship like
Carlyle's"

(Letters. II, 466).

Adams's reasoning was that

heroes "neutralysed" each other in history.

While thought—

and hence the good of society— was advanced by only a very
few thinkers, their sole contribution was to "drag us up the
cork-screw stair of thought" to no avail.
...you could doubtless at any time stop
the entire progress of human thought by
killing a few score of men...What then?
They drag us up the cork-screw stair of
thought, but they can no more get their
brains to run out of their especial
convolutions than a railway train (with
a free will of half an inch on three
thousand miles) can run free up Mount
Shasta. Not one of them has ever got so
far as to tell us a single vital fact
worth knowing. We can't prove even that
we are.
(Letters, II, 466)
The process of writing biography seems to have
suggested the idea that Adams was to articulate twenty years
later in The Education— that all great thinkers were doomed
to be devoured by

subjectivity in a "sea of introspection."

When Adams set out to rewrite Sartor Resartus in his
Education.

he intended to demonstrate that perhaps the

point of education was not the revelation of self and its
possibilities at all. The cloak of education, which for
Adams came to mean something like the cloak of ideology, is
the only self there is in The Education.5

Nevertheless, in

1911, when he was acknowledging that his "sense of a crushed
humanity" had dominated everything he had written, Adams

still yearned toward the achievements of "Herakles, who was
quite another person." Adams was referring to the literary
"Herakles"

created by George Cabot Lodge.

Adams's last

work, written on the heels of his most depersonalized
theories of history was a biography intended to memorialize
Lodge, whose early death had profoundly saddened him.
Significantly, The Life of George Cabot Lodge(1911) was not
a biography of a statesman at all, but a portrait of the
artist. Thus, while Adams never entirely lost the sense he
shared with Carlyle of the power that accompanies the
historian's involvement in the creation of an authorized
version of the collective human past in history, and the
individual past in biography he did shift his focus from
history to art. He also never ceased to see himself as both
product of and participant in the enlightenment project,
though he believed he was presiding over its endpoint and
transfiguration. In December,

1884, in the middle of his

production of "two heavy volumes" of his History. Adams
wrote Francis Parkman that

the more he wrote the more

certain he was that the old models of history needed to be
exchanged for newer ones.
The more I write, the more confident I
feel that before long a new school of
history will rise which will leave us
antiquated. Democracy is the only
subject for scientific history. I am
satisfied that the purely mechanical
development of the human mind in society
must appear in a great democracy so
clearly, for want of disturbing
elements, that in another generation
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psychology, physiology, and history,
will join in proving man to have as
fixed and necessary development as that
of a tree; and almost as unconscious.
(Letters. II,

563)

Only Adams's faith in the principle of identity and its
reflection in the idea of biography and history had been
shaken; he continued to embrace the aims of the Enlighteners
and to believe that a mechanical science of man was
possible.

Though he continued to see himself as an

Enlightenment historian, he was

self-conscious very early

about the limits of history and biography in ways that
Carlyle and other nineteenth-century historians were not.
For Adams, history was not merely the record of either
a cyclic or a developmental process. Neither was it simply
an icon of progress. For Adams history was an emblem of
continuity in which the historian assumed a kind of
impersonal power over the chaos of the past and transformed
it through narrative into history.

Adams believed that the

historian could construct patterns from the fragments of the
human past, and thus provide his readers and himself with an
anchor in history. History in this view is entirely
subjectified. For Adams, as for Nietzsche and others, the
subjectification of history involved what Lewis Simpson
calls "the climactic stage of mind's willful transference of
nature, man, and society— and eventually of God, and finally
of mind itself— into itself."6

Adams was one of the first
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historians to realize that modern historiography had usurped
the god-like role of

universal storyteller and mythmaker,

and that this revolution founded on words and textual study
had been implicit in nominalism and its stepchild, the
Reformation. Underlying and informing Adams's quest for an
appropriate mode of historiography in the age of modernity
was his complicated response to his family's history and the
intricacies of their relationship to the American past and
their demands that their descendants continue and complete
their projects.
process by

The convoluted and often paradoxical

which he came to understand that his own work

was not and could not be

either "objective"

or scientific

history as prescribed by the purer versions of the
Enlightenment formula but was more nearly biography shading
off into autobiography— and therefore, of necessity
subjective and fictional— is the subject of this chapter.
•k k k k k k k

The historian's capacity for endowing history with a
shape and a meaning that had previously been the province of
God was

especially apparent for Adams in biography.

Biography, that peculiar genre in which the biographical
subject and biographer merge in a fictional— and, for Adams,
an increasingly

troubling— union affords a transformed

meaning and an altered shape for both the biographer and the
biographical subject.

Biography in the Enlightenment

formula served as a replacement for the frayed idea that God
had given man a substantive self and a place in the
providential order that his destiny on earth would reveal.
Adams increasingly came to feel that in biography he was
shaping the eguivalent of Dr. Frankenstein's creature from
the lifeless artifacts of his subjects' lives.

He believed

that his subjects took on an unnatural existence as
distorted doubles of himself and themselves.

Even in his

first effort at biography, where he had vowed to let his
subject Albert Gallatin speak for himself, Adams realized
that a kind of alchemy was taking place as he wrote. When
Gallatin's daughter, Frances Stevens, was

killed in an

accident just as Adams was completing the

biography of her

father. Adams sent her brother, who had commissioned the
project, several chapters, remarking that he was as shocked
at Mrs. Stevens's death as "though I had known her from
birth." He had given a public existence in print

to a much

older woman whom he had never known.
The biographer is curiously situated,
for being immersed in the interests of a
past generation, he sees people born, is
a confidant in all the affairs of their
childhood, youth, and middle life, and
gets to entertain a personal regard for
them apart from personal acguaintance.
To me your sister was still the child
whom I am watching with your father and
mother here in Washington nearly eighty
years ago.
(Letters. II, 330)

Adams's present tense— "I am watching"— is characteristic of
his attitude toward his biographical subjects. The reverse
was also true; Adams felt that his identity was altered by
the act of writing biography. He felt that a sort of
unnatural coupling took place between him and his subjects,
leaving both forever altered. Adams's writing of the
Randolph

and Burr biographies seems to have crystallized

his feelings that in biography he was at the very least a
midwife in the process that lent his characters a new life.
Mr. John Randolph is just coming into
the world. Do you know, a book to me
always seems a part of myself, a kind of
intellectual brat or segment, and I
never bring one into the world without a
sense of shame. They are naked,
helpless, and beggarly, yet the poor
wretches must live forever and curse
their father from their silent tomb.
This particular brat is the only one I
ever detested...I know he will live to
dance, in the obituaries, over my cold
grave.
(Letters. II, 475)
The motif of biography and its incarnation of lives in print
as murder and entombment anticipates the radical statement
of 1909, that "in biography we are taking life" (Letters.
VI, p. 227). Adams was beginning to feel that the
biographer's art figured among the black arts of linguistic
sorcery. Letters from the period attest to his combined
revulsion and fascination with the creatures he conjured in
biography. While he is completing his history of Jefferson's
administration, for example, Adams writes that he has "just

finished with T. Jefferson! He has gone off to Monticello
forever, carrying eight years of my life with him."
(Letters, II, 549).

As Adams continued to work with

biography, and as he began the history of Madison and
Jefferson in the mid-1880's, he came to see that biography
involves

what Deleuze calls an "individuation without a

subject."7 To borrow Deleuze's language, Adams came to
regard individuals as "pockets of consciousness and
sensation" that "run over the heath like a line of flight or
a line of deterritorialization.1,8 In biography the author, a
pocket of isolated consciousness, runs over the "line of
deterritorialization" that is the alternative self produced
through the writing of the biographical narrative.

Adams

wrote John Hay in 1882, only half-jokingly, that he had
"invented Jefferson, Gallatin, and Burr"

(Letters. II, 455).

Later that year, after Hay had expressed an interest in
Adams's biography of Burr, Adams wrote him that his "ideal
of authorship would be to have a famous double rAdams's
italics] with another name, to wear what honors I could win"
(Letters. II, 463).

He also remarked that it would be

amusing to publish a "low and shameless essay," complete
with "smutty woodcuts," and attribute both to his double.
When he wrote again and again that his intellectual quest
was a quest for form, Adams meant that he was forever
seeking a temporary shape for his increasingly unbounded
sense of self.

"Form" for Adams means a vehicle in which

mind and consciousness can be expanded. Biography was a
necessary vessel for such endeavor,

but Adams discovered

that it had to be transformed before it could reflect a
conception of identity and a vision of history appropriate
to a world characterized by

multiple and dissonant voices

and a sense of imminent chaos rather than the single voices
of individuation and order that we see in biography and in
the enlightenment models of history. Adams wrote Sir John
Clark in late 1884 that "history and biography end with
1815"

(Letters. II, 560).

Adams's sense of the exhaustion

of the idea of biography came to him while he was writing a
history that he regarded as an extension of the "feelers"
provided by

his own major biographical works. Echoing the

reflections that accompanied his completion of the
biographies of Gallatin, Randolph, and Burr, Adams begins to
doubt the efficacy of writing history even before he began
the massive undertaking that resulted in The History of the
Madison and Jefferson Administrations. As early as 1883,
Adams wrote Samuel Tilden that he was sorry he had decided
to write the history of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, "for
they appear like mere grasshoppers kicking and gesticulating
on the middle of the Mississippi River...They were carried
along on a stream which floated them, after a fashion,
without much regard to themselves."9

Adams's view of the

individual caught in the forces of history reflects more
than his disgust with Jefferson's political machinations.
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He decided that his view of Jefferson was and is the
necessary conclusion that any modern historian must draw
about the role of any individual in history.
This I take to be the result that
students of history generally reach in
regard to modern times. The element of
individuality is the free-will dogma of
the science, if it is a science.
My own
conclusion is that history is simply
social development along the lines of
weakest resistance, and that in most
cases the line of weakest resistance is
found as unconsciously by society as by
water.10
Biography and history can only exist in a world picture
generated by the concept of identity. As the individual's
overburdened consciousness explodes into the world it
perceives, a new model for both the self and history must be
constructed.

History in this sense becomes, paradoxically,

both the climactic point of the triumph of subjectivity and
an emblem of a willed flight from subjectivity. In an
historical reality conceived and rendered in history as
subjectivity, the text of written history becomes the
meeting ground for a community of being which is posited not
on a base of lived experience but on a written document
which is shared by both writer and reader— a Dickinsonian
"letter to the world" writ large. Adams

recognized that the

real task of historians is that of designing the subjective
reconciliations between past, present, and future that
produce the text of history.

Autobiography— the linguistic

sphere of the deterritorialized subject— and biography— the
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sphere of the self as other— blended to produce the form he
finally settled on in the Education. which is a sort of
antithesis of both genres.

After 1894 in his essays and

letters on historiography he also felt that part of the
historian's purpose was

to analyze the text of the history

of historiography as an alternative version of self.
Adams's word for continuity was "Unity.”

If

"multiplicity" was the descriptor of life in the world of
the modern historian, unity was embodied in the lifeworlds
and the historical narratives of the Augustinian vision of
history.

In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams makes it

plain that St. Thomas Aquinas's systematic vision with its
insistence that the world was susceptible to human
understanding had paved the way as early as the thirteenth
century for the individualistic readings of world and self
provided by humanist text criticism.

Indeed, he suggests

that St. Thomas had outlined the path that would lead toward
the Reformation and the emergence of modern science.

The

Enlightenment notion of biography, like St. Thomas's vision
of the natural world, was appropriate to a history that
could be represented in a unified way.

It assumed that

societies and individuals had their origin in the providence
provided by a non-contingent Being, and that their record
would be the organic one of evolution and demise provided by
the predictable patterns of nature and individual existence.
The task of the modern historian for

Adams lay not only in

producing a scientific,

"objective" history that reflected

the altered vision of existence provided by science and
technology, but also in finding a new shape for existence— a
replacement vision of the lost Unity provided by the God of
the Christian Middle Ages. An ancillary role of the
historian in a historiography described in this way is thus
interpreting the changing definitions of what constitutes
the individual and its

world.

If Adams seems to have found

part of his solution for narrating a new vision of unity—
and a replacement for God— in the idea of biography, he
deconstructed the idea of the possibility of both
autobiography and biography in his Education.

The rest he

adapted through a fusion of his vision of the shape of the
American past with Gibbon's

aesthetics of history, and the

methods of Bancroft and Parkman.
Adams's quest for an appropriate form for
historiography was in some ways not only determined but
compromised by his family's place in American history. Adams
felt the presence of the family past, with
of diarists and statesmen as a great weight.

its generations
Like a New

England version of Quentin Compson, Adams seems to have felt
that he was not a being at all, but, in the language of
Absalom. Absalom!.a commonwealth, ringing with sonorous
defeated names.

If it were true, as Adams said, that family

pride and politics were in his blood, then it was also true
that the Adamses had sacrificed at the alter of the

Enlightenment Project and honored the god of Science, and he
felt that he must continue the tradition that they had
begun.

In "The Heritage of Henry Adams," a curious and

lengthy essay that accompanies the posthumous publication of
Henry's last historical essays, his brother Brooks says that
John Quincy Adams was a "scientist of the first force," who
had been "vexed" by the same problems that troubled Henry
and Brooks himself.

In Brooks's opinion,

"science and

education were passions and amounted to a religion" for his
grandfather. The Enlightenment habit of mind that makes
Jefferson allow the Declaration of Independence to consume
the linguistic spaces of his personal memoirs informs "The
Heritage of Henry Adams." Brooks's introduction to his
brother's life begins not with his and Henry's parents or
grandparents, but with the idea of America as an embodiment
of Enlightenment thinking. George Washington's

desire to

devise a "consolidated community" on a scientific model is
the focus of the introductory section of Brooks's essay.
Brooks eulogizes Washington's vision of a scientifically
engineered, urban society focused on a central city which
was to be the point of convergence for a network of highways
and canals. His plans for the national capital included a
national university "which was to serve as the brain of the
corporeal system developed by the highways." The purpose of
the university was to "fix a standard of collective thought"
and "spread systematic ideas through all parts of the rising

empire.”

The "Heritage of Henry Adams" is

a genealogy of

thought, and in it Adams's first ancestor is thus not the
seventeenth-century Henry Adams who left Somersetshire for
the Bay Colony in the 163 0s, but an ancestor in mind— a
fellow traveler in a project which involved the exploration
of the possibilities of mind. In Brooks's view, and perhaps
in his brother's view, Henry Adams's work is a continuation
of the Enlightenment project that his forbears of mind had
begun a century earlier and educated their children to
complete.

The second figure in this genealogy of mind is a

natural ancestor— John Quincy Adams— who, according to
Brooks, expanded upon Washington's plan for a "constructive
centralization,"

with "the expansion due to the operation

on the problem of a profound scientific mind." Brooks
believed that even the most radical of Henry's historical
theories had their origin in the work of their grandfather
and even their great-grandfather, both of whom had believed
that there was a "volume of energy ...stored within the
Union."

John Quincy Adams believed that it washis function

to help

liberate the energy of the "corporeal body" of the

Union through a continuation of the acts

of mind that had

contributed to the invention of America in the first place.
The public lands are the richest
inheritance ever bestowed by a bountiful
Creator upon any national community. All
the mines of gold and silver and
precious stones on the face or in the
bowels of the globe, are in value
compared to them but the dust of the
balance. Ages upon ages of continual
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progressive improvement... were stored
up in the possession and disposal of
these lands...I had long entertained and
cherished the hope...of improving the
condition of man, by establishing the
practical, self-evident truth of the
natural equality and brotherhood of all
mankind as the foundation of all human
government, and by banishing slavery and
war from the earth...
(Degradation. 27-28)
J.Q. Adams saw his plans for an enlightened society wither
under the blight of slavery and through "the total
abandonment by President Jackson, of all internal
improvement by the authority of Congress." The tragedy of
the Adamses entwined with the failure of the Enlightenment.
If the

Enlightenment wrecked on the extreme idealism of

belief

in education, the Adamses' political fortunes wrecked

on the rock of the

its

property interest of slaveholders and

Jackson's "land-j obbers."
The enlightenment project for the Adamses was not
merely the eighteenth-century's enlightenment. For them, as
Brooks and Henry Adams were aware, it began with the
Reformation, and continued the reformers' faith in the
possibility of making what Steven Ozment calls "radical
intellectual enlightenment" available to all.11
to Brooks Adams, Henry

According

had planned a large project in the

intellectual history of the Reformation which would have
afforded him an historical anchor akin to the one provided
by Mt. St. Michel and Chartres.12

The source of the

fascination with the Reformation is obvious; part of its aim

was to enable the individual believer to participate in a
transformed world through education. Erasmus, in whom the
educational and the religious aims of the Reformation are
most clearly fused, realized, as Lisa Jardine has recently
shown, that the technology of mass print culture would
enable all believers to come to his own recognition that
Christ was available to us through speech. Texts and the
reading of texts in this view becomes the means through
which Christ penetrates to the hearts and minds of
believers.13 However, while the Adamses failed for some of
the same reasons that Erasmus and Luther and Calvin did,
they did not lose their faith in the divine origins of their
mission until Henry Adams examined them from the vantage
point of the twentieth century. For John and John Quincy
Adams, the "ultimate extinguishment of slavery" was the
"great transcendent earthly object of the mission of the
Redeemer."

More startlingly, for John Quincy Adams, "the

Declaration of Independence was a leading event in the
progress of gospel dispensation.

Because he failed to

persuade his fellow countrymen that the way of the future
lay beyond private interest, he was possessed of a profound
sense that his life had been a sort of passion play,
complete with a crucifixion and the hope of a resurrection
in history.
John Quincy Adams's martyrdom took place on yet another
level, one that is inextricable from his political

martyrdom. He was devoted to the cause of science, and
produced a report of weights and measures for the Senate in
1821 that made John Adams write him that

the report was

such a "mass of historical, philosophical, chemical,
metaphysical and political knowledge" that "no industry in
this country but yours could have collected [it] in so
little time."

His real passion, however was astronomy.

To me, the observation of the sun, moon,
and stars has been for a great portion
of my life a pleasure of gratified
curiosity, of ever returning wonder, and
of reverence for the Creator and mover
of these unnumbered worlds. There is
something of awful enjoyment in
observing the rising and setting of the
sun. That flashing beam of his first
appearance upon the horizon; that
sinking of his last ray beneath it; that
perpetual revolution of the Great and
Little Bear round the pole...There is,
indeed, intermingled with all this a
painful desire to know more of this
stupendous system; of sorrow in
reflecting how little we can ever know;
and of almost desponding hope that we
may know more of it hereafter...
(Degradation. 60)
Adams was mortified that there was no observatory in America
and that American sailors were still dependent on
observations taken at Greenwich.

For him, this was the

eguivalent of a lingering intellectual subservience to
England. When Cincinnati decided to build an observatory and
asked him to offer an oration at the laying of the
cornerstone, he risked his life to attend in 1843.
My task is to turn this transient gust
of enthusiasm for the science of

instrumental in elevating the character
and improving the condition of man...
(Degradation. 66-67)
The trip was a disaster, complete with snow, trains frozen
to the rails, and

Adams's own worsening sore throat and

fever. He delivered his address long after the appointed
time, and, as Brooks notes, "frankly admitted to himself
that, in substance, he had committed suicide for the sake of
science."

His wife wrote that he had "returned in a state

of debility and exhaustion beyond description."

He did not

die in 1843, but three years later having noted in his diary
that "some discouragement of soul" accompanied his belief
that his desire to "live in the memory of after-ages as a
benefactor of my country and of mankind" had not, in his
opinion,

"received the sanction of my maker."

The elder Adams's project lay unfinished.

He had

"labored all his life to bring the democratic principle of
equality into such a relation with science and education"
that it would become an "efficient instrument"
governance.

for

His projects were continued and immortalized in

the efforts of his grandson Henry with some irony.
Mr. Adams always adored order and
loathed chaos. Yet he died for
astronomy, the science of chaos. Such is
human effort and prescience.
(Degradation. 122)
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His grandson's work, in his own and in his brother Brooks's
view, would focus not on envisioning a world order, but on
the emerging science of chaos.
In his biography of Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's
Secretary of the Treasury, which was written in the late
1870s, Henry Adams first displays his tendency to allegorize
the history of his own nation and his own family through
narrating the history of other nations and other families
and individuals.

Anyone who knows the history of the

American Adamses is struck by the similarity between Henry
Adams's representation

of the Gallatins and the

representation of his own family that develops in his
letters, essays, and other projects— his New England
Federalism, for example-— from 1858 until about 1890. Adams's
sense of the entwined destinies of the Adamses and America
had its origins in family mythology, but

is mirrored in

virtually every narrative history of the U.S.

To read the

history of the United States from at least the 1770s to the
1820s is to realize that the history of the Adamses was in
miniature a history of the ideological bedrock that
sustained the formation and molding of the American
experiment in republican government. The Adamses were rich
in the virtues that Adams ascribes to Geneva aristocracy in
the biography of Gallatin, and they, like the Gallatins,
were steeped in something akin to Calvinistic doctrine.
Self-designated as the "Gibbon of his generation," Adams set

out to write the tragedy of the inevitable decline of the
United States after it failed to adhere to the policies of
the Federalist Adamses and failed to choose Adamses for
leaders.

Brooks Adams thus writes accurately that the

history of the Adams family was a sort of typology of the
history of America for his brother. By extension, the
history of America was also a landscape of the self.

Adams

believed that America's quest for national identity could
best be studied through the fortunes of the Adamses, and the
first forty years of his career as an historian were spent
in carefully studying and correcting the chronicle of his
family's history. Though there is filial piety in his
experiments with his family's history, there is also the
origin of the

pattern of Adam's quest for

a

deterritorialized self, an unfettered sense of identity,
that emerges fully formed

in the Education and "Rule of

Phase" essay.
Beginning with his early essays for The North American
Review. Adams traces what he believes to have been America's
tragic destiny, foretold by the drama enacted by his
Federalist forebears and their foes. For Adams, the dramatis
personae were particularized in the personalities of John
and John Quincy Adams, on the one hand, and anti-Federalist
figures from the American South whom Adams chose to
represent in the shape of John Randolph on the other.
long before he formally undertook the writing of

Thus,

biographies, much less of an actual history, Adams was
covertly writing a genetically altered species of biography
and autobiography in his early historical essays and more
limited efforts at historiography such as the editing of the
documents that make up the volume he called New England
Federalism.

At the time, however, he was committed to the

idea that he was using the scientific and objective forms
appropriate to Enlightenment historians.
Adams was quite serious about the matter of family and
rather Calvinistic himself about determining his vocation.
Possessed of what he called a mens conscia recti
I, 18),

(Letters,

Adams was determined to take his place in the

family gallery, but

at the same time he felt the weight of

his family and the demands of life in Boston, where, as he
notes in the opening chapters of his Education— which was
written a half century later— he felt himself surrounded by
the visible monuments to the Adamses and their history in a
thoroughly ominous way.

Letters written to his older

brother Charles from Europe beginning

in November,

when Adams was only twenty, suggest both

1858,

his subtle sense

of conflict between private ambition and his yearning

to

make himself worthy of the legacy of earlier Adamses that
dominates Brooks's "The Heritage of Henry Adams" which was
written in 1919.

There is a typology of place apparent in

the letters that recurs later in both the Randolph biography
and, much later, in the Education.

Italy, like the American
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South, is for him the realm of art and nature. Adams's
letters from his trip to Italy focus on events like his
visits to William Story's studio and his intoxication with
the art world and the artifacts that were all around him.
Germany, like New England, was school and duty. The life of
the passions, which must be subjugated to the life of mind,
confronts the realm of public obligation.

In the geography

of Adams's childhood, Quincy confronted State Street. In the
geography of his histories and biographies, New England
winter confronted the Maryland spring.
Adams's first collected letters date from his stay in
Berlin, where he had gone after graduation from Harvard to
read law and study German, French, and Latin.

Having

persuaded his father to allow him to take the rather daring
step of studying in Berlin, and finding himself in a city
where he

was "surrounded by Art"

(Letters. I, 3), Adams

seems to have become aware for the first time that being an
Adams was something of a burden.

He wrote his brother

Charles that Charles's letter of Thanksgiving Day, 1858, had
left him feeling a profound sense of relief at being out of
Boston.
Your letter dated Thanksgiving day
arrived yesterday and I give you my word
that though I have been having a
delightful time here
...still I have
never felt quite so glad at being out of
Boston as I felt after reading that
epistle.
There was in it a sort of
contented despair, an unfathomable depth
of quiet misery that gave me a placid
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feeling of thankfulness at being where I
am.
(Letters. I, 6)
Nevertheless, and this is yet another of the paradoxes that
mark Adams's personal history, he was already engaged in
self-consciously defining himself through
imitation of

a mannered

the actions of the models provided by his

antecedents. In particular, he imitated John Quincy Adams,
whom he was alternately to vilify and idealize over the next
sixty years. Temporarily free of what he seems already to
have viewed as the suffocating atmosphere of Boston and the
political enterprises of his omnipresent ancestors and the
sense of his duty to them, Adams gleefully orders a
"quantity of clothes," including a "miracle" of a greatcoat
of "peculiar beaver-cloth," with a thick fur lining
(Letters, I, 2-3). He also engages in epistolary rhapsody
over the availability of "Museums, picture Galleries,
Theatres, Gardens."

There is an echo in these early

letters, no doubt already self-conscious, of the moral
conflict in John Quincy Adams's diaries over the guilty but
absolute pleasure that he took in the plays and the opera in
Paris of fifty years before. Though the theater is somewhat
disappointing to the younger Adams, he does

go "a good deal

to the Opera House," which he describes as "glorious" with
its "orchestra, scenery and the ballet."

(Letters. I, 8).

Still, the opera which he admires so intensely is gravely
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described as "a great temptation"

(Letters, I, 19).

Amid

his delight in an extravagance no doubt born of a new sense
of the freedom that accompanied his personal anonymity and
the excitement of Berlin, he finds, as he grandfather had,
that the "tone" in Europe is "low, selfish, and irreligious"
compelling him to "a love for what is pure and good"
(Letters, 1,10).
In the same letters that detail his qualified delight
in his pleasures, Adams agonizes over his plan for life:
"Can I have enough time to do all this, or ought I to resign
the Law and devote myself to Latin? ” Initially, he seems to
have planned to study law for two years in Berlin and two
years in

Boston. He proposes to "emigrate" and "practice at

Saint Louis" when he completes his self-prescribed course of
study. Already, however, in November of 1858, when any plans
for his future were necessarily embryonic, Adams fears
failure.
I have a theory that an educated and
reasonably able man can make his mark if
he chooses, and if I fail to make mine,
why, then— I fail and that's all...But
if I know myself, I can't fail.
(Letters. I, 5)
Adams's oft-stated fears of failure, which persisted
throughout his writing career, seem really to have been
another way of saying that he feared he would fail in the
public sphere and hence fail to acquit himself with his
family. Always, in the midst of plans for a future lived out

of politics and away from Boston and his family, Adams's
sense of his family intrudes. In response to one of his
brother's letters

Adams writes that "to be a lawyer I must

cease to be what I am" (Letters I, 22) .

St. Louis and

Adams's tentative plans for the future dim and recede as
Adams recalls the advice of Richard Henry Dana, who had
treated his plans for Europe and life in St. Louis with
contempt.

Dana had "insisted" that Adams was already

looking toward politics, and Adams ruefully admits to his
brother that politics are probably an inevitable part of his
life.
There are two things that seem to be at
the bottom of our constitutions; one is
a continual tendency toward politics;
the other is family pride, and it is
strange how these two feelings run
through all of us.
(Letters. I, 5)
As Adams ponders his destiny, the tone of his letters always
shifts sharply when he invokes the specter of his family. He
believed that he had very few choices.
Here in Europe, away from home, from
care and ambition and the fretting of
monotony, I must say that I often feel
as I often used to at college, as if the
whole thing didn't pay, and if I were my
own master, it would need more
inducements than the law could offer, to
drag me out of Europe these ten years
yet. I always had an inclination for the
Epicurean philosophy, and here in Europe
I might gratify it until I was gorged.
(Letters. I, 5)

The qualifier here is Adams's "if I were my own master." He
plainly believes that he is not his own master, and that his
family

is.

The results for him are that he must "work,

work, work," whether he seeks his fortune in St. Louis or
not.

The ideal life that he envisions for himself has

little to do with the path of duty.
wonders if

For his part, Henry

he will not derive the "most pleasure and

...advantage from what never entered into my calculations:
art"

(Letters, I, 5).
Give me my thousand a year and free
leave and a good conscience, and I'd
pass as happy a life here as I'm afraid
I never shall in St. Louis.
(Letters, I, 5)

Adams fails to find his "free leave," however.

Art does not

seem to have been any more acceptable a vision of
Adams's sense of his destiny

Henry

than it was for his

grandfather John Quincy Adams.

Within six weeks he is

musing on his destiny again.
But how of greater literary works?
Could I write a history, do you think,
or a novel, or anything that would be
likely to make it worthwhile for me to
try?... it seems probable that the duty
of editing our grandfather's works and
writing his life may fall on one of us,
and if it does, that alone is enough for
a man, and enough to shape his whole
course...
(Letters, 1/ 15)
Henry's sense of his duty to his family is mirrored and
underscored by his brother's exhortations. Henry's own

letters suggest that Charles Francis admonished Henry to
"combine in [himself] the qualities of Seward, Greely, (sic.)
and Everett"

(Letters, I, 20) Henry is to engage himself in

"teaching the people and becoming a light to the nations"
(Letters, I, 24).

Henry says that he and Charles are a

"modern Romulus and Remus, only omitting their murderous
propensities"

(Letters, I, 23). Henry

is to don the "mantle

of Cicero" and continue the Adams's tradition of selfsacrifice and public service. One of the peculiarities of
Adams's sense of himself and his destiny which appears even
as he is drafting his first letters to his older brother is
his tendency to find his reality in mirrors provided by
literary or historical doubles. The first of his literary
and historiographic models was Gibbon. Charles Francis had
recommended that Henry read Gibbon, and

not long after he

received his brother's letter, Henry is writing that he has
been trying to find copies of Gibbon.

By May 9, 1860, Henry

was reading Gibbon's Autobiography and writing Charles
Francis that his reading had prompted him to recognize that
his earlier quandary about the law or literature might have
been misplaced.
...our house needs a historian in this
generation and I feel strongly tempted
by the quiet and sunny prospect...What
do you think? Law and literature.
(Letters. I, 149)
On July 9, 1860, Henry wrote Charles Francis from Paris that
he was working from ten to four every day, "la plupart du
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temps en suivant le plan de Gibbon que tu te souviendras
d 'avoir lu dans sa biographie."
Adams thus found a resolution in the ’’quiet and sunny
prospect" of writing history.

The tension between private

inclination and public responsibility, between the pursuit
of art and the defense of and continuation of a tradition of
family greatness thus emerges early. Adams's fascination
with Gibbon, however, was to continue throughout his career.
His claim that the Education and the "Rule of Phase" were
diversions and toys echoes his master Gibbon's claim that
the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was a diversion
designed for his amusement. Adams's

vision of history and

historiography entwines with his vision of New England and
the South.

Both are intimately connected to his belief that

he was an eighteenth-century man, and that he had inherited
the values of a family drenched in the dogma of
enlightenment and enlightenment conceptions of society and
its institutions. Adams's early conception of history is
closely connected to enlightenment ideas of history.
Adams, history rests on a theory of education.
You come down, in your political
philosophy, to the principle of
education; from different grounds I did
the same here some time ago. It's the
main idea of all progressists; it's what
gives New England its moral power;
Horace Mann lived in this idea, and died
in it. Goethe always said that his task
was to educate his countrymen, and that
all the Constitutions in the world
wouldn't help, if the people weren't
raised, and he and Schiller did more for

For
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it than anyone else. Our people are
educated enough intellectually, but it's
superficial and only makes them more
willful; our task insofar as we attempt
a public work is to blow up sophistry
and jam down hard on morality...
(Letters. I,

105-106)

As his correspondence with his brother Charles confirms from
1858-1860, Adams seems to have believed that America was to
be a new Rome.

The mission of the Enlightenment historian,

for him, was to provide America with the modern equivalent
of a religious vocation— a sense of political destiny.
Adams's sense that American history, statesmen, and
statecraft were necessarily tragic seems to have been
present in embryonic form from the beginning. As a model of
style,

Adams adopted the ironic mode that was

characteristically Gibbon's.
he was disposed to believe,

At the beginning of his career
in the not-altogether-odd

company of Thomas Arnold, that history, "read aright, is a
mirror to reflect the true character of existing
parties...and gives us this true mirror when we have learned
to separate what is accidental and particular from what is
essential and universal."14

Adams's early essays reflect

what Hayden White calls the nineteenth-century's "rage for
realistic apprehension of the world." This tendency
manifests itself in a confirmation of the Enlightenment
doctrine of progress at the same time that it offered a
critique and a revision of this view. As White also notes,

however, an understanding of the nineteenth-century's
passion for the real carries with it the necessity of
considering the vast realm of experience that they dismissed
as "unreal." The primary tendency of the Enlightenment
philosophy of history was its faith in progress and reason.
For the Enlightenment historian, the project of history was
rather like the progress of the human being toward
individuation.

The origins of society lie in a primitive

state where man is enfolded by and at the mercy of nature.
History is the record of the triumph of rationality at the
expense of the dimension of the natural.

Beneath

the

Enlightenment critique of history, then, is the bedrock of
the principle of reason, and its corollary, the principle of
identity.

By the end of the eighteenth century,

Adams's

model Gibbon as well as de Tocqueville and Burckhardt, not
to mention the philosophers Hume and Kant, feared that

a

proper justification for the belief in progress, at least,
had not yet been articulated.

Enlightenment thinkers like

Voltaire had operated under the assumption that history as
the record of man's progress toward enlightenment would
emerge as long as the proper historical methodology was
used.

For Voltaire, that meant separating the particular

from the general, the private man and his incidental
passions from his service in the public sphere.

As Voltaire

notes in his definition of "figurative language" in the
Philosophical Dictionary [Works, IX, 64) "ardent

imagination, passion, desire...produce the figurative
style."

Voltaire goes on to say that the historian is not

to "admit it [the figurative style] into history, for too
many metaphors are hurtful...to truth...by saying more or
less than the thing itself."15 Voltaire and his fellow
apostles of enlightenment thus failed to realize something
that Henry Adams saw clearly, though the idea remained
substantially absent from his published works— the idea that
historical truth could come from outside the chronicles of
public service that comprise the documents of political
history.

Adams does, however, share with the Enlightenment

historians the belief not so much in progress as in
continuity, and his version of the mythos of rationalism is
akin to Vico's; that is, Adams, initially at least, believed
that there was a reasonable pattern in even the most
irrational outpourings of the human mind as manifested in
historical event as man asserted himself against nature in
the unfolding narrative of human history. Adams's quest for
a new focus of unity is tempered by the Viconian recognition
that the province of history is the

realm of states and

laws and the narrative of human accomplishment, passion, and
failure.

Vico believed that, unlike nature, the realm

created by God and hence inaccessible to the historian, the
human experience was comprehensible for humans because
humans experience the world in universal ways.

He did not

believe that there was anything universal or stable in human
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nature itself. Instead, Vico, and Adams long after him,
believed that human nature was a phenomenon that was
transformed through the experience of the multiple realms of
discourse that we call by the singular name of history.
Adams's way of separating the life of the emotions and
of figurative language from the life of reason in his own
historical endeavors involved assigning the passions to the
American South and to southerners like John Randolph or,
later,

Andrew Jackson.

The life of reason was left to New

Englanders like John Adams.

Hamilton is dismissed as an

opportunist and an upstart; Jefferson is portrayed as a
moral coward and a liar.

Thus, in further imitation of his

accepted model Gibbon, whose subject had been the decline of
Rome, Adams, although he was ostensibly dealing with the
rise of a new western power, also told a story of inevitable
decline. John Randolph, state's rights, slavery, and
nullification collectively represented for Adams what
Christianity had represented for Gibbon— the affirmation of
the dangerous dogma that the individual and its interior
provinces of mind and feeling are the world. In what he
initially believed to be his ordained role as preserver and
interpreter of family fame, Adams demonstrated that failure
to heed the advice of the Federalist Adamses had determined
the future and disastrous course of America, a course which
had led to inevitable civil war.

Adams's fatal symbols for

this tragic turn of events were the life of John Randolph
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and the state of Virginia, and he was to write about each in
both oblique and direct ways. Adams's first foray into the
writing of history, where he, once again in imitation— this
time of

the philosopher Hume— seems to have thought he

would find peace and certainty, was an essay on the explorer
John Smith and the Indian heroine Pocahontas.
Adams's first serious historical essay, "Captaine John
Smith,”

separated myth from chronicle in the legend of John

Smith and Pocahontas, and reflects a deeply felt belief that
historical narrative

could both replicate and refigure the

past. In representing Smith who "maintained many different
characters"

and Pocahontas, whom seventeenth-century

writers described not as an imperial figure but as a

"well

featured but wanton yong (sic.) girl," Adams did, in fact,
create

alternative lives for them.

may seem far-removed

An essay on John Smith

from the Adamses and John Randolph,

and yet, in the Viconian mvthos that Adams was erecting, the
essay has its place.

John Smith

and his falsification of

the chronicle of history becomes a type of the bad
historian.

Pocahontas, whose virtue is impugned, is the

ancestress of many Virginia bluebloods,

including Randolph.

In demeaning her, Adams is deconstructing the sacred ground
of southern genealogy. In particular, Adams is
deconstructing the sacred ground of the Randolph family
tree.

He is also suggesting an antecedent in spirit for

John Randolph. Just as John Smith is, for him, an icon of
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the bad historian, so John Randolph is an icon of the bad
statesman.
Adams began the Smith essay in 1861, in the midst of
the American Civil War. He was serving as his father's
private secretary in London, and was in search of a
compelling story that would help him realize his ambition to
be his family's historian, the Gibbon of his century at the
same time that it would permit him to set the Virginia
aristocracy on its ears.

Adams and his father were watching

the lobbying efforts of "The Southern agents" in Parliament
(Letters. I, 272), who were attempting to incite a popular
movement in favor of intervention on the side of the
Confederacy.

While Adams and his father believed that "the

Southerners" would fail in Parliament, they had "steady aid"
from The London Times and firm support among the "Clubs,
which are hopelessly anti-American"

(Letters. I, 273).

Adams's essay thus has a topical political purpose, but, in
one of the paradoxes that characterizes everything about
Adams's career, it remained unpublished until well after the
end of the war. Characteristically, the essay, which was
eventually published in 1867 in The North American Review
under the unassuming title "Captaine John Smith,"
undertakes its two-fold
abilities as an historian

mission of proving Adams's
and of suggesting in a veiled

manner that Virginia aristocracy was a house built on myth
and blind worship of a nonexistent past, not on science and

belief in the future-

Though he claims merely to be engaged

in the Enlightenment project of purifying the chronicle of
history of the taint of myth and legend, Adams in fact was
already

beginning the interminable project of defending his

grandfather John Quincy Adams from his detractors—
especially from John Randolph, who, as we have noted,
claimed descent— as did many Virginians— from Pocahontas and
her husband John Rolfe. In preparation for writing the
essay, Adams contacted John Gorham Palfrey in late 1861.
Palfrey was a Harvard professor,

editor of The North

American Review, and author of a history of New England.
Adams informed him that he was doing some research on the
history of Pocahontas.

After he had worked on the material

for a while, and concluded that Charles Deane, who had
recently produced a privately printed edition of Wingfield's
Discourse on Virginia, had been right in assuming that
Pocahontas's rescue of John Smith was pure fiction, he wrote
with some glee:
I fully expect that the ghost of John Randolf
(sic.) will haunt you and Mr. Deane and me
for this impiety, but it wasn't my fault...
(Letters, I, 280)
Elsewhere, Adams announced that "the Virginia aristocracy
...will be utterly graveled by it if it is successful."16
He wrote John Gorham Palfrey in 18 62 that "I can imagine to
myself the shade of John Randolf turn green at that quaint
picture...of Pocahontas clothed in virgin purity...turning
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somersets with all the little ragamuffins ...of Jamestowne"
(Letters. I, 287).
In deconstructing the myth upon which many sacred
Virginia family trees were erected— Adams called it an
"article of American religious creed"

(Letters. I, 287)—

Adams was already preparing the defense of John Quincy Adams
that would resurrect him in history. John Randolph and the
southern faction are simultaneously dismissed as lost in
intellectual darkness and enchained by the claims of
irrational myths and eccentric passions.

The method of the

essay is remarkable. Juxtaposing passages from Smith's own A
True Relation of Virginia, which Smith had written in 1608,
with what should have been at least similar passages from
Smith's Generali Historie. which was printed in 1624, Adams
shows not only that Pocahontas is absent from the earlier
work, but also that the dimensions of all of Smith's
exploits have been similarly exaggerated and transformed:
Eight guards, which had been sufficient
in 1608, are multiplied into thirty or
forty tall fellows in 1624. What was
enough for ten men...would feed twenty
according to the later version.17
Adams also points out that Edward Wingfield's account
of these same events, which was rescued from obscurity by
Charles Deane and published in 1860, altogether ignores the
existence of Pocahontas. That esteemed ancestress of
nineteenth-century Virginians first appears in Smith's Map
of Virginia, which was printed in 1612, though in this

account she does not yet throw herself between Smith and the
blows that would have spilled his brains as she does in
Smith's later versions of the story.

Adams is perhaps

most intrigued by what he, at least at that time, perceived
to be Smith's ability to hoodwink even so eminent an
historian as George Bancroft. In fact, as he notes, John
Smith died quietly in 1631, but his book survived him and
took on a life of its own as the "standard authority on
Virginian history."18
When he was
deeply disturbed

writing the

Smith essay, Henry Adams was

by the fact that fiction masquerading as

myth had managed to survive and prosper as national myth.
Yet, when he was

writing the Education of Henry Adams

between 1905 and 1907, he places the work he had done on
Smith after the Civil War.
While drifting, after the war ended,
many old American friends came
abroad... among the rest, Dr.
Palfrey...When Dr. Palfrey happened on
the picturesque but unpuritanic figure
of Captain John Smith, he felt no call
to beautify Smith's picture. The famous
story of Pocohantas roused his latent
New England skepticism. He suggested to
Adams that...an article on Captain John
Smith's relations with Pocohantas would
attract as much attention...and break as
much glass, as any other stone that
could be thrown by a beginner...
(Education. 923)
The sequence was actually quite different.
Adams's correspondence with

As we have seen,

Palfrey begins in 1861. When

Adams first writes Palfrey, he says that he has been

"fascinated" by Palfrey's "historic doubts" about the legend
of Pocahontas and John Smith ever since Palfrey had voiced
"certain historical doubts" about them during a visit to the
Adams' house in the previous spring. Adams writes that he
has "had it in his head ever since" to examine the problem
himself, and has spent some time in the British Museum
delving into the problem. Palfrey sent Adams's letter to
Charles Deane, who responded on 17 November that "I perceive
he is not yet possessed of all the facts." The "facts,"
according to Mr. Deane, were that the earliest accounts of
John Smith's adventures are "silent as to his rescue by the
Indian girl."19

In the months that followed Palfrey's and

Dean's confirmation of his suspicions about Smith's
transformation of his experience into adventure story, Adams
completed the essay.

Ironically, his own final public

reference in The Education to what was implicitly a study in
the responsibility of the historian is couched amid
fictional dates and fictionalized actions.

The Henry Adams

who tried to rescue historical fact from the shadowy realm
of legend

ends by abandoning the aims of Enlightenment

historiography in favor of the fictions that permit the
creation of a deterritorialized self in a narrative that is
neither biography nor autobiography, neither legend nor
history.
Adams's essay on Smith is the beginning of the
realization of the choice of life he had made as a student

in Berlin— to deal with John Quincy Adams's papers and write
his life.

The project continued with the publication in

1877 of Documents Relating to New England Federalism.

Adams

specifically set out to clear his grandfather of the
lingering charge that he had failed to provide proof of his
claims that

he was innocent of having accused a number of

extremists among the Massachusetts Federalists of plotting
the dissolution of the Union in the days of the separatist
conspiracy that had accompanied

the seizure of the ship

Essex in 1805. The British, of course, had defeated the
French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar, and were in a
position to claim sovereignty over the seas, but Napoleon,
for the time at least, exercised control over the land mass
of western Europe. In the case of the Essex, a British court
ruled that whether or not French and Spanish goods passed
through American ports they were still enemy goods, and
could be seized at any point in a continuous voyage.

When

the commercial provisions of Jay's Treaty expired in 1807,
British interference with American shipping escalated. A
complicated series of British Orders in Council followed,
and were met by Napoleon's Continental Orders, with the
result that American shipments were likely to be seized by
either the British or the French on any continental voyage.
To make matters worse, the British attacked the Chesapeake,
an American frigate, when its captain refused to be
searched. The British killed three

men, wounded eighteen,

and seized four more, one of whom was later hanged for
desertion from the British Navy. To avoid declaring a war,
Jefferson proclaimed an Act of Embargo in 1807.20
Predictably, it failed, and a group of New England
Federalists, who claimed that Jefferson was in league with
the French, revived the old Federalist cause.

At this

point, as Thomas Jefferson later recalled in 1825 at the age
of eighty-three,
embargo."

"Mr. Adams called on me pending the

According to Jefferson, Adams told him that

"certain citizens of the Eastern States"

were engaged in

negotiation with British agents. The object of these
negotiations was an agreement that the New England States
should withdraw from the war, and that "without formally
declaring their separation from the Union of the States,
they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to them." In
return, New England shipping was to be free from "restraint
and interruption by the British." The "affair of the Essex
Junto" as it came to be called, became a focus in John
Quincy Adams's vicious political battle against Andrew
Jackson in 1828.

Adams had shed his Federalist affiliations

in favor of Republican ones over the Embargo and the
separatist controversy in 18 07. Angered by what were
perceived as his neo-Federalist policies as President, some
"old Republicans," most notably William B. Giles of
Virginia, chose to revisit in 1825 the political decisions
of nearly two decades before, questioning Adam's integrity

and charging him with personal treachery and self-interest.
Giles obtained permission from Jefferson's grandson Thomas
Randolph to publish letters that Jefferson had written him
concerning his conversations with Adams about the Junto.
When the letters were published, Adams responded to them
indirectly, through The National Intelligencer, denying both
Jefferson's recollections of the events and Giles's
interpretation of them. Giles responded by printing yet
another letter which called John Quincy Adams an example of
"human depravity." Adams again responded indirectly, this
time through The Washington Expose.

A series of similarly

bitter exchanges followed, and Adams was even asked for
clarification of his position by a group of Bostonians who
felt their families' honor had been compromised. Adams
refused to offer evidence to substantiate his claims on the
grounds that they could not be proven in a court of law. The
latter-day Federalists' "Appeal to the People" followed.
Adams refused to respond to the document in any public
forum, with the result that his behavior remained open to
question.

In his Constitutional and Political History of

the United States. Herman von Holst wrote that the "final
decision of history must be suspended" on the conduct of
Adams and others in the affair of the Essex Junto.
With the help of Henry Cabot Lodge, who also had an
ancestor, George Cabot, to defend, Adams set out to find the
scientific evidence that would

enable him to correct Von
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Holst's version of the story, and, with him, the chronicle
of history. He found it in John Quincy Adams's unpublished
reply to the Boston Federalists' "Appeal to the People."21
Henry Adams's preface to
England Federalism.

his Documents Relating to New

1800-1815 begins with the

characteristically outrageous claim that "this volume has no
controversial purpose." While "the fires of personal and
party passion" are buried under the "ashes of half a
century," they still glow, he says for the student of
history.

His avowed aim is an appropriate one for an

Enlightenment historian: he seeks to present the student of
history with a volume compiled in a "broader spirit of
impartial investigation," purified of filial and sectarian
loyalties. His decision to omit some passages of "pure
invective" from his grandfather's "Reply to the Appeal of
the Massachusetts Federalists"

is similarly explained. The

younger Adams describes them as "passages of a personal
nature;" following Gibbon and Voltaire he eliminates them so
as to eliminate the distracting world of the passions and
focus the reader on the relevant sequence of events in the
"Reply."

In his "Reply," John Quincy Adams calls his

accusers the "mouldering relics" of the Essex Junto, which,
in its time,

had consisted of "partisans of Alexander

Hamilton when he was publishing his pamphlets of slander
upon my father." According to Adams, he had acted on
Jefferson's behalf, and had informed him only that the

Governor of Nova Scotia was accusing Jefferson of being the
creature of the French government, and that there was
evidence of ongoing intrigue between Massachusetts
Federalists and agents of the British government in
Massachusetts. Adams states that he never accused any of the
Massachusetts Federalists of treason. Adams then presents
the documents, primarily letters, that attest to his
innocence.

According to Adams, the real issue for Mr. Giles

and his other accusers was not his neo-Federalism, a charge
that stemmed from his statement to Congress in his first
address that "effective energy" must be tapped from "the
powers delegated by the people" for the "improvement of the
condition of the country." Invoking the ancient
controversies and even the language of the English Civil
War, Adams embarks on a vitriolic attack on Virginia and on
the doctrine of "State rights." Adams is a latter-day
Cromwell confronting the claims of English "cavaliers."
The patriotism of this portion of the
people of Virginia was rallied by the
cabbalistical watchword of 'Staterights.' The lurking jealousies of
slave-holders were enlisted against the
native of a State wholly free. The bonebred dislikes of the cavalier race to
the scion from the stock of Pilgrim
Puritans were summoned to the array
against him; and the Virginian and
southern and slave-holding mind was thus
predisposed to receive falsehood for
truth, and sophistry for reason, to ruin
the reputation and paralyze the power of
a President of the United States...
(Federalism.

140)

With great bitterness, John Quincy Adams notes that William
Giles was not content to speak alone, but that he also had
to summon the mighty shade of Thomas Jefferson and the
lesser presence of John Randolph to help him make his case.
Adams excuses Jefferson’s lapses of memory. Of Randolph, he
writes only that he will say nothing of "Mr. John Randolph's
agency in this honorable conspiracy.

I leave him and his

unreproved potations of English porter for a more suitable
occasion"

(Federalism. 144). Adams ends the "Reply" by

reminding his audience that the "lyre of Orpheus was
transported to the heavens for its attractive virtues in
civilizing and harmonizing the solitary savage of the desert
into the social denizen of a community"

(Federalism. 329).

Orpheus, a type of the mythic civilizer, was a favored
Augustan image of the artist, who had the capacity to
envision the ideal political order. For Adams, the American
politician must also be an Orphic poet. Like the
Enlightenment theorists he admired, Adams believed that in
matters of governance, the particular and sectarian interest
must yield to the general good. Adams feared, rightly, that
the general good in America was in danger of being
sacrificed to private property interests.
Adams's "Reply" is addressed to the "Citizens of the
United States," who had rejected him for a second term as
president. Written for the widest audience,

it remained

unpublished until his grandson chose to give it life and
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speech by including it in the text of received history. The
long narrative amounts to a revisionist history of the
Jefferson and Madison administrations, as well as an attack
on all of Adams's ideological enemies.

Though he chose not

to print his own revisionist history, his grandson Henry
did, and spent the next ten years of his life taking the
lives, to use the grandson's phrase, of John Quincy Adams's
friends and enemies alike, first in the biographies of
Gallatin, Randolph, and Burr, the last of which he never
printed, and later in the History of the United States.
In his introduction to New England Federalism.

Adams

says that his ancestor was "driven, in what he conceived to
be disgrace and humiliation, from the Presidency" when his
greatest wish had been to serve selflessly in the furthering
of the Enlightenment project in America.
His diary tells how, at this time, the
sense of personal abandonment...had
gained so strong a hold upon his mind
that scarce a day passed when his ears
did not ring with the old refrain:— 0
Richard! 0 mon roi! L'univers
t'abandonne.
(Federalism, vi)
As a student, Adams had felt that preserving his
grandfather's papers and writing his biography was enough to
occupy any scholar for life.

The process of preparing even

a few of his letters seems to have resulted in the sense of
doubling through narrative that characterized all of Adams's
work with history and biography.

Writing to Elizabeth
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Cameron in late 1891 Adams recalled his grandfather's
obsession with Gretry's Richard Coeur de Leon again.

In

this letter, however, the passage takes on a rather
different significance.
...hurried off to the Opera Comique to
perform an act of piety to my revered
grandfather... a century ago, more or
less, President Washington sent my
grandfather to the Hague, and my
grandfather was fond of music to such an
extent...that he tried to play the
flute. Anyway, he was much attached to
Gretry's music...when he was turned out
of the Presidency, he could think of
nothing for days together, but "Oh,
Richard, o mon roy l'univers
t'abandonne...
(Letters. Ill, 594)
As early as 1877, Adams was creating the sort of fable
for public consumption that John Smith had created in the
seventeenth century, and which Adams himself would later
create in the story of his grandmother's supposed exotic
heritage as Southerner. The private significance of the
story about the Opera Comique was that JQA, as Adams liked
to call him, not unlike the Henry Adams of 1858 was deeply
haunted by his passion for the arts.

By 1891, Adams's

identification with his grandfather as a sort of double is
complete:
Nothing more delightfully rococo and
simple could well be, than the music of
Gretry. To think that it was fin de
siecle too— and shows it in the words
and led directly into the French
Revolution. I tried to imagine myself as
I was then— and you know what an awfully

handsome fellow Copley made me— with
full dress powdered hair, talking to
Mme. Chose in the boxes and stopping to
applaud 'un regard de ma belle.'
(Letters, III, 228)
Adams is referring, of course, to the famous oval portrait
of his grandfather that had been painted by John Singleton
Copley in 1796.

His playful experiment in attempting to

conjure his grandfather through his own experience of an
opera already echoes Nietzsche's claim to Burckhardt that
"every name in history is 'I. ,n22

Adams's obsession with

his grandfather's life never ceased. Even in 1909, long
after the Education was completed, he was still involved in
evaluating his grandfather's life, though by that time he
seemed to want him obliterated from the chronicle of
history.

In responding to his brother Brooks's attempt to

write a biography of their grandfather, Henry condemns their
grandfather for the very acts that had constituted his
martyrdom in the Documents. and even doubts the old man's
patriotism.
I can't forgive him his vote on the
Embargo, or his defense of Andrew
Jackson.
He was not punished half
enough for either...he loathed and hated
America..he never thought of going home
without nausea...
(Letters. VI, 228)
In the same letter Henry also questions John Quincy's
devotion to the arts, condemning him for his "indifference,"
as well as for his "didactic" tastes in literature.

He

also describes him in terms that recall his

treatment of

John Randolph, suggesting that his biography of Randolph, a
work he had claimed at one time to despise (Letters. II,
475, 479), was

a work which had succeeded because he had

managed to "put some depth and shadow in my picture." Adams
implies that a similar treatment would be appropriate for
John Quincy Adams, whom he describes as a tragic figure— the
"prophet who ends in secret murder and open war, violence,
and fraud, and hideous moral depravity."

This is presumably

the same John Quincy Adams whose "I" Adams had claimed in
1891 as his own in a symbolic act of piety to his memory,
and whom he had defended in 1877

(Letters, II, 323) for his

love of truth, and whose deep reservations about Jefferson's
moral character are meticulously preserved in Adams's own
version of the text of history.
Puzzling and contradictory as Adams's attitudes toward
himself, his projects, and his biographical and historical
subjects are, he continued to produce biography and history
throughout the 1880s and returned to it in 1911.

With the

Smith essay and the biographies of Albert Gallatin and John
Randolph that he began in the late 1870s, New England
Federalism seems to have been yet another "feeler," as Adams
called his biographies, for the eventual writing of the
massive History.
Feeling that he had at last
historian"

donned the "cloak of

(Letters. II, 303) in his New Encrland Federalism
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volume,

Adams began his massive biography of Albert

Gallatin in the summer of 1877 at the request of Gallatin's
son Albert. In writing the life of Gallatin, or, perhaps
better, in organizing a narrative around Gallatin's letters
and papers, Adams was literally giving life to a figure who
had left few documents to indicate anything other than years
of public service

and a continuing interest in the language

and culture of the American Indian tribes. Gallatin was
Adams's ideal politician.

His life was subsumed in service

and in the scientific endeavor that resulted in his
celebrated classification of the linguistic groups among
American Indian tribes on a large scale.
To do justice to Gallatin was a labor of
love. After long study of the prominent
figures in our history, I am more than
ever convinced that, for combination of
ability, integrity, knowledge,
unselfishness, and social fitness, Mr.
Gallatin has no equal. He was the most
fully and perfectly equipped statesman
we can show.
Other men, as I take hold
of them, are soft in some spots and
rough in others. Gallatin never gave way
in my hand or seemed unfinished.
(Letters. II, 491)
Again, Adams's polarized sense of a moralized geography
intrudes. Gallatin was opposed at every turn of his
political life by the Southern faction that John Quincy
Adams had hated. Gallatin thus interests Adams in part
because Gallatin provides an oblique means of writing about
John Randolph. In preparation for writing the volume, Adams

began an extended correspondence with Hugh Grigsby, the
President of the Virginia Historical Society, explaining
that without assistance from the Virginia archives he could
not proceed with the biography.

The Gallatin biography is

probably the best example of Adams's efforts at writing
objective history. He wrote Grigsby with some dismay that
"Gallatin unfortunately detested letter writing," and that
since Gallatin had also avoided gossip Adams was "debarred
from the most interesting portion of biography"(Letters. II,
317). His aim, however, avowed to both Grigsby and John
Russell Bartlett, was that "as far as possible his story
should be told by his own letters or writings"

(Letters, II,

347). Adams's own letters that record the process of writing
the Gallatin biography show that Adams rapidly became more
interested in what he was discovering about John Randolph,
Thomas Jefferson, and the Adamses than he was in Gallatin,
though Gallatin's life as biographical subject takes on the
patterns of exile, alienation, and flight that characterize
all of Adams's narrative portraits of all of his
biographical and historical subjects.

Adams's desire to

allow Gallatin to represent himself through his letters
extended to a decision not to translate Gallatin's French
letters. Adams wrote Gallatin's son that there were several
reasons for his not having attempted translation. The most
telling of these is the last: "as regards M. de Voltaire, I
have my doubts whether the man who thinks he can translate
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him, is not a little of a fool" (Letters, II, 330).

At the

end of his preface to his biography of Albert Gallatin,
Adams acknowledges a perhaps exaggerated sense of
indebtedness to George Bancroft.

Adams seems to have

absorbed most directly from Bancroft what he could have
gotten from reading any Enlightenment historian, including
Carlyle: the idea that the individual is representative of
his age. And, as we have seen, by the time he published the
Gallatin biography he had abandoned Carlyle's "heroworship."

Thus, early in the Gallatin biography Adams

announces that "after the elevation of Geneva to the rank of
a sovereign republic, the history of the Gallatins is the
history of the city.23
The family, if not the first in the
state, was second to none.
Government
was aristocratic in this small republic,
and of the eleven families into whose
hands it fell at the time of the
Reformation, the Gallatins furnished
syndics and counsellors with that
regularity and frequency which
characterized the mode of selection...of
the other ten. Five Gallatins held the
position of first syndic, and as such
were the chief magistrates of the
republic...
(Gallatin. 3)
The Gallatins, Adams writes, also counted "at least one
political martyr among

their number."

...a Gallatin...charged with the crime
of being head of a party which aimed at

popular reforms in the Constitution, was
seized and imprisoned in 1698...
(Gallatin.

3)

Though they filled the ranks of the professions and died in
military service on nearly all of the great battlefields of
Europe, the Gallatins were Genevans, after all, and not
feudal aristocrats.
In another European country a family
like this would have had a feudal
organization, a recognized head, great
entailed estates, and all of the titles
of duke, marquis, count, and peer which
royal favor could confer or political
and social influence could command.
Geneva stood by herself. Aristocratic as
her government was, it was still
republican, and the parade of rank or
wealth was not one of its chief
characteristics.
(Gallatin. 4-5)
What they lacked in money and land they made up for in
prestige. The family estate was one of "integrity, energy,
courage, and intelligence."

Despite his scrupulous attempts

to let Gallatin write his own biography, and his refusal to
usurp Gallatin's voice through translating his letters, the
shape that Adams lends Gallatin's life is the shape provided
by Adams's sense of his own family history and the
lineaments of his own experience.

In his quest for a

destiny that lay outside his family's sphere of influence in
Geneva, and in his profound restlessness, Gallatin's line of
flight is similar to Adams's. Ironically, Gallatin first
"began to feel his own powers and to see them recognized by

the world"(Gallatin. 53) in Boston, the city Henry Adams had
longed to escape. Unlike Henry Adams, Gallatin became a
victim of what Gibbon in speaking of the fall of Rome called
"immoderate greatness."
...the insidious elevation of Mr.
Gallatin, the displaying of him as a
magician whose touch was superhuman; the
ascribing to him every power and every
act that emanated from government
...destroyed his usefulness by
indirection.
(Gallatin. 438)
There is an echo of Gibbon's elegy to Rome at the height of
its powers in this passage, and a tragic certainty of
Gallatin's coming "betrayal" at the hands of his former
associates Jefferson and Madison.

Throughout the

difficulties of his association with the Jefferson and
Madison administrations, however, Gallatin sought always to
"preserve and invigorate the Union"

(Letters, II, 481).

As

Secretary of the Treasury in a financially troubled country
he had sought to forge a vision that was capable of
"providing for and guiding the moral and material
development of a new Era,— a fresh race of men."
It was not a mere departmental reform or
a mere treasury administration that Mr.
Gallatin undertook; it was a theory of
democratic government which he and his
associates attempted to reduce to
practice. They failed, and although
their failure was due partly to
accident, it was due chiefly to the fact
that they put too high an estimate on
human nature. They failed as Hamilton
and his associates, with a different
ideal and equally positive theories had
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failed before them. Yet, whatever may
have been the extent of their defeat or
of their success, one fact stands out in
strong relief on the pages of American
history. Except those theories of
government which are popularly
represented by the names of Hamilton and
Jefferson, no solution of the great
problems of American politics has ever
been offered to the American people.
Since the day when foreign violence and
domestic faction prostrated Mr. Gallatin
and his two friends, no statesman has
ever appeared with the strength to bend
their bow— to finish their uncompleted
task.
(Gallatin. 492)
These are essentially the same claims that Brooks Adams
always made for John and John Quincy Adams, and that Henry
Adams's published works suggested

during most of his career

as an historian. In the chapter on Gallatin's diplomatic
career, Adams acknowledges the "curious parallelism" between
the "lives and characters" of John Quincy Adams and Albert
Gallatin (Gallatin. 496).
In the process of writing about Gallatin, Adams
developed his interest in John Randolph and the problem of
what he called "Southern eccentricity." Adams thought he had
identified the phenomenon as early as 1862, when he was
working on the Smith essay. He was later to realize that
this eccentricity was only another name for the tendency of
all history in the modern world— a tendency to, if not be
invented, then at least swallowed up by the individual mind.
Subjectivity was hopelessly entwined for Adams with the idea

of entropy which influenced his vision of history in the
Education. Adams first explores the problem of
'•eccentricity" seriously in his biography of John Randolph,
which he had in part researched during the writing of the
Gallatin biography.

The two works are conjoined— like a

pair of medieval exemola.

Randolph is the exemolum in malo

of statecraft, whereas Gallatin is the standard by which all
statesmanship must be judged.
Probably no aspect of Henry Adams's thought and writing
is more complex than his attitude toward the American South
and Southerners. Whether he found them compelling, and
somewhat damnable, as in the case of Jefferson, or mostly
damnable and still compelling as in the case of the
archvillain John Randolph, Adams spent much of his career
writing and thinking about Southerners. In part, this may
have been a response to his sense of a moral topology of
place. Whether he was writing of southern Europe or of the
southern U.S., Adams tended to associate the South with the
nether world of pleasure, passion, and art that is
conspicuously absent from his vision of history.

He usually

claimed to despise Virginians, though he wrote in the
Education that he "liked the Virginians." He also claims in
the Education that he was Roony Lee's amanuensis, thus
appropriating Robert E. Lee's son's "I" as his own.
Acknowledging and underscoring his sense of kinship with the
South, he gives the chapter in the Education that deals with
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the Civil War the title "Eccentricity," an echo of a chapter
in the biography of John Randolph which he had similarly
called "Eccentricities."

Moreover, Adams transforms his

English grandmother into a Southerner, though she herself
claimed late in life that she had no sympathy with
Southerners at all.24 One of the most famous passages in the
Education describes the intoxicating aura of the Maryland
spring, which Adams says he loved

"too much" as though in

its "delicate grace and passionate depravity" it were "Greek
and half-human."

The passage recalls nothing so much as

Adams's letters about the Italian countryside that he had
written on his travels at the age of twenty-two. Only much
later, at the age of sixty-seven, could he say that the rest
of his education paled by comparison

with the "delight of

this"(Education, 965). Adams's first analysis of Southern
character is far less sympathetic. For Adams, John Randolph
was a type of the South, just as Adamses were types of New
England. In his biography of John Randolph, which he
published in 1882, Adams creates a version of Virginia life
which illuminates his idiosyncratic typology of place.
Virginia--and, by extension, all of the South, was a region
wholly dedicated to the notion that America should engage in
the recreation of the gracious life of the English manor and
build a

model of a "future Arcadian America." This idea of

the future of America opposes the urbanized and more
technical Enlightenment model espoused by the Adamses, and,

to an extent, even by George Washington. Having noted at the
beginning of the biography that John Randolph claimed to be
a descendant of Pocohantas, in sly allusion to his earlier
essay, Adams proceeds to paint Randolph as the
"representative man of the South," a type of the "Slave
Power" and eccentricity, of slavish devotion to English ways
and pastoral myth.

Randolph is described on the one hand in

the History as a man who should have been the Archangel
Michael, Adam's emblem of masculine power both in the
Randolph biography and, later in his Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres. and on the other as the hapless victim of a
regional poison that he "sucked with his mother's milk."
Randolph bought his books from English booksellers and aped
English manners. "Eccentricity," which, as I have mentioned
reasserts itself in Adams's Education, seems to have been
Adams's private term for excessive concern with self and
self-presentation and the subjectively engendered universe
produced through reflection. Henry

Adams, like John Quincy

Adams, or perhaps Henry Adams in the guise of John Quincy
Adams, believed that the drama of the early decades of the
Republic resolves itself into a conflict between those who
were dedicated to the public good, and who sacrificed their
private interests like the heroes of Augustan Rome, and
those who, like Randolph and other Southerners, served
private vanity,

"eccentricity," and a mental as well as

literal human bondage.

Necessarily, the forces of

eccentricity favored the dissolution of the Union— that
symbol of the general Good— while the forces of
Enlightenment served the cause of the Union's preservation.
Virginia was a dependent culture.
...the country had plunged into a war
which in a single moment cut that
connection with England on which the old
Virginian society depended for its
tastes, fashions, theories,and, above
all, for its aristocratic status...the
Declaration of Independence proclaimed
that America was no longer to be
English, but American,that
is...democratic and popular in all its
parts,— a fact equivalent to a sentence
of death upon old Virginian society, and
foreboding dissolution to the
Randolphs.. ,25
Adams depicts Randolph as a sort of memento mori of American
politics. For him, Randolph and the South are engaged in a
war for survival with the forces of Enlightenment. Adams
notes that Randolph believed that many of his more excessive
personal characteristics came from his Indian heritage.

In

fact, Adams asserts, "The Indian owns no such person..or
such temperament,...which... belongs to an order of animated
beings still nearer...to the predaceous instincts of dawning
intelligence"
cannot produce

(Randolph. 253-254). In Adams's view, Nature
an aberration like Randolph, who is

emblematic of a way of thinking and living that was as
exhausted as the tobacco fields that surrounded him. The
province of the rationalist historian is to explain Randolph
to the chronicle of history.

Randolph is explicable only as

an agent of benighted thinking and a figure, who, in
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opposition to Albert Gallatin and John Quincy Adams, could
prefigure the towering interests that were to collide in the
American Civil War.
As I have indicated, Adams referred to his biography of
Randolph, as he did to that of Gallatin, as a "feeler for my
history"

(Letters. II, 476-77).

The latter work began as

Adams's ultimate effort at scientific history-writing.

He

asked Justin Winsor, a Harvard librarian, to send him "six
or seven volumes" of the American newspapers from 1807-09
each week.

He also wanted accounts of banking and education

and of the "practise of medicine."

He asked for a "good

sermon, if such a thing existed." In addition, Adams
searched archives all over Europe for documents that might
illumine his recreation of the past.

He believed, as he

says in one of the early volumes of the history, that
whereas lawyers had to give the shape of theory to their
claims,

"the historian need only state facts in sequence."

In the eyes of his reviewers, Adams's project
succeeded.

One critic wrote that his history "approaches

nearer the standard of science than any extended historical
work yet written on this side of the Atlantic.1,26 Adams's
purpose was to define what he called "national character,
and

Adams conjures an almost Edenic vision of nature

undisturbed by man.
Even after two centuries of struggle,
the land was still untamed; forest
covered every portion, except here and
there a strip of cultivated soil; the

"
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minerals lay undisturbed in their rocky
beds...27
The only blight on this landscape of possibility, one which
Adams called "a cancerous disease"

(History. 107), was the

fact that "one-fifth of the American people were negro
slaves"

(History. 5). The nation was still an untamed

wilderness,

in which "nature was rather man's master than

his servant." Following the organic model of Enlightenment
history, Adams proposes to trace something like America's
path toward individuation and cultural independence.
Adams's narrative which swiftly turns into an elegiac one is
a study in how the blight came to overshadow the
possibilities. The primary danger that he saw lay in the
southern states where "thought could find little room for
free development"

as long as "it confined its action to

narrowing its own field" (History. 99).

The paradox of the

Southern problem was epitomized not so much in John
Randolph, whose excesses of mind and spirit knew no bounds,
but in Jefferson, the acknowledged intellectual leader in
Virginia politics.

Jefferson was a man of the Enlightenment

whose "instincts were those of a liberal European nobleman,
like the Due de Liancourt.”

His "true delight was in an

intellectual life of science and art."
To read, write, speculate in new lines
of thought to keep abreast of the
intellect in Europe, and to feed on
Homer and Horace, were pleasures more to
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his mind than any to be found in a
public assembly.
(History. 99)
Adams describes Jefferson in moving terms as having been
"beyond the ambition of a nationality." His vision "embraced
the whole future of man," in the purest Enlightenment
fashion.
Jefferson aspired beyond the ambition of
a nationality, and embraced in his view
the whole future of man. That the United
States should become a nation like
France, England or Russia, should
conquer the world like Rome, or develop
a typical race like the Chinese was no
part of his scheme. He wished to begin a
new era. Hoping for a time when the
world's ruling interests should cease to
be local and become universal; when
questions of boundary and nationality
should become insignificant...he set
himself to the task of governing with
this golden age in view.
(History. 101)
Adams's praise also damns. In his view, Jefferson's
Enlightenment was the European Enlightenment, and as long as
America's vision for itself was derivative of European
versions of enlightenment, America would remain

spiritually

and intellectually colonized. The implied analogy between
Jefferson's life and thought and those of a French nobleman
are hardly careless when we recall Adams's disdain for John
Randolph's slavish adherence to English customs and thought,
and the accusations of illegal French connections that
surrounded Jefferson's career in politics. With telling

irony, Adams qualifies his comparison of Jefferson with the
Due de Liancourt by noting that "he built for himself at
Monticello a chateau above contact with man"

(History. 99).

If his house was above the sphere of ordinary life, so was
his theoretical stance on the nation's problems.

Jefferson

was inclined to "generalize without careful analysis," and
he was willing to "risk the fate of mankind on the chance of
reasoning far from certain in its details"

(History. 100).

Echoing John Quincy Adams, Henry Adams felt that Jefferson's
plans for the nation's development, were in some ways
"narrower than ordinary provincialism"

(History. 101).

In

contrast to the vision of an urban and industrialized nation
espoused by the Adamses, Jefferson feared that "cities,
manufactures, mines, shipping, and accumulation of capital
led...to corruption and tyranny"

(History. 101). For Adams,

the South and Southerners, including Madison and Jefferson,
its primary intellectual exponents, was a terrain afflicted
not only by slavery but its moral equivalent in mind.

Of

the Southern states, only North Carolina, the poor relative
of Virginia and South Carolina, earned his approval. North
Carolina, in Adams's perception, was "the healthiest
community south of the Potomac," and was thus partially
exempt from his criticism.

Charlestonians, like Virginia's

John Randolph, remained content to imitate "whatever
reminded them of European civilization"

(History. 102-103).

In the planter society of tidewater South Carolina as
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a whole Adams saw the same "interesting union" between
"English tastes and provincial prejudices" that disturbed
him in Jefferson.

Again, Adams preferred the poorer regions

of the Southern states; in particular, he was fascinated by
the mountainous Piedmont and its up-country farmers whom he
saw epitomized in John C. Calhoun, whose "modes of thought
were those of a Connecticut Calvinist," and whose mind was
"cold, stern, and metaphysical"

(History. 106). In the stark

landscapes of the Carolina hill country, Adams found an
analogue of New England habits of mind and their
corresponding ways of seeing and being.
Adams's vision of the new republic, with its images of
"a thousand miles of dreary and desolate forest"

(History.

107), echoes that of de Tocgueville with some of the same
ends.

Adams's aim, however, was not to show the

possibilities of democracy in America, but to outline the
ideological battle for its mind and soul.

For the careful

reader of the history, the dramatis personae of Adams's
vision of what was to be a uniquely American tragedy are set
in motion.

The fatal weaknesses in the Jeffersonian vision

of America were to be ignored; the Adamses' warnings were to
go unheeded. In the history Adams demonstrates the sense
indicated in the previously cited letters on his view of
Madison and Jefferson. They were creatures inundated by
historical forces that were larger than they were.
Jefferson's tendency to inhabit the country of mind rather
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than the landscape of his countrymen, and the sectarian
politics of New Englanders like the members of the Essex
Junto, who had accused

John Quincy Adams of "moral

depravity" were fatal to the vision of a country liberated
from the original sins contained in history.

In the absence

of a consensus, the outcome of the fatal election that saw
Jackson and his version of democracy in triumph was assured.
In Jefferson and Madison's day, "individuals retained their
old interest as types of character,
power."

if not sources of

The figures of John Quincy Adams, of Madison, and

of Jefferson collide in the declining years of the old,
organic model of a history that,in Adams's view, ended in
1815.
The History outlines the demise of the eighteenthcentury view of progress and history which necessarily
evaporated in the face of a century of hero-worship and
fact-finding that masqueraded in vain as science.
even came

Adams

to maintain a revisionist view of Gibbon. By

1905, when he was writing the Education, he is less inspired
and more troubled than he had been when a first reading of
Gibbon helped him map out his destiny as his family's
historian.
...he was led more than once to sit at
sunset on the steps of the Church of
Santa Maria di Ara Coeli curiously
wondering that not an inch had been
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gained by Gibbon or all the historians
towards explaining the Fall.
(Education, 803)
Adams wrote Henry Osborn Taylor on 17 January,

1905, that he

"had no object but a superficial one, as far as [writing]
history is concerned."

"Accuracy is relative," he said,

articulating a dramatic reversal of the feelings that had
dominated his career as an historian in the 1880s. By
February of 1909, he claimed to be unable to behold the
spectacle of American history without nausea:
...this mental paralysis has practical
drawbacks. One is my nauseous
indigestion of American history, which
now makes me physically sick, so that
only by self-compulsion can I read its
dreary details...
(Letters. VI, 224)
Adams felt particularly nauseated by the very period of
American history that had served as a focus for his
histories and biographies. This was the era that had been
dominated by men like his grandfather and by John Randolph
and Thomas Jefferson. By the time Adams wrote of the despair
that engulfed him as he contemplated the incomprehensible
vistas of an unknowable history, his younger brother Brooks
had written a biography of John Quincy Adams.

Henry's

responses, some of which have been suggested earlier, were
overwhelmingly negative. He called the "picture of our
wonderful grandpapa" that Brooks had painted a "psychologic
nightmare." At the same time, he said that "the
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psychological or pathological curiosity of the study takes
possession of me."
The unhealthy atmosphere of the whole
age, its rampant meanness...the one
sided flabbiness of America; the want of
self-respect, or purpose; the
intellectual feebleness, and the
material greed,— I loathe it all.
Adams had begun by believing that John Randolph and the
South represented the accidental and particular. What he
later realized was that what they represented was universal
and essential. What he had at first painted as
"eccentricity" was the same malady that Nietzsche had called
the disease of historical self-consciousness. Like the
Hawthorne of "The Customs House," but belatedly, Adams
realized that the reconstruction of history was essentially
an art form, and that the historian invariably faces
crumbling fragments of the patchwork of past reality, not
hard facts. The chronicle of history, practically speaking,
purified of all that Voltaire and Gibbon alike would have
found offensive did not exist. His view of historians and
historiography thus changed drastically between 1858 and
1888. When he was finishing his History of the Jefferson and
Madison Administrations he wrote that as he "composed the
last page of my history" he was "in vain trying to do Gibbon
and walk up and down in my garden"

(Letters, III, 144).

As

he began the publication of the history he also began the
destruction of his diaries.

For Adams, there was a

necessary connection between his inability to imitate Gibbon

in life and his inability to imitate Gibbon's vision in
historiography.
The narrative was finished last Monday.
In imitation of Gibbon, I walked in the
garden among the yellow and red autumn
flowers, blazing in sunshine, and
meditated. My meditations were too
painful to last. The contrast between my
beginning and end is something Gibbon
never anticipated. I have brought from
Boston the old volumes of this Diary and
begun their systematic destruction. I
mean to leave no record that can be
obliterated...
(Letters. Ill, 144)
In what appears to be a conscious juxtaposition of the
completion of the History and the destruction of his
personal past, Adams adds that "of the four concluding
chapters [of the History1 I have already written one-third."
(Letters. Ill, 144).

Adams continues to destroy his diaries

(Letters. Ill, 146) as he "works ahead toward [his] demise"-presumably the publication of his History.

His brain, he

says, "reels with the vividness of emotions more than thirty
years old."

A few weeks later, however, Adams records that

he is still reading his diary, but that he "hesitates" to
destroy more of his past, as he "may want to read it again."
Adams thus juxtaposes the creation of a chronicle of the
past— in this case an historical epoch with which he felt a
passionate and personal identification— with an act of selfdestruction which takes place not through physical violence,
but through the destruction of a body of literary texts— the
texts which of necessity incarnate both his personal history
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and human history.

He destroys his diaries— which perhaps

record a more "realistic" account of his life and feelings—
in order to obliterate a record that would enable some later
historian or biographer to do with his existence what Henry
Adams had already done to John Randolph and John Smith and
Albert Gallatin.

Having demolished the possibility of

writing history, Adams seems to have turned toward the
stance he had assigned in the History to law: that of
theorist. His last works combine the enterprise of
biographer, autobiographer, philosopher, and historian of
history.
******

My

epigraphs for this chapter are both taken from

Faulkner. One, the first and more poetic but less coherent
of the two, is part of Quentin Compson's musings on the
nature of self and history in The Sound and the Fury. The
other, and more articulate of the two, is provided by a
fictional narrator— or biographer or, in Adams's view, a
sort of secular historian-god. This second perspective, from
Absalom. Absalom!. captures Quentin's peculiar status as a
destabilized consciousness. It is more coherent because it
is intended to provide a textual ground of community between
reader and writer, just as Adams's histories were intended
to produce a text that would provide his audiences with a
sort of communion

through an artificially conjured past.

Henry Adams spent a lifetime trying to articulate what a
fictional Quentin Compson knew only in those moments when he
began to feel the water engulfing him even before he came to
that fatal, lichened bridge over the Charles River in the
spaces of William Faulkner's imagination.

In those moments,

both Quentin and his creator knew that he was and could only
be his "father's Progenitive;" in the modern world, we
create not only the selves which imprison us, but also the
history within which the self as subject is conceived and
moves.

Quentin's claim on his father's creation, is of

course, both a tragic and ironic echo of what, for Sir
Thomas Browne, writing on the opposite fringe of modernity,
was a reassuring notion— the idea that "Eve miscarried of me
before she conceived of Cain."

Eve miscarries of Sir Thomas

before she conceives of Cain in the comforting caverns that
are part of a landscape of absolute being in the
foreknowledge that is omnipresent in the mind of God.

In

the providential vision, we can invent our fathers and
grandfathers with impunity because there is, after all,
reconciliation in a time that is imbued with both a
preordained shape and a meaning.

Quentin Compson and Henry

Adams conceive and miscarry of a few generations and a few
alternative selves that are generated only by themselves
within the confines of a time that is relentless and
damaging— one thinks of Quentin's bleeding hand, cut on the
crystal of a watch— precisely because it is unredeemed by

any access to anything outside a history whose limits and
whose finitude are those of the very subject that it
entraps.

We recall the clock that presides over the tragic

vestibule of Spenser's House of Pride, and with it,
Spenser's awareness that the clock-time of Augustine's City
of Man would necessarily preside over the projects of a
modernity whose presence he had already internalized.
because Quentin's and Adams's past, like their being,

But
is

generated by a self condemned to isolation, they can have
life only

through the agency of memory and the

reconciliations provided by memory's record— the texts that
constitute self and community alike in the political and
personal spaces of the modern world.

The agony of a

historical consciousness that is both deific and imprisoning
accompanies Quentin's "I invented him created I him,” and it
is an agony shared by Henry Adams.

And, like Quentin, Adams

self-consciously and intentionally wrecks on the
enlightenment project of modernity.

His suicide in print,

his destruction of his diaries, is a way of shattering the
walls of subjectivity, of deterritorializing the problem of
identity in a world that has been engulfed and devoured by
mind, and by mind's hieroglyph and hand-maiden— history.
Quentin chose a baptism in water; Adams, a baptism in the
textual waters of history.
I chose the first of the two epigraphs

because,

in

writing this chapter, I realized that, while Henry Adams may

be an ancestor in a genealogy of anti-mind that leads at
least from Nietzsche to Gilles Deleuze, he is (and perhaps
more importantly) the ancestor of Quentin Compson and of a
modernist faith in a resolution in art that was not
available to him because he was an Adams.
Faulkner did, that

Adams knew, as

no one can narrate coherently from the

interiors of Macbeth's solipsistic

nightmare of a history

that is horrific precisely because it is self-generated.
That species of narration is the province of artists who
envision possibilities of coherence and who conjure the
semblance of meaning for themselves and their audiences.
Necessarily and ironically artists, like historians, engage
in a activity which is above all a motion of mind, but which
nevertheless embodies the possibilities of the
deterritorialized consciousness.

And what could be more

descriptive of Henry Adams and his sense that he was not a
being or entity at all than the haunting passage from
Absalom. Absalom1 that forms my second epigraph: "his very
body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous, defeated
names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth.
He was a barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts
still recovering...from the fever which had cured the
disease...”

With Quentin, Adams was both monarch and

subject of a commonwealth of echoes-— sounds that are
articulated and heard only by the subject that produces
them.

Different fevers— those suffered by the fictional

Compsons and the literal Adamses, but perhaps— and Adams's
and Faulkner's brilliance is that they recognized this— the
same disease.

In Sanctuary Faulkner has Horace Benbow,

another Prufrockian male, fraught and tormented by the
endless mirrors that reflect endless consciousness of
himself and his hopeless— and quasi-incestuous desire— say
that "nature is a she and progress is a he."

That "nature

made the grape arbor, but Progress invented the mirror."28
The mirror of the self-reflexive universe is Narcissus's
pool for the subject of modernity; the mirror embodies the
nightmare of our enclosure in Macbeth's world where our
image is, through our own desire, visited not on a
successive line of kings who will endow history with our
design, but on a successive line of selves. The mirror
betokens our sense of both the presence and power of the
past that engulfs both Quentin and Henry Adams. The pools of
introspection and self-absorption that frame Sanctuary also
frame Adams's career as modernist historiographer,
biographer, and autobiographer. If Brooks Adams's bizarre
claim that John Quincy Adams

committed suicide for the sake

of science is true, then perhaps Henry Adams's symbolic
suicide through his
history

publication of his theories of self and

is but a last act of imitation— one that is

mirrored yet again when Quentin Compson is engulfed not by
any southern stream, but by the deeply symbolic river of
mind that flowed past Cambridge and Harvard, near the heart
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of an institution, which, like the republic itself, was a
living symbol of the enlightenment project.
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CHAPTER 3

T H E SOFT PARADES THE FORMS OF R A D I C A L N O M I N A T I O N
A N D THE SHAPES OF S I MULACRA

Your life has been prolonged until the
world has changed around you.
You have
treasured up all that time has rendered
worthless— the principles, manners,
modes of being and acting, which another
generation has flung aside— and you are
a symbol of the past. And I, and these
around me— we represent a new race of
men— living no longer in the past,
scarcely in the present— -but projecting
our lives forward into the future.
Ceasing to model ourselves on an
ancestral superstition, it is our faith
and principle to press onward, onward!
Yet...let us reverence, for the last
time, the stately and gorgeous
prejudices of the tottering past.1
Hawthorne,

"Old Esther Dudley"

A new idea is formed in view of the old
one, whose defects it avoids and
bypasses; but this means that the new
idea has the old one inside it, thanks
to which it was engendered. This is why
many, many years ago it occurred to me
to say that while in nature mothers bear
offspring in their wombs, in history the
female offspring that are new ideas bear
their own mothers in their wombs.2
Ortega y Gasset, Historical
Reason
In the first decade of the twentieth century, as
theorist, as historian, as biographer, and as designer of a
new kind of self for himself, Adams sets out, in Foucault's
language, "not to discover what we are but to refuse what we
are."3

Adams's works from 1893-1910 write an ongoing
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obituary for the idea of the autonomous self and for the
enlightenment project in America. In them, Adams undertakes
a prolonged flight into the theory of historiography and
away from the Hegelian models of mind and identity that he
had adopted so unquestioningly in his youth, but begun to
abandon by 1875.

First, and more subtly, in the anonymous

and pseudonymous novels of 1880 and 1884, and in the memoirs
he co-authored with the Aritamaii of Tahiti, and then more
explicitly in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and The Education
of Henrv Adams. Adams addresses the same questions about
modernity and subjectivity that are a perpetual subtext in
the biographies and histories of the 1880s. His later work
embodies an attempt to explore the sources and possibilities
of identity solely for the purpose of escaping identity.
This chapter and the two which follow it are an
artificially divided, but unified, triad that chronicles
Adams's self-conscious transformation from historian and
heir to the enlightenment traditions of the Adamses to
theorist and nihilist. In them, I have myself engaged in the
kind of artificial division and classification that is at
the heart of the enlightenment project.

I have arbitrarily

divided Adams's late works into what the uninitiated reader
might see as a logical or at least as a useful grouping;
works of historiography and theory are separated from works
of self-representation, which include Esther and Democracy.
Adams's two novels. For Adams, however, and, ultimately for

his reader-initiates,

if we read him rightly, the emerging

theory of history that is the explicit concern of "The
Tendency of History"

(1894) is as "autobiographical" and as

self-annihilating as Mt. St. Michel or the Education, or
"The Rule of Phase Applied to History," the final sequence
of his "autobiography," in which Adams takes a last willed
flight from subjectivity, and in which he, posing as an
homunculus scriptor, is at last as deterritorialized as his
theories of language and history.

After he wrote the

Education and "The Rule of Phase" Adams liked to claim that
he was already dead— that he had taken his life in his
autobiographical enterprise.

Of course, Adams had

maintained for years, as his brother Brooks points out, that
some

earlier version of self had been dead since his wife's

suicide in 1885.4

Whether or not it was because Adams-as-

Adams had been killed off in his Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres, and freed to inhabit his twin mansions of an
imagined twelfth-century monastery, and the grave at Rock
Creek Cemetery, there is no "I" in Adams's narrative
landscape after Mt. St. Michel.

Even there the "I" appears

only as a record of the utterance of an unnamed Renaissance
poet in the Preface, and sporadically, when for example
Adams records the words of the simulacrum of self that he
has constituted as the Uncle-Narrator, who begs the reader's
pardon for "wasting your precious summer day on poetry which
was regarded as mystical in its age and which now sounds

like a nursery rhyme11 (MSM, 430) . The rest of this strange
hybrid genre of a work is part travelogue and part
meditation on history.

Having fashioned a double of himself

in the uncle who is to be the narrative voice of M t . S t .
Michel. and having manufactured an audience of "nieces,"
Adams aligns himself with the reading audience and stands
with us behind the arras of the text, listening to the
Uncle-simulacrum restore the text of medieval history. The
text is either addressed to the reader directly, in the
second person, or, in a recognition of the complicity
between reader and author-reader, in the multiple voices
implied by Adams's "we." The erasure of the "I" from the
text of Adams's autobiography is even more apparent in the
sequel to Mt. St. Michel.

From its falsely attributed

preface by "H.C.L." to its last sentence, The Education of
Henry Adams is a portrait of a dehumanized "manikin," an
emblem of the discontinuous being of a disembodied Cartesian
cocfito

drowning in the seas of its own thought and history.

Appropriately,

it is written entirely in the third person—

Adams has assumed the voice of a reified self. "The Rule of
Phase Applied to History,"

(1909) the third installment in

his serial experiment in life-writing has no recognizably
human characters at all; it is a critique of the presence of
nameless,

impersonal forces in history written by a voice

that is liberated from the limiting construct of the
personal self.

"A Letter to American Teachers of History
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(1910), a sort of postscript to the previous triad of
autobiographical works, continues and exteriorizes the aims
of the Education. The "Letter," which is in fact an essay of
more than one hundred pages, is directed toward the sphere
of actual community and action. It is a textual grounding of
Adams's emerging sense of the shape of an existence based on
community. Adams chose the epistolary mode for this last
presentation because "that literary form affects to be more
colloquial and familiar than the usual scientific treatise"
(Degradation. 138). The epistolary mode also has the effect
of concretizing the writer's absence and the reader's
presence, and of literalizing the status of the text as a
ground of mediation between writer and reader.

The "letter"

is a demand for reform of the university system along the
lines of a new spirit of philosophic vitalism— a recognition
that a new conception of self and a new sense of the
direction of society had to replace the ones inherited from
the Reformation and the Enlightenment.

Citing Rousseau, who

reversed the Cartesian formula by insisting that he felt
before he thought, and that the man who thinks is a depraved
animal; and Bergson, whose Creative Evolution and embrace of
the life of the instincts had influenced him deeply; Adams
rejects the mode of thinking that universities and,
particularly, historians had been forced to avow through
their voluntary subjugation to the religion of Progress.
The historian is required either
expressly to assert or surreptitiously
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to assume, before his students, that the
whole function of nature has been the
ultimate production of this one-sided
Consciousness,— this amputated
intelligence — this degraded Act, this
truncated Will...the function of man is,
to the historian, the production of
Thought; but if all the other sciences
affirm that not Thought but Instinct is
the potential of Vital Energy...nothing
remains for the historian to describe or
develop except the history of a more or
less mechanical dissolution.
(Degradation. 205-206)

In these last works, beginning with the Mt. St. Michel,
which was privately printed in 1904, Adams forges a
personal, and intentionally arbitrary, anchor in history and
creates a succession of linguistic doubles and others who
allow him to use the biographical mode to trace his origins
and his dissolution as an emblem of western historical
consciousness.

Part of the reason that he emphasizes his

disappearance from the Education and the essays which follow
is explained in his claim that

the historian of modernity

could chronicle only the dissolution of self as subject and
its replacement by the objectified simulacra modelled by the
imperial mind. Adams's absence from his last
"autobiographical" essays reflects his sense of the
truncated nature of his being, which

has been both

determined and restricted by the Cartesian model of man as
the "thinking thing." If man is, in effect, merely a
floating consciousness which belongs everywhere and nowhere,

then Adams can pose as a universal and ahistorical subject,
a fluid being on the stage of history, taking on an
incarnation in whatever historical dimension he chooses, but
incapable of manifesting himself in any sphere of action.
That being so, as Adams notes in the "Letter to American
Teachers of History," to trace the arc of western
intellectual history through the examination of his own
evolution from the twelfth-century to the present is to be
forced to trace not self-creation but self-dissolution. This
is the reality behind Adams's claims that he was dead or
dying. In the Education he describes learning to ride a
bicycle and acquiring an automobile in the final years of
the nineteenth century when he was in his fifties. He took
particular delight in the idea of being transported by
automobile on his excursions to look at the glass at the
French churches and cathedrals that interested him. He
enjoyed his private conceit that the modern world was a
machine that had been engineered into being by impersonal
and non-transcendent force. In his mind, he was riding the
machine of modernity into a vanished past. Even better, for
his purposes, an actual machine transported him from the
alien terrain of the present moment to the pastoral idyll of
the pre-Reformation past that he preferred.

Adams's

experiences with the new machines quickly acquired a
personal and metaphorical significance. For him, the actual
automobile rides over a literal countryside mimicked the
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transport of imagination through the spaces of mind that he
required of his readers in the opening chapter of M t . S t .
Michel and Chartres.

The machines, and particularly the

dynamo, were the tangible manifestations of his attempts to
grapple with his new anti-Carlylean suit of philosophical
clothes that his letters suggest he had begun to design in
the 1870s.
provoke

At times,

his retailoring of himself seemed to

him to a sort of despair, and a longingto cling

the

old model of self as mind and consciousness.
If you want to take charge of the
dynamo, you can. It all makes me look
with yearning eyes to my happy home at
Rock Creek, where I can take off my
flesh and sit on my stone bench in the
sun, to eternity, and see my friends at
quiet intervals of thousand-year naps.
(Letters, V, 202)
As always, in dealing with Adams, the reverse of this claim
is also true. In dissolving Henry Adams as a pocket of
consciousness, Adams points toward a new, more vital and
nameless species of being, which lies beyond the limited
realm of rational discourse.

The first novels and the last

works are thus Adams's history of the modern world—
metaphorically and necessarily hinged on the progress of a
single consciousness— his own. They are a culmination of
meditations and experiments with the nature of the self, of
thought, of history, and of the possibilities for
representation in language that, as we have seen, begin to
haunt Adams's letters in the 1870s and his published works
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in the 1880s, but which,

in some form had always been with

him.
******

After "devouring" Henry James's William Wetmore Storv and
his Friends in November,

1903, Adams wrote James that he

found it difficult to judge the work's success or failure.
For Adams as reader, the Story biography

seemed to be an

unhappy combination of an unintentional version of James's
autobiography and a history of a generation of New
Englanders from 1820-1870. The difficulty for him was that
in James's representation, this generation was not made up
of distinct individuals at all, but was a manifestation of
"one mind and nature; the individual was a facet of Boston."
(Letters. V, 524). Adams might have said with equal accuracy
that Boston was a facet of the individual mind.

Adams

provides James with a list of alternative and
interchangeable selves in which not only Story, but Alcott,
Emerson, Longfellow, and Lowell are robbed of any claim to
individuality, and reduced to multiple embodiments of the
mind of Henry

Adams. Through their inability to find what

Emerson had described as an "unconditional ground for
being"— that nebulous replacement for the certainty provided
by religion, and a corollary promise of the enlightenment
project — the Bostonians had come to languish in a kind of
community of "self-distrust" that became a

shared condition

of what Adams calls "nervous self-consciousness." Adams's
analysis of the nature of his fellow Bostonians is
reminiscent of his earlier images of Randolph and Jefferson
and the other renegade Southerners whose "eccentricity" had
distressed him when he was writing history as biography in
the 1880s. "Southern eccentricity" seems to have been
contagious, for in this letter and in all of Adams's late
work, the disease afflicts not only James and Adams, but all
of nineteenth-century New England.

By the first years of

the twentieth century, Adams had completely reconfigured the
geography of the mind of America that he had— somewhat
ironically— shared with Thomas Jefferson.5

Like Randolph

and Jefferson and most Tidewater Southerners of an earlier
generation, mid-nineteenth-century Bostonians were all
"improvised Europeans,"
dislike of America."

who were possessed of an "irritable

Their sense of spiritual exile

extended to their "antipathy" for their New England origins.
The notion of a motionless ground for being was a tentative
replacement for the certainty that religion had provided in
an earlier age, and it was a corollary of the
enlightenment's promise of intellectual certainty. From the
domain of the individual consciousness Adams's Bostonians
simultaneously "looked through each other with microscopes,"
and "feared each other's Knowledge." In trying to write
Story's life, James had inadvertently written not the
biography of a man or a generation, but a revelation of self
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and of the limits of subjectivity;

he had configured the

"type bourgeois-bostonien," but in the process had "written
not Story's life, but your own and mine,— pure
autobiography." James's work was thus an extension of
Adams's own consciousness:

"the whole thing spreads itself

out as though I had written it...Verily I believe I wrote
it. Except for your specialty of style, it is me"
V, 524).

(Letters,

James's verbal simulacrum of Story was self-

multiplying in Adams's imagination, and bore no more
relationship to Story's life than it did to that of Adams or
James or Alcott. The

textual image of Story is merely an

index of the text of the mind of Henry James.

Whatever

reality Story may have had has been erased and supplanted by
the action of the mind of his creator, James, and James's
creator and reader, Adams.
Six years later, Adams used the

"failure" of the Story

biography as an excuse for not helping his brother Charles
write their father's life and as
his harsh criticisms of his

a sort of explanation for

younger brother Brooks's

efforts to write a biography of John Quincy Adams.
Harry James can fail as often as he
likes in novels, but when he fails in
biography he leaves mighty little of
William Story. In biography we are
taking life. I would never have anything
to do with the life of our father, for
that reason. I felt sure that his
position in history would be the lower
for it. As he stood, the public
imagination filled all gaps and voids.

Had I botched it, he would have
vanished.
(Letters. VI, 227)
In writing the Story biography, James had also given the
simulacrum of a collective life lived by a generation of New
Englanders from 1820-1870 a solidity in print that it lacked
when it existed only in the private provinces of individual
memory and the subjective universe.
what Hegel said the historian should:

He had accomplished
"out of individual

unreflected features" he had composed a portrait that
"transforms the events, actions, and situations present to
[him] into a work of representative thought."6

Adams's

final response, "You make me curl up like a trodden-on
worm...you strip us...like a surgeon, and I feel your knife
in my ribs" anticipates his metaphor for the entire corpus
of his own work— the haunting image of himself as a
helpless, writhing "caterpillar that has lost its string."
Adams's fear self-consciously reverses the fears of Pascal,
who influenced him perhaps more than any other philosopher,7
and whom he saw, even more than Descartes, as having
articulated the dilemmas of the isolated subject of
modernity. Adams found in Pascal an echo of his own sense of
the separate spaces occupied by individual subjectivity.
Like Pascal, Adams was terrified by the "eternal silence" of
"infinite immensity of spaces

that know me not," but while

Pascal's spaces were the spaces of a reconfigured physical

universe that lay outside the "little space" filled by his
subjectivity,8 Adams's spaces were inner recesses of
subjectivity, and they were as vast as the spaces of an
infinite universe. Worse, these spaces had no uncontaminated
contact with the unknown world that fascinated and terrified
Pascal. The prism of perception was for Adams the instrument
that accomplished the

death of the world outside the self.

Adams does not fear the spaces that "know not me;" he fears
the idea of life as an endless hall of mirrors

where the

self is eternally replicated in the images that mind
produces of world. Adams accepts Hegel's affirmation that
"our minds are primarily conceptual and immediately
transform all events into reports for communication," but
for him the transformation of the matter of world into the
spirit of mind was a frightening rather than an affirming
phenomenon. Ironically, Hegel's belief that the critical
historian should "wrest results from narrations rather than
from events"9 was the source of Adams's belief that in
writing history and autobiography we are taking life. The
self-contained existence of Hegel's realm of spirit— of
"Being within itself"—

and the union of the phenomenon of

consciousness with the phenomena that consciousness could
know was a prison sentence, not a harbinger of transcendent
freedom.
Part of Adams's sense that he had seen the hieroglyph
of his own crushed humanity mirrored in William Wetmore
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Storv and his Friends may have stemmed from having seen his
being represented symbolically before, in one of Story's
statues.

Adams had visited Story's studio in Rome in 1860,

as a twenty-two year-old student on tour in Italy. There he
first saw Story's statue of Cleopatra. Hawthorne had only
recently published The Marble Faun, with its famous
description of Story's "Cleopatra."

Adams,

in quest as

always for external affirmation of his own responses,
unsuccessfully scoured all the bookstalls in Rome for a copy
after he heard that Hawthorne had "introduced [the
"Cleopatra"] into his new novel"

(Letters, I, 155).

His statue represents Cleopatra seated;
her head leaning on her hand; a figure
thoroughly Egyptian in costume as well
as feature. She is meditating apparently
her suicide.
To me, apart from the rich
sensualism of the face and form, there
is a great charm in the expression that
she wears; it seems to be the same old
doubt at God's great mysteries of life
and death; a scornful casting up of
accounts with fate and a Faust-like
superiority and indifference to past,
present, or future. Mr. Story has tried
to breathe the mystery and grandeur of
the sad and solemn old Sphinxes and
Pyramids into his marble. I shall not
undertake to say whether he has
succeeded or not. I only know that his
Cleopatra has a fascination for
me,before which all his other
works...seem tame and pointless.
(Letters, I, 147)
Adams's description of "Cleopatra" is strangely similar to
and yet quite different from Hawthorne's.

For Hawthorne,

the statue embodied the "repose of despair" but there was
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still "a great, smouldering furnace deep down in the woman's
heart."

The apparent calm, which is "as complete as if she

were never to stir hand or foot again" is deceptive, for
"such was the creature's latent energy and fierceness, she
might spring upon you like a tigress, and stop the very
breath that you were drawing, midway in your throat."

Story

may have meant his viewers to perceive the statue as
contemplating her suicide, but Hawthorne saw

a terrible

beauty and vitality in the strongly featured face. For him,
the most compelling aspect of the figure was its
extraordinary ambiguity.
The expression was of profound, gloomy,
heavily revolving thought; a glance into
her past life and present emergencies,
while her spirit gathered itself up for
some new struggle, or was getting
reconciled to impending doom. In one
view, there was a certain softness and
tenderness, how breathed into the
statue, among so many strong and
passionate elements it is impossible to
say. Catching another glimpse, you
beheld her as implacable as a stone, and
cruel as fire. In a word, all Cleopatra-fierce, voluptuous, passionate, tender,
wicked, terrible, and full of poisonous
and rapturous enchantment was kneaded
into what, only a week or two before,
had been a lump of wet clay from the
Tiber. Soon, apotheosized in an
indestructible material, she would be
one of the images that keep forever,
finding a heat in them that does not
cool down, throughout the centuries.10
Story's "Cleopatra" is the first of the many iconic
images of human despair that compelled Adams throughout his
life. What Hawthorne read as an embodiment of the terrible
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ambiguity of nature and of sensuality, Adams read as the
intoxicating aura of suicide.

Adams saw the figure's

sensuality, but for him the physical beauty and power of the
"Cleopatra” was of far less interest than the image of the
triumph of a consciously chosen death that she seemed to
embody. For both Hawthorne and Adams, the statue captured
that moment that Nietzsche described a scant twelve years
later as the shattering of the comforting illusions provided
by the principium individuationis.
...Schopenhauer has described for us the
tremendous terror which seizes man when
he is suddenly dumfounded by the
cognitive form of phenomena because the
principle of sufficient reason...seems
to suffer an exception. If we add to
this terror the blissful ecstasy that
wells from the innermost depths of man,
indeed of nature at the collapse of the
principium individuationis. we steal a
glimpse into the nature of the
Dionysian, which is brought home to us
most intimately by the analogy of
intoxication...These Dionysian emotions
awake, and as they grow in intensity,
everything subjective vanishes into
complete self-forgetfulness.11
For Nietzsche, this escape from the layers of subjectivity
is a triumph, and produces a riot of sensual intoxication
and ecstasy. The recovery of the Dionysian realm of animal
nature and instinct was for Nietzsche a state of
forgetfulness that approached the sublime. Only through
forgetting could historical man escape the disease of
historical self-consciousness. The crippling dilemma of a
subjectivity configured through historical self
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consciousness is at the root not only of Nietzsche's, but
also of Adams's view of modern life. Writing in 1874,
Nietzsche addressed the dilemma that Adams was coming to see
as the primary problem of modernity.
Take as an extreme example a man who
possesses no trace of the power to
forget, who is condemned everywhere to
see becoming: such a one no longer
believes in his own existence, no longer
believes in himself; he sees everything
flow apart in mobile points and loses
himself in the stream of becoming: he
will, like the true pupil of Heraclitus,
hardly dare in the end to lift a
finger...there is a degree of insomnia,
of rumination, of historical sense which
injures every living thing and finally
destroys it, be it a man, a people, or a
culture.12
The disease that unites Adams's nineteenth-century
Bostonians is that of all of Nietzsche's "superhistorical
men." As we have seen, Adams's rationalist conception of
personal identity as a product of the exercise of sufficient
reason through consciousness and as synonymous with the idea
of humanity began to unravel even as he was writing his
series of biographies. He was intuitively moving as early as
1875 toward Nietzsche's view of the very concept of
scientific history as a crippling and limiting weight which
tied modern man to the enlightenment ideology in much the
same way that a family name and a sense of identity
imprisoned the individual and circumscribed his
possibilities.13

For Nietzsche,

"this famous inwardness of

subjectivity" "sitting in its inaccessible little temple"
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was dangerous. In the nineteenth century, everything about
man had come to be counterfeit because all experience was
refracted through the all-powerful center of individual
consciousness and annexed to the personal self.
He must, as is well known, be measured
by his thoughts and his feelings and
these he now expresses in his books. If
only it were not just these books which
lately raise more than a doubt, whether
this famous inwardness still sits in its
inaccessible little temple: it would be
terrible to think that it disappeared
one day and all that now remains ..is
his outer being...It would be almost as
terrible as if that inwardness were to
sit there hidden from view, a
counterfeit rouged and painted, having
become an actress if not something
worse: as for example Grillparzer
...seems to have come to believe though
his dramatic theatrical experience. 'We
feel with abstraction,...we hardly know
any longer how feeling is expressed by
our contemporaries; we portray
expressions of feeling which no longer
occur nowadays. Shakespeare has spoiled
all of us moderns. '14
Nietzsche recognized, as Adams did, that, in
anticipation of Descartes,

late sixteenth-century figures

like Montaigne and Shakespeare seem to have believed that
man without the principium individuationis was a sham— a
form without a soul— the self as simulacrum.

The sleeping

and the dead are only "pictures"15 in Macbeth; in Hamlet.
Ophelia is "divided from herself and her fair judgment
without the which we are pictures or mere beasts."16
Similarly,

in his essays, Montaigne self-consciously

produces an iconic image of self which solidifies and

constitutes his being as a record of the process of
thinking. The image cast in the form of the essay will
escape and outwit the mortality of its author, a man who
suffers from all the afflictions that are attendant upon
what Spenser called the "condition of mortal state."

In

Descartes, of course, the certainty of existence itself is
specifically dependent on the mind's activity.

Unless the

mind is engaged in the production of simulacra through

its

interchange with the world, there is no self. The idea of
the tortured soul burdened by its own self-consciousness and
mesmerized by the image of its own dissolution becomes the
central motif in Adams's work. His response to the Story
statue and to James's biography of its author reflects a
unifying tension in his career. Though he spent his life
trying to shape images of other people's lives and his own
he seems to have been compelled not so much by life and its
preservation in print as he was by an embrace of the death
and dissolution of the concept of isolated selfhood. He may
have wanted to produce iconic images of being, but Adams as
a self acting in a privately constituted history could only
produce simulacra of himself. The chief characteristic of
these pseudo-Adamses, which they share with the Story
biography,

is their essential dissimilarity from their

objects and even from Adams himself.17 The idea of suicide
for Adams represented the ultimate possibility of flight
from the inner prison of consciousness. Whether it was
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metaphorical or literal, suicide is perennially present in
Adams's work, and it is no accident that Hamlet both as
character and as play haunts his letters and the Education.
Like Keats, driven by too present a sense of the weight of
his consciousness of mortality, but without Keats's passion
for living, Adams was half in love with easeful death, and
whether he was looking at Story's statue, or
life in autobiography,

Adams was

taking his own

as compelled by theidea

of a willed cessation of being— a willed division from self-as he was by the possibility of incarnating alternative
lives in print. In the inner kingdom of subjectivity
was as tormented by bad dreams and solitude as
been three hundred years before him.

Adams

Hamlet had

The problem, as

Nietzsche also knew, was that for superhistorical
individuals death brings not only the "longed for
forgetfulness"

but also a final sense of violation.

It [death] robs [man] of the present and
of existence and impresses its seal on
this knowledge: that existence is only
an uninterrupted having-been, a thing
which lives by denying itself, consuming
itself, and contradicting itself.18
Writing in August, 1875, of the suicide of a "worthy
neighbor" at Beverly Farms, who "had had too much of all he
wanted in the world except content," Adams sees in the man's
perpetual ennui and violent death an emblem of his own
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condition as a man condemned to life as an "uninterrupted
having-been."
Our New England climate and soil do not
even breed picturesque situations or
incidents. We are but a rather improved
low-country Scotland and our lives and
deaths are too absolutely unimaginative
to adorn a tale. One very worthy
neighbor of mine a couple of months ago,
being out of spirits because he had too
much of all he wanted except content,
sat down in his neighbor's avenue and
blew his brains out as calmly and
practically as a Britisher and was bored
with life. There was no flourish, no
pathos, no moral, and, except for his
poor children and his old father and
mother, no tragedy about it.
(Letters. II, 235).
The anecdote is half humorous, but the irony is worthy of
Swift.

Adams had been

having trouble with his eyes,and was

bored,

a "feeling not unnatural to a man who is more utterly

devoid of resources than any English squire outside of
stables." The extent of his tragedy is that he has not "read
a book" all summer, or even "[kept] a dog," though he is
"looking for a bull terrier."

Conscious of the absurdity

and self-absorption in his claim, Adams juxtaposes his story
of his

neighbor's desperation and death with his own misery

and failure of will; Adams, too, is a man who has everything
he wants except contentment. He lives a kind of death-inlife, as his own simulacrum, denying himself, contradicting
himself,

immersed in and absorbed by the past. His

neighbor's tragedy calls him only insofar as it is an
extension of his own discontinuous being.

Adams's sense of the community of nineteenth-century
intellectuals is one based on the exhaustion of the idea of
mind as an adequate ground for history and for identity.
The community is not a living

community of being at all,

but a condition of emptiness, produced by the collapse of
world into mind. In Nietzsche's language, subjectivity has
"learned to leap, to dance, to use make-up, to express
itself with abstraction and calculation and gradually to
lose itself"19— in short, the mind can shape endless false
versions of the world, but it cannot enable its subject to
live as a sentient being in the world. For Adams and his
fellow moderns, the self that they saw reflected in the
mirror images produced by the action of

mind on its objects

had lost all ability to represent anything that lay outside
itself.

As mind imposes its simulacra on the world, the

world as object disappears, and the subject is relegated to
the sterile world produced by its own mirrors of itself.
Quoting Ecclesiastes, Baudrillard points out that "the
simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth— it is the
truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is
true."20

This was partly what William Faulkner meant when

he said forty years later that "progress invented the
mirror."

Man judges the world by first imposing a set of

mental constructs on the world. The world, in consequence,
ceases to be itself for man, and reflects back only the
mirror image of the viewer and the ideology that produces
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both viewer and ideology.

Thus, in the bankruptcy of the

vision of Progress, the mirror of subjectivity can provide
Adams only with images of death, despair, and a paralyzed
wi l l .
In some way, all of Adams's characters,

including the

"historical" ones like John Quincy Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
John Randolph, and Aaron Burr come to the same end that his
fictional heroines do.
of Egypt.

Madeleine Lee flees to the pyramids

Esther flees to Niagara Falls in what her cousin

George Strong describes as "a genuine flight and escape in
all its forms."21

Esther falls "in love with the cataract

and turn[s] to it as a confidant, not because of its beauty
or power but because it seemed to tell her a story which she
longed to understand"

(Esther, 314).

Something of the same

impulse that attracted Adams to Story's statue sends his
heroine Madeleine Lee to the pyramids to hide and
contemplate the "polar star" "unseen." In 1884, in his novel
Esther. Adams portrays Wharton, an artist who works in
stained glass, in desperate flight from a disastrous
marriage. Wharton appears as an already damaged figure when
he is introduced in the novel, an escapee from a marriage
that had taken place in part because of his fascination with
his wife's preoccupation with suicide. Their troubled and
tempestuous life together— which is only suggested in the
novel; Adams is never quite comfortable with the life of the
body— was apparently built upon Wharton's erotic fascination
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with her exoticism, her sensuality, her violence, and her
love of death. And while Democracy ends with a journey to
the great tombs on the Nile, Esther ends with its heroine
mesmerized by the cataract of Niagara Falls, and certain
that,

"whichever way she moved, she had to look down into an

abyss and leap"

(Esther, p. 33 0) . The journey that Adams

asks his invented audience of readers to take with him to
Chartres ends with the haunting reminder that if "faith
fails heaven is lost." The work ends not with the triumph of
the synthesis of reason and revelation, but with an image of
the broken arch and the failure of mind.
Of all the elaborate symbolism which has
been suggested for the gothic Cathedral,
the most vital and most perfect may be
that of the slender nervure. the
springing motion of the broken
arch...The equilibrium is visibly
delicate beyond the line of safety;
danger lurks in every stone. The peril
of the heavy tower, of the restless
vault, of the vagrant buttress; the
uncertainty of logic, the inequalities
of the syllogism, the irregularities of
the mental mirror,— all these haunting
nightmares of the Church are expressed
as strongly by the gothic Cathedral as
though it had been the cry of human
suffering...
(Mt. St. Michel.

695)

The Education, similarly, ends with the death of Adams's
friend John Hay and Adam's own encounter with the final form
of the force his heroines Madeleine and Esther had sought
with such tentative results.

Adams is thrown into "the

depths of Hamlet's Shakespearean silence."
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One had seen scores of emperors and
heroes fade into cheap obscurity even
when alive; and now, at least, one had
not that to fear for one's friend. It
was not even the suddenness of the
shock, or the sense of the void that
threw Adams into the depths of Hamlet's
Shakespearean silence in the full flare
of Paris frivolity in its favorite haunt
where worldly vanity reached its most
futile climax in human history; it was
the only quiet summons to follow,— the
assent to dismissal. It was time to go.
(Education.

1181)

Adams's suicide in autobiography ends with his own encounter
with a metaphorical Niagara, his own ultimate flight into
that dissolution and death which is also a species of
perverse communion.

Something like the image of the

nameless woe that Story had captured in his statue of
Cleopatra forms the climactic point in each of Adams's major
works. Just as he

claims to be author, subject, and

audience of the Story biography, Adams in contemplation
becomes his despairing neighbor, dead in a nearby avenue,
not, again, through any ability to share his neighbor's
agony, but because of his ability to etch his own agony onto
the face of every object that presented itself to his field
of vision. He escapes Washington with Madeleine Lee, and
finds himself checkmated at Niagara with Esther, conjuring
again, as he recognized in 1911, not the figure of Bay
Lodge's Herakles, but of another lifeless simulacrum,
another image of a "wretched humanity." Significantly, the
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ultimate symbolic embodiment from his own being was not
verbal at all, nor was it created by Adams himself.
A monument is a symbol, and the symbol
should be your's. If there is a single
one in the whole innumerable catalogue
of symbols that you feel. you should
give that to the artist to put in form.
By a personal weakness, I have always
felt most keenly the sense of a crushed
humanity, and, do what I will this
symbol comes out in everything I touch.
My true symbol is that of our
caterpillar which has lost its thread;
only I know that it is no use to turn
when I am trodden on hard enough...So
Saint Gaudens put it in form.
(Letters. VI, 483)
Augustus St. Gaudens had designed a monument to Adams's
wife, and, untitled and unmarked,

it presided over what

Adams called his "mansion" in Rock Creek Cemetery. When
William Roscoe Thayer asked for a photograph of him to
include in his biography of John Hay, Adams refused: "I have
never had a photograph of myself taken. Early from Junius, I
learned to like best the nominis umbra." The refusal to
provide a likeness of himself— and the desire to stand
behind the particular shadow of linguistic protection that
he had provided in the sepulchre of his autobiography— was
not a simple one, however.

Adams suggested an alternative

to a photographic likeness.
I would rather you gave no likeness of
me, but, in its place... insert a
photograph of St.Gaudens' monument, to
show what a wonderful mastery of words

143

he could command when the occasion rose
to his level.
(Letters. VI, 713)
Asked about the Five of Hearts Club— the circle of his close
friends that had included John and Clara Hay, Clarence King,
and Adams and his wife, he responded that

"People who want

to know us— we were not eager for notoriety at any time— can
always go there. We shall tell no lies"(Letters, VI, 701).
Just as Adams sought to embody a concept of history and of
identity that transcended the limits of a subjectively
conceived world, he sought to transcend the limits of
language by taking refuge in an image as hauntingly
ambiguous as Story's "Cleopatra." The

last part of Adams's

literary career is spent in a quest not for a vital
existence of his own— he had taken too many lives in print
for that— but for an image of that vast dimension of human
experience that had been devalued and suppressed by the aims
of the enlightenment project

and its fixation on the realm

of rational discourse. The non-verbal language of a world
that lies outside the self is the story that the Falls were
trying to tell Esther, and it is what the Maryland
springtime taught Adams himself. His last works are thus a
memorial to the most central facet of the

failed experiment

of modernity— -the fatal notion shared by Emerson that "mind
creates the world." Adams's map of a route out of the self
is also a route toward silence. The landmarks of Adams's
being— his printed works— dissolve as the reader moves

toward their sentence. which in medieval style points toward
silence in the face of a truth they cannot contain. Unlike
his medieval models, hcwever, Adams's silence does not
resolve itself in God, but in a denial of the capacity of
language for containing any meaning except meaninglessness.
For Adams, there was a corollary to the proposition that
mind creates the world; subjectivity led not to selfaffirmation, but to kind of exhaustion and even extinction
of being. In reading the Story biography, Adams was aware
that the modern reader engaged in the activities of
Emersonian consciousness is a predator of mind who does not
simply read texts or the self or the world, but enters into
and devours whatever it encounters. In reading any
biography, the life of both the biographical subject and its
text is "taken" yet again, as the reader's consciousness
envelopes and devours the life of the text. Increasingly, in
his letters, Adams figures the reader as a carnivore and
voyeur.
You cannot escape the biographer. When I
read— standing behind the curtain—
these repetitions of life, flabby and
foolish as I am;— when I try to glugglug down my snuffling mucous membrane
these lumps of cold calves'-head and
boiled pork fat, then I know what you
will suffer for your sins...
(Letters. V, 526)
For Adams, the modern premise of the primacy of mind could
lead only to the deafening silences of the solipsistic
universe. In his vain attempts to escape his discontinuity

with the world outside the self, the modern subject would
devour the world in the same way that Adams as reader,
standing Polonius-like behind the arras of the text, had
cannibalized James's biography of Story. Like Polonius, he
is caught in his subterfuge and killed for his trouble; in
the language of his earlier letter to James, he feels
James's knife in his ribs. For Adams, the relationship
between the subject and the

world it is perpetually engaged

in consuming was one characterized by a violence which could
also be seen as perverse sort of creativity. Adams escapes
his sense of the discontinuity of his own being by a kind of
erotic cannibalizing— a sort of bizarre and forcible
intercourse— of his mind with its objects.22

Through their

death and dismemberment in his mind, Adams himself is
paradoxically made more whole.

The gulf that separates us

through subjectivity is, as Georges Bataille points out, a
kind of death, and "for us,

discontinuous beings that we

are, death means continuity of being."23

In Story's statue

of Cleopatra, Adams, mesmerized by the otherness of
Cleopatra's despair, discovers the possibility of a felt
kinship with the world. Adams is thus restored to a
paradoxical sense of continuity with the world through an
image that conjured the death of the self for him.

Within

this frame, of a quest for an escape from the subjectivity
of superhistorical individualism, Adams's equation of
biography with murder and autobiography with suicide becomes
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explicable. In taking his life in print, in being reduced to
silence, Adams is reestablished as a continuous being. In
biography, similarly, the biographer cannibalizes his
subject, stripping him to the bones that are worthy of
veneration, and consuming and digesting the flesh of an
alternative being at the same time.

The biographer for

Adams is a cannibal with imperialist designs. While he was
working on Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, and beginning to
plan The Education of Henry Adams. Adams wrote George Cabot
Lodge that the thing that he found most troubling in his own
work was
field

its incapacity to "reflect

what lies beyond its

of reflection." Adams at last

affirmed explicitly

that the enlightenment religion of mind and reason was an
imprisoning one.
The fact, which all the psychologists
insist on, that the mind really reflects
only itself, is to me the most
exasperating thing in the world. Until I
read over my own work, I never see the
holes and bare spots in my own mind; and
only then I feel how hard it is to
scratch about and put on false hair and
rouge and a grin...The application of
all this twaddle is perhaps too obvious.
You can see it all, at a glance...by
that tiresome faculty of seeing oneself.
Never— never— never— can you see it as I
feel it, for in that case you would be
somebody else.Yet by that stupid mental
process on which men foolishly pride
themselves— called reason— you can
construct a doll-figure of my literary
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form, and see how it fits, or does not
fit, yours.
(Letters. V, 490)
Like Spenser's Archimago, that prophetic emblem of
modern man's perverse powers of artifice, the mind of the
modern subject fashions lifeless doubles— Shakespeare's
"pictures"—

of all it encounters. Thus, Adams can write

that the individual Bostonian of his generation is a facet
of Boston, and mean that Boston itself is a facet of the
individual mind.

********

Part of Adams's critique of identity involves,
necessarily, a critique of the nature of the subject's
relationship to power, both as private citizen and— in the
case of his friends, and, in his own role as the historian
and biographer of other subjects— as public figure.

And

indeed, the triumph of subjectivity in the West is tightly
interwoven with the development and proliferation of power
structures that are first apparent in the hierarchy of the
Church, and later in the hierarchy of its successor— the
modern state. Thus we should not be surprised that Adams,
masquerading as a twelfth-century monk, and refusing to
indicate his personal authorship of his Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres on the title page of the privately printed version
of the volume, tells his niece of the "marriage" of the
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Virgin and St. Thomas Aquinas in one letter, and moves
comfortably to Alfred T. Mahan's view of the necessity of a
canal through the Isthmus of Panama in another. In the
letter to Elizabeth Cameron, cited above, his longing for
his "happy home at Rock Creek"

(his burial site, unmarked

but already landscaped and memorialized with the unnamed but
immediately famous statue by St. Gaudens)

is couched amid

the details of political intrigue from his vantage point at
the centers of power in Washington.

Adams's entire oeuvre

is an anatomy of power. He is not only an imperialistic
biographer who colonizes his subjects, and assumes
responsibility for the shape of their identity; he colonizes
himself. In the Education, he is the subject and prisoner of
his own Cartesian coqito.

As Foucault recognized a half-

century after Adams, the condition of radical subjectivity,
which Adams found so simultaneously fascinating and
alarming, was a

manifestation of a particular form of

power.24
This form of power applies itself to
immediate, everyday life which
categorizes the individual, marks him by
his own individuality, attaches him to
his own identity, imposes a law of truth
on him which he must recognize and which
others have to recognize in him.
It is
a form of power which makes individuals
subjects. There are two meanings of the
word "subject": subject to someone else
by control and dependence; and tied to
his own identity by a conscience or
self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a
form of power which subjugates and makes
subject to.25

Adams's career— characterized as it always was by a
quest for flight and deterritorialization of the self— is
also characterized by a related effort to untie his sense of
his being from his consciousness of himself and his
preservation in history. Adams denies the power of extension
through family and place that localizes, categorizes, and
imprisons him within a set of family names and traditions
and iconic places and received modes of knowing and
understanding. Central to Adams's exploration of the
possibility of the world outside what he called the "sea of
introspection" is an exploration of the powers of language
that fascinated every nineteenth-century writer from
Coleridge to Matthew Arnold and Nietzsche. Adams was deeply
aware that he inhabited a linguistic field of resurgent
nominalism.

He belongs to that period which saw the

simultaneous advent of man as an object of study in what
Foucault calls the "field of western knowledge," and the
exit of a theory of the correspondence between word and
thing which, however embattled, had served a dual purpose as
a theory of language that was also a critique of the
possibilities of knowledge until the beginning of the
nineteenth-century.26

In Adams's time, language as the

"spontaneous tabula, the primary grid of things, as an
indispensable link between representations and things, is
eclipsed in its turn."27 When language ceases to be the
locus of reality— when words lose their meanings— language

may lose its specially privileged status, but its users are
also magically empowered. In losing its "privileged status,"
language is deterritorialized; freed from representing the
entrenched power structure, it can, like Adams's notion of
an unbounded self, range at the whim of the individual will,
acquiring new capacities with every user and every audience.
Words, as Humpty Dumpty and Deleuze remind us, mean what the
"I" who articulates them "wants them to mean."28

Adams's

fear of representation in biography, autobiography, and
history, stems from his sense that the nominalism he had
first identified in Abelard was triumphant in his own time
and, for better or worse,

in his own work. Adams's obsession

with form is itself reflective of his aesthetic nominalism,
which Theodor Adorno defined as "a process taking place at
the level of form; in fact, nominalism itself becomes form:
an example of the mediation between particular and
universal."29 Adams's experimentation with the forms of
autobiographical representation mirrors his linguistic
nominalism.

As the forms of traditional biography, history,

and autobiography implode and fuse in Adams's

late work, he

illustrates the impossibility of closure in the modern work
of art. His frequently avowed

aesthetic failure reflects

the oxymoronic nature of the "open form," which in itself
illustrates the nominalist critique of the idea of
universal, closed, forms in genre and in language.

In "The

Rule of Phase" and "Letter to American Teachers of History,"

and even in the Education, having denied the organizing and
guiding hand provided by a self-conscious subject, Adams
moves toward mapping the forces and forms of chaos, with
results that, judged from a vantage point of enlightenment
notions of coherence and unity, were necessarily and
intentionally disastrous. Despite the apparently historical
subject matter-— that of mapping the motion of forces in
history— or, in the case of the Education, mapping the
motion of a reified self— there is no movement or
development in the ordinary sense, only a motion around the
single point of the subject's unwavering and inescapable
consciousness. Adams marks time, but without any claim to a
patterned development or sequence. The very principle of
narrative itself is reduced to a hollow shell in the
Education.

As Adorno wrote of Beckett, Adams's principle of

construction is "trans-dynamic," in that it "marks time,
shuffling its feet and thereby confessing to the uselessness
of dynamics." And in Beckett, as in Adams, the "only telos
towards which the dynamic of the immutable moves is
perennial disaster."30 The open form of the Education
refuses and parodies the models from the picaresque
tradition that provide the skeleton of its form.

Adams as

character is as isolated at the end as he is in the
beginning— the old rituals of social integration and of
autobiographical narrative as a progress toward
understanding are denied and replaced with the motifs of
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perennial flight and perpetual uncertainty. As hero, Adams
does not move toward the revelation of meaning at all, but
toward the dissolution and death that had fascinated him
even at twenty-two. In the process, he shatters his own as
well as his readers' illusions of continuity.
On the high-explosive revelations,-— or
revelation— I have hopelessly failed. So
did Kelvin, as he took pains to affirm.
He fell back on the absolute necessity
of a creation. I am inclined to think
that my logic drives me further, to the
unreality of all phenomena.
Unfortunately, this conclusion destroys
mysticism, too, as well as the Ego, the
Non-Ego, and ends in the Unknown. Q.E.D.
...To us old people, the universe
resolves itself into an effort of the
Ego to maintain an illusion of
continuity...Of all the solutions
offered for the universe, this is the
only one which seems to be
demonstrated...but only we old people
may use it...You younger ones are
obliged to deal with the illusion of
continuity alone, though science is
getting precious close to chaos...I
speak strongly because I lost my own
illusion of unity and continuity thirty
years go, and I know how fatal the
rupture is to one's scheme of life. Once
hit by Zeno's arrow, one is a mere mad
rabbit. I printed all this ten years ago
in my Education and merely drivel in
repeating it.
(Letters. VI, 692)
Writing to Charles Milnes Gaskell in August 1914, just after
the explosive beginning of the first world war, Adams said
that he felt like Browning's Childe Roland. He had come to
the dark tower of revelation only to find a ruined chapel
and a desolate landscape. "Childe Roland to the dark tower
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came! He came once too often...and was trapped like an
octogenarian rat...He can't get out" (Letters. VI, 657).
Part of Adams's "illusion of continuity" was sustained
by his nominalist approach to the shape of his own life. He
liked to insist that he had been "born in 1138" (Letters. V,
222).

He also liked to say

Creek"

that his "mansion in Rock

was growing more attractive, and that it was

"idiotic, grotesque, convulsively laughable" to celebrate a
sixty-third birthday in 1901, when he knew that he had been
"born in the twelfth century with Abelard"

(Letters. V,

202). Like the yearning for the grave and his claim that he
was already dead, Adams's claim that he had been born in the
twelfth century becomes one of his ongoing poses in his
letters from the late 1890s until his actual death. Adams
meant that the predicament of the subject of modernity had
been conceived in the twelfth century and that it had borne
fruit in his own particular burden of historical
consciousness. Imprisoned in his own center of subjectivity,
his particular burden of consciousness was the only one he
could know.
For Adams, the crucial conflict in medieval philosophy
had been the conflict between realism and nominalism, and he
believed that it had begun in the twelfth century with
Abelard. Paradoxically, nominalism's triumph had been
ensured by the middle of the thirteenth century in the
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas which, in its time, had acted

as a point of triumph for the principle of reason and
linguistic realism. With its dependence on artificial and
arbitrary designations in language, which originated with
man not God, nominalism was also the necessary philosophic
and linguistic stance that bound the Reformation to the
Enlightenment project and underlay the transfer of power
from Church to Sovereign and then to the State. Its
continuation was implicit in the very idea of a "Universal
History" that, with the notion of radical enlightenment for
all, lay at the heart of the aims of the Reformation and of
its offshoot, the Enlightenment. A universal history would
become for man the sacralized secular text of a new age—
replacing the universals implied by the sacred text of
scripture. The need for a "universal history," like the
eighteenth-century's need for handbooks of grammar and for
compiling

dictionaries which codified both spelling and

meaning has its origins in the special privileging of the
individual's powers of subjective interpretation that was
attendant upon the Reformation views of the individual and
his understanding. Brooks Adams wrote that "as Henry neared
the end of his application of the development of the
thirteenth century according to scientific historical theory
in 'Mt. St. Michel and Chartres,' he turned more and more
toward his next step in the 'Reformation,' on which he
constantly talked with me."31

Adams was antagonistic to the

Reformation, and not only because he felt that it

"dethroned" the Virgin as a unifying symbol of medieval
society, though this was in his view symptomatic of a
fundamental alteration in man's conception of his world.
Adams saw the Reformation as the point where the
"distinction between Reason and instinct" had originated.32
The Reformation can be read as a crisis in the history of
subjectivity, a moment when the liturgy and the hierarchy of
the church with their dual claims to embody and represent
both universal truth and the needs of a supplicant band of
souls were no longer seen as a sufficient means of bridging
the chasm between a subjectively constituted individual and
his notion of a god. The Reformation was a response to
western man's need to avail himself of the truths that lie
in texts, as well as of a need to engage himself in the work
of salvation as a full participant. Subject to none and yet
subject to all, in Luther's famous formulation, the subject
of modernity is king of the metaphysical forest. He no
longer needs a pontiff who claims to be servus servorum Dei
at the same time that he makes the believer subject to not
only God, but the Church and its representatives.

Adams's

imaginatively constructed refuge in the twelfth-century with
its images of Virgin and Archangel, of a harmoniously
configured interior of mind and a corresponding exterior of
action and words that matched their meanings was a
manifestation of the Church's ability to make subjects out
of believers through the exercise of its "pastoral power"

and its claim, through its concern for the individual soul
and the individual life, to be engaged in the individual's
production of truth.

The prisonhouse of self and language

that Adams seeks to escape was forged with manacles of
religion, and made possible by the very sense of "unity"
that made him regard the Christian Middle Ages as a point of
spiritual refuge.33 Subjectivity, as Adams saw in a
wonderfully perverse way, is the ultimate form of the
pastoral mode— the conjuring of protected mental spaces that
are valorized and then shepherded and controlled first by
the Church and later by the state and its servant-of-theservants of God— the Sovereign.

It is hardly an accident

that the pastoral mode in literature enjoys a spectacular
revival in the tangled history of the early modern period
with its sometimes conflicting strands of Renaissance,
Reformation, and Counter-Reformation.

The pastoral mode

does for the literary artist and the reader what the Church
did for man— it provides a safe space of textual
containment, where the Blatant Beast of mortality can be
enfolded and reconciled in the life of man. Lope de Vega's
Arcadia. Sidney's Arcadia, Spenser's experiments with
pastoral in the Faerie Oueene. the Shepheardes Calendar, and
the Daphnaida; Montemayor's La Diana— all

are of a piece.

Perhaps the role of pastoral is most clearly illustrated by
the English estate poem, which makes of the individual
household and family a repository of the canonized political

and spiritual values of a nation— at least until Marvell's
Upon Appleton House, when subjectivity itself usurps the
power of pastoral space, and the poet is no longer able to
escape either the sense of his mortality or the intrusion of
the politics of modernity.

The varieties of Renaissance

pastoral all conjure protected— even Neoplatonic— spaces of
thought, where the dilemmas of the artist, the individual,
and of society at large can be examined in a refuge that is
exempt from mortality at the same time that it is
necessitated by the consciousness of mortality. In
Renaissance pastoral we see the shift from the Church as
good shepherd to the idea of the artist as shepherd and
protector of the province of subjectivity. By extension,
just as Augustine envisions the shape of history for the
faithful, the Renaissance artist, recovering his Virgilian
roots in Dante, envisions the shape of the political future
from Spenser to Marvell and from Marvell to Dryden and Pope.
Adams places himself in their company, but his visions
displace the artist's subjective vision with a chronicle of
the powers of force. Adams's private project of modernity
may have been that of tracing the arc of subjectivity in the
West, but his longing to reform the university system in
America and to reshape the face and focus of American
history are profoundly

political and, in his view, were

inseparable from his metaphysical enterprises. Adams's M t .
St. Michel and Chartres is an American analogue of the

English estate poem, transplanted to New England and the eve
of the advent of urban, industrial society, and transfigured
by the enlightenment sensibility. The historian, not the
poet, is the seer, and Adamses and Jeffersons, not the
Sidneys or Fairfaxes, are beacons of American enlightenment
values. Rather than a literal estate, couched in real earth
and complete with a dependent peasantry, the estate that
Adams treats is that of the boundless territory of mind.
Unfortunately, Adams finds that the beacons shed no new
light in the night of modernity, and that he himself is
rudderless and abandoned amid the forces that were shaping a
new world. The Education, a monument to the disappearance of
the personal self in the glare of self-scrutiny follows as a
necessary sequel. Adams saw himself as completing the
process of the sacralization of the secular34 which begins
with the crisis in subjectivity, or the triumph of the
private self, that accompanies, or perhaps culminates in the
Reformation.

Paradoxically, Adams explores this personal

genealogy of mind only in order to escape it. Specifically,
he aims to reject what he saw— and what is immediately
recognizable— as a Hegelian model of mind, identity, and
history in favor of a philosophy built on what he called a
more "instinctual" way of seeing and being that he saw
confirmed in the philosophy of Nietzsche and of Bergson.
As we have seen, Adams's multiple experiments with
multiple identities have their origin in the biographies and
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histories of the 1880s, which were closely allied in both
time and spirit with his novelistic endeavors from the same
period.

In Democracy and Esther. Adams concretizes his

tendency to extend himself through imitation— which we have
seen even in his student days in Berlin and Italy— by
endowing himself and his dilemmas with alternative names and
an alternative sex. As the anonymous author of Democracy—
Henry Holt, his publisher, was exhorted to the strictest
secrecy35— Adams embraces for the first time the possibility
that perhaps the kind of history and biography he has set
out to write only exacerbated the
subjectivity.

problem of radical

Like Adams, Madeleine Lee has been reading

nineteenth-century social theory. She has read "voraciously
and promiscuously one subject after another," with the
result that "Taine had danced merrily through her mind with
Darwin and Stuart Mill, Gustave Droz and Algernon Swinburne"
(Democracy.

7). She has also read Herbert Spencer

(Democracy.

3),and she is consumed by a desire to experience

the "action of primary forces" at first-hand.
Here then, was the explanation of her
restlessness, discontent, ambition,—
call it what you will. It was the
feeling of a passenger on an ocean
steamer whose mind will not give him
rest until he has been in the engineroom, and talked with the engineer.
She
wanted to see with her own eyes the
action of primary forces; to touch with
her own hand the massive machinery of
society; to measure with her own mind
the capacity of motive power. She was
bent upon getting to the heart of the
great American mystery of democracy and
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government. She cared little where her
pursuit might lead her...
(Democracy. 7)
Adams makes Madeleine Lee a modern-day, feminized version of
Marlowe's Faustus, or perhaps she is only a ten-years-later
version of George Eliot's Casaubon— determined to find the
"key to unlock all mysteries."

Like Hamlet, the figure of

Casaubon haunts Adams's letters. Shortly after the
publication of Democracy. he wrote Henry Cabot Lodge that he
had always thought that he was something of a Casaubon, with
his investigations and his habitual "making little memoranda
of passages," and that "now I see the tendency steadily
creeping over me.

Pleased with his analogy, he declares

that he is "touched" by Lodge's loyalty to
professor;"

his "venerable

he feels like "two Casaubons rather than one,

at the idea of standing in the attitude of a gray-haired
Nestor surrounded by you and Young and poor Laughlin"
(Letters, II, 400). Adams claimed to be seeking "amusement,"
in his studies of history and biography. Similarly,
Madeleine Lee claims to be seeking only "amusement," in her
exploration of political life, but she is really in search
of the roots of power.
What she wished to see, she thought, was
the clash of interests, the interests of
forty millions of people, and a whole
continent, centering at Washington;
guided, restrained, controlled, or
unrestrained and uncontrollable, by men
of ordinary mould; the tremendous forces
of government, and the machinery of
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society, at work. What she wanted was
POWER.
(Democracy. 8)
Lee's mistake,

like Adams's own, is that she believes that

she can explore the "passion of exercising power for its own
sake" without incurring any personal cost, and without being
altered by what she encounters.

Henry Adams wanted to be an

unseen observer on the backstage of history, and his Mrs.
Lee wants something like that privileged vantage point, too.
She believes that she can "go quietly on among the
supernumeraries and see how the play was acted and the stage
effects were produced; how the great tragedians mouthed and
the stage-manager swore." In her passion to observe power at
close range, she also makes the mistake of confusing the
"force of the engine" with "that of the engineer," and "the
Power with the men who wielded it." (Democracy. 8). Mrs. Lee
is caught in the web of ambiguity that Story had captured in
his image of Cleopatra.
Adams also uses the figure of Mrs. Lee to explore his
fascination with the regional basis for American character.
Adams once again introduces what he saw as the intrinsic
bond between New England and the South. Mrs. Lightfoot Lee
herself is a hybrid— a product of the Middle Colonies. Her
father is a famous Philadelphia clergyman, but her husband
is descended from "the Virginia Lees." All of Adams's
special seers— including himself— must possess some "taint"
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of southern blood.

Like Adams, who chose to spend his life

in voluntary and dogged exile from his native Boston,
alternating between lodgings in Paris and a house in
Washington, Mrs. Lee is a sort of fashionable nomad, another
of Adams's picaros, offering a running commentary on a
society within which they are perpetual aliens.

Like Adams,

Mrs. Lee is accepted everywhere, but feels at home nowhere.
She frowns on Europe, but she is "bitter against New York
and Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston."
friend
who

and confidante, and

is hopelessly enamored

Her closest

the helpless hero

of

the book,

of her, is John Carrington,a

Virginia aristocrat who has been financially ruined by the
Civil War.

Carrington carries the secret costs of the Civil

War in his soul.
...the curious look of patient
endurance on his face was the work of a
single night
when he had held his
brother in his arms, knowing that the
blood was draining drop by drop from his
side, in the dense, tangled woods,
beyond the reach of help, hour after
hour, till the voice failed and the
limbs grew stiff and cold.
(Democracy. 125)
Adams makes Carrington another defeated voice of reason who
has been

silenced by his confrontation with the forces and

the consciousness of

history. Carrington is "troubled with

memories of civil war and of associations still earlier,
belonging to an age already vanishing or vanished"
(Democracy. 108). In the formulation that haunted Adams and

would haunt other American literary artists, Carrington is a
man whose imagination resounds with the sonorous names of
the dead who people the spaces of his memory and sap his
essential life.

He is a sort of prefiguring of Quentin

Compson and Horace Benbow and Jake Barnes.

As

he sets out

to entertain Madeleine's younger sister Sybil with rides in
Rock Creek Park and into the Virginia countryside he awakens
in her a sense of the terrible presence of the past.
Arlington Cemetery acquires a life in

the normally

unthinking Sybil's awakening imagination, as "though Cadmus
had reversed his myth, and had sown living men, to come up
dragons' teeth"

(Democracy.

109). The Lees, "old family

friends of Carrington's," are conjured as a ghostly
presence, even though their abandoned mansion is an empty
shell that plays host to

"a grave-yard."

Carrington

explains that Robert E. Lee was "to be our Washington," and
as he talks, and the road from Richmond to Appomattox comes
alive for Sybil, Adams experiments with the simultaneous
recreation of history and the invention of a receptive
audience— of uncle talking to niece that was to characterize
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Significantly, the fictional
rides of Carrington and Sybil recapitulate Adams's rides
along the same trails with his wife Marian. The favorite
path is not the one that leads to Arlington, but to Rock
Creek Cemetery. In the "quiet shadows" at Rock Creek Sybil
and Carrington find a kind of "protection and a soft
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shelter;” there, they are free from the "risk of criticism
from curious eyes." Adams was later to use these same
phrases to describe both his "autobiography" and his grave
at Rock Creek.
The villain of the novel, who teaches Mrs. Lee the
reverse of Carrington's lessons about honor and virtue in
history, also echoes Adams's fascination with regional
characters.

Silas P. Ratcliffe is an Illinois senator who

is a transplanted New Englander.

The Midwest introduces a

new element into Adams's geographic eguation. If Southerners
are voluptuaries and radical individualists, and New
Englanders are all metaphysics and Calvin, Ratcliffe is the
rising spirit of the new order— the product of a state whose
primary city would serve, in Sandburg's words, as "hogbutcher to the world." He has what Carrington calls "Yankee
eyes."
Cold eyes...steel grey, rather small,
not unpleasant in good-humour, diabolic
in a passion, but worst when a little
suspicious; then they watch you as
though you were a young rattlesnake, to
be killed when convenient...His eyes
only seem to ask the possible uses you
might be put to.
(Democracy. 15)
Though Ratcliffe had ridden the crest of the tide of the
anti-slavery movement in Illinois, the issues of mind that
so perplexed Adamses and Jeffersons and Randolphs are alien
to him. Adams has Ratcliffe come not from Peoria, but from
"Peonia," Illinois. For Madeleine,

"the Peonia giant" seems
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to be "the high priest of American politics"

who will

initiate her into the mysteries of political power.
To her eyes he was the high-priest of
American politics; he was charged with
the meaning of the mysteries, the clue
to political hieroglyphics. Through him,
she hoped to sound the depths of
statesmanship and to bring up from its
oozy bed that pearl of which she was in
search; the mysterious gem which must
lie hidden somewhere in politics. She
wanted to understand this man; to turn
him inside out; to experiment on him and
use him as young physiologists use frogs
and kittens.
fDemocracy. 20)
Madeleine wants to put Mr. Ratcliffe to rack and torture,
and in her quest for the pearl of political wisdom which
lies buried in the "oozy bed" of Mr. Ratcliffe's
statesmanship, she is quite willing to sacrifice his
humanity.

Adams frames Madeleine's anatomy of Senator

Ratcliffe in Baconian terms, and, just as Bacon and the
enlighteners who came after him sought power over nature,
she seeks power over Ratcliffe in a peculiarly nineteenthcentury manner. She seeks to classify him as a particular
kind of beast, and to provide him with a name and a
definition which will also serve to immobilize him in her
mind. Like a biographer Madeleine thus intentionally sets up
a discontinuity between herself and Ratcliffe that is also
an assertion of her superiority over him. Madeleine attempts
to place Ratcliffe in the grid of things known in her mind.
In so doing, she engages in the characteristic activity of

modernity— she "cuts up the continuum of being into a
pattern of characters."36 In short, she takes his life
through the activity of her mind, and substitutes a
simulacrum for it. Her inability to probe the depths of Mr.
Ratcliffe's mystery stems not from any lack of coldness or
intelligence on her part but from her complete lack of
awareness that Ratcliffe is a new creature, made from the
new cloth of industrial civilization, which, as Hawthorne
had known thirty years before, would scarcely take the
present into account, much less the past.

Not content with

having Madeleine place Senator Ratcliffe in a table of
things known, classified, and limited,

Adams insists that

the reader replicate Madeleine's activity. Adams's method
recalls that of

Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose brutal

constitutions of economic class guide the reader to reject
the realm of slave traders. The reader rejects Haley, the
slave trader we encounter in the tableau that opens Uncle
Tom's Cabin not because his activity is morally repugnant,
but because he had "coarse bejewelled hands" and "gaudy
vests of many colors." The distinction that the reader draws
between himself and Haley is based on an assertion of
social, not moral superiority. The reader wants to feel
superior to Haley; he wants to deny any kinship with this
man who speaks in "easy defiance of Murray's grammar."37
Adams's characterization of Senator Ratcliffe, similarly,
draws on class distinctions that are designed to define him
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for Adams's audience as a creature separate from the world
of Madeleine and Carrington and Sybil, the old Baron Jacobi,
and most of their familiar acquaintances.
And he was a western widower of fifty;
his quarters in Washington were in gaunt
boarding house rooms, furnished only
with public documents and enlivened by
western politicians and office-seekers.
In the summer he retired to a solitary,
white framehouse with green blinds,
surrounded by a few feet of uncared-for
grass and a white fence; its interior
more dreary still, with iron stoves,
oil-cloth carpets, cold white walls, and
a large engraving of Abraham Lincoln in
the parlour; all in Peonia, Illinois.
(Democracy. 20)
Ratcliffe's oil-cloth carpets and the solitary engraving of
Lincoln that adorns his parlor contrast sharply with
Madeleine's

"melancholy Wilton carpets," and with the

miscellany of sketches, paintings, and porcelain"

that are

scattered throughout her house on Lafayette Square.

Her own

"domestic altar-piece" is

no engraving of Lincoln, but a

"mystical Corot landscape"

(Democracy. 9). As always,

however, Adams's vision of Madeleine is not a simple one.
Corot's landscapes, of course, had a special bourgeois
vulgarity of their own, and Mrs. Lee's taste in
like her taste in philosophy,

paintings,

is one of Adams's hints that

this is a satire that cuts in all directions and does not
shrink from spearing the character who seems to be a
composite of Adams and his wife. Corot landscapes were
popularized versions of a Rousseauesque fascination with
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nature. Along with other paintings of the Barbizon school,
they were most in vogue among newly monied city-dwellers who
liked to adorn their walls with emblems of a country life
they had no intention of living, and a life in nature from
which they were perpetually alienated by both education and
habit.38 In the summer of 187 5, as he contemplated the onset
of a new term as a history professor at Harvard where
"university priggishness" bored him, Adams wrote Sir Robert
Cunliffe that he was delighted to have decorated his own
summer-house parlor at Beverly Farms with English
watercolors,

including a Cousens which he called "the best

thing I have."

Adams's fellow professors found his tastes

alien. Their tastes, like Madeleine's, tended toward Corot
paintings, Morris wall-papers, Herbert Spencer, and
"culture."

The obsession with "culture" as Matthew Arnold

had defined it made Adams "want to foam at the mouth."

His

hostility extended to most of his university acquaintances,
and further, to most New England intellectuals.
We are a practical people. We are
sternly conscientious. Our young women
are haunted by the idea that they ought
to read, to draw, or to labor in some
way...to 'improve their minds.' They are
utterly unconscious of the pathetic
impossibility of improving those poor
little hard, thin, wiry, one-stringed
instruments ... which haven't range enough
to master one big emotion...Our men in
the same devoted temper talk "culture"
till the word makes me foam at the
mouth. They cram themselves with second
hand facts and theories till they bust,
and then they lecture at Harvard College
and think that they are the aristocracy
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of intellect and are doing truly heroic
work by exploding themselves all over a
younger generation, and forcing up a new
set of simple-minded, honest, harmless
intellectual prigs as like to themselves
as two dried peas in a bladder.
(Letters. II, 235)
In his assault on his fellow New Englanders, Adams despises
their continuing dependence on "European fashions in
'Culture.'" His chagrin at a kind of self-willed
intellectual colonialism is assigned seven years later to
Southerners, but in this letter, written in 1875, Adams in
private plainly feels that this is a phenomenon that is
endemic to American intellectual life, and perhaps to the
modern world. Most importantly, Adams is already moving
toward his embrace of the life of the instincts and of
feeling that will become of such crucial importance in his
later theories of history, of education, and of identity. In
the summer of 187 5, Adams has already identified what he
found

to be the troubling tendency of modern education.
It is an atmosphere of "culture," with a
really excellent instinct for all the
very latest European fashions in
"Culture." Matthew Arnold should be
their ideal. Ruskin and Herbert Spencer,
Morris wall-papers, Corot paintings,
Eastlake furniture, are our food and
drink. The theories are the very best
and latest imported. Our young people
have all the most novel intellectual
fashions crammed into them with alarming
conscientiousness. But I am aghast at
the result. Such a swarm of prigs and
all suffering under a surfeit of useless
information, is new to human experience.
Are we never to produce one man who will
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do something himself, is the question I
am helplessly asking...
(Letters, II, 234-235)
While Madeleine's tastes are built on prejudices
against American intellectuals and their pretensions, Adams
does not simply skewer his acquaintances in Democracy.

He

skewers himself and he skewers his readers. We innocently
affirm Madeleine's tastes. We want to associate ourselves
with her as surely as we want to dissociate ourselves from
Ratcliffe. Adams's private joke is that we as readers are
unknowingly mocked through the very tastes that we seek to
affirm. The joke extends to him, however; Adams and his wife
Marian had shopped, albeit unsuccessfully, for Morris
wallpapers,39 and their own house was decorated with an
array of objects not unlike those presented by Madeleine's
parlor.
At the same time, Adams's own longings-"are we never to
produce one man who will do something himself"— are echoed
in Madeleine's question of five years later: "Why will
somebody not grow to be a tree and cast a shadow?"
(Democracy. 6). Similarly,
loss of

Carrington's regret over the

"whatever it was that produced George Washington

and a crowd of other men like him" (Democracy. 66) is
Adams's regret.

Madeleine's quest for the public good in a

"maze of personal intrigue, this wilderness of stunted
natures"

(Democracy. 87) is Adams's own quest in his

historical investigations.

Madeleine's despair after

reading the lives and letters of the American presidents and
their wives, and her disgust at the "melancholy spectacle"
"from George Washington down to the last incumbent"
replicates Adams's own— the fruit of his efforts at writing
American history. Madeleine discovers, as Adams himself had,
that all who had "aimed at high purpose... had been
thwarted, beaten, and habitually insulted." With Adams
himself, she asks what "deeper abyss could have opened under
the nation's feet"

(Democracy. 43). Madeleine's resolution

to her discovery— through Carrington's intervention— of the
proof of Ratcliffe's corruption— is also Adams's. She flees,
exchanging Washington for Egypt, and consumed by

a longing

to "live in the Great Pyramid and look out forever at the
polar star" (Democracy. 182).

Like Adams himself, she seeks

relief through entombment. The pyramids, after all, were
mysterious monuments that served as both palaces and tombs
for the restless dead. The novel closes in a sort of
narrative disintegration, which mirrors the confusion and
flight of Madeleine and her sister. Except for a postscript
that notes that most of her countrymen would think she "had
made a mistake" in dismissing Mr. Ratcliffe, we hear from
Madeleine only through an amanuensis, Sybil. Sybil's letter
is supplemented by a "thin strip of paper" advising Mr.
Carrington to "try again" to win Madeleine.

This novel is

the first of Adams's works to use the nominalistic device of
the open form. The novel collapses as a form as Mrs. Lee
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moves beyond its circle of action to embrace a different way
of seeing and being that is withheld from the reader.
Mrs. Lee's secret— and the source both of her power
over others and her inner restlessness— in the narrator's
view, is that "she had artistic tendencies,"

which lent her

an air as "impalpable as an Indian summer mist and
nonexistent except to people who feel rather than reason."
Like her creator, Mrs. Lee may be a frustrated artist, but
she also shares with him a yearning for power, and for
exploring the possibilities of modernity and of democracy.
When Baron Jacobi, a seventy-five year old Bulgarian
minister notes the American tendency to believe itself
"excepted from the operation of general laws," with the
result that it will "be more corrupt than Rome under
Caligula," Mrs. Long wants to believe with Nathan Gore, a
New England historian and poet, that one can still hold a
faith in the possibilities of modernity.
But I have faith; not perhaps in the old
dogmas, but in the new ones; faith in
human nature; faith in science; faith in
the survival of the fittest. Let us be
true to our time, Mrs. Lee!
(Democracy. 41)
Mr. Gore

does not recognize, nor does Mrs. Lee, though

Gore's analysis sounds hollow to

her,

that the idea

of the

"survival of the fittest" is merely a reworking of the old
Greek argument

for governance based on the order of phvsis-

-the rule of the stronger as it is represented in nature.

173

Baron Jacobi's warning echoes
on the

Jefferson's warning in Notes

State of Virginia that Virginians, and by extension,

Americans, should look ahead to a time when corruption would
necessarily ensue,
They should look forward to a time, and
that not a distant one, when corruption
in this, as in the country from which we
derive our origin, will have seized the
heads of government, and be spread by
them through the body of the people;
when they will purchase the voices of
the people,and make them pay the price.
Human nature is the same on both sides
of the Atlantic, and will be alike
influenced by the same causes. The time
to guard against corruption and tyranny,
is before they shall have gotten hold on
The safeguard against corruption, in Jefferson's view was
the rule of law— a source of order that lay outside the
realm of individual caprice.

What Madeleine learns in the

course of the novel is the necessity of adhering to
Jefferson's only political dogma: that in times of
necessity, the American "enlists under no man's banner,
enquires for no man's name,
standard of the laws."41

but repairs always to the

Jefferson haunts the narrative

spaces of Democracy. Indeed, the novel provides a sort of
alternative understanding of Jefferson and of democracy to
the versions of history and biography that Adams was
providing in New England Federalism and in his biography of
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Gallatin and the evolving project of the History of the
United States.
Adams's relationship to both of his novels is a
peculiar one and belongs to a period when his many masks and
disguises began to proliferate.

Madeleine Lee is the first

of Adams's fictional masks. While Democracy was
characteristically published under the veil of anonymity,
John Hay and Marian Adams were frequently named as possible
authors.

One of Adams's little masquerades involved

pretending that Hay was the author of Adams's books. Hay had
in fact proposed to "redeem" the author of Democracy by
publishing a vindication of American politicians.42

Adams's

response to Hay's suggestion once again reflects his sense
that the act of writing both fiction and non-fiction
involved a species of "murder and self-destruction."
If you follow your scheme and write a
story'by the author [of Democracy1.'I
hope you will take the new motif under
your eyes.
Describe the sufferings of
the anonymous author on hearing his book
discussed in a foreign country, and how
it gradually led him to murder and selfdestruction.
Although my brain is much
disturbed by the whirl of authors known
to have written your book [i.e.
Democracy1, and the vision of you and
King and James listening to revelations
on the subject is almost too much for
m e . ..Much as I disapprove the spirit of
your book...I can see that in English
reflection it must become more terrible
to its creator than to anyone else...The
situation is tragi-comic to an
exceptional degree, and quite new to
literature. You can make some atonement
for your offence, by explaining the
terrors of your atonement. This new
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crucifixion is unique in history, and
should have great success.
(Letters. II, 474)
Adams's musings on a "crucifixion in history" through novelwriting accompany his announcement of the birth of Adams's
version of John Randolph, the biography that was "part of
myself" and wherein Randolph, must "live forever" and curse
Adams as his literary father from his "silent tomb."

Later

on, Adams compares the first installments of the proofs of
his history to the birth of a "baby." His equation of
writing and publication with birth and death

transcends all

boundaries of time and genre.
The history of Adams's second novel, Esther. is even
more complex than that of Democracy. It was published under
a pseudonym. Adams was "Frances Snow Compton." Even Adams's
closest friends were for a time unaware that he was its
author. Adams convinced Henry Holt, its publisher, to allow
the book to be published without any advance notices or
advertisements, claiming that he wanted to see if the work
could survive without the commercializing endeavors of the
publishing industry. While Holt had been indiscreet about
the authorship of Democracy.

he never revealed that Adams

had written Esther. Adams's authorship became generally
known only after his death in 1918.43

When he began work on

Esther in 1883, Adams wrote John Hay, who was rumored to be
a possible author of Democracy, that he heard

that Hay was
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publishing "another" novel. While Hay was, in fact
publishing the first installment of The Bread-Winners
anonymously, Adams was still playing with the idea that Hay
had authored Democracy.
I am glad to hear that you are
publishing another novel. I was so
frank in telling you my unfavorable
opinion of 'Democracy' that I will try
to read the new one in hopes that I may
be able to speak well of it. Is it not a
little risky to lay the scene at
Cleveland after laying the scene of
Democracy at Washington? Two such
straws must be fatal.
(Letters. II, 508)
Eventually Adams told Clarence King and then John Hay
his "melancholy little Esther"

about

(Letters, III, 34), but only

after his

wife, Marian, had killed herself by

drinking the

potassium

cyanide that she used to retouch photographs

in

December, 1885. Clarence King claimed that the reason for
Adams's secrecy about the book stemmed from his guilt at
having "exposed his wife's religious experiences, and, as it
were, made of her a chemical subject vis a vis religion."44
Adams wrote John Hay from Japan in 1886 that the book should
die.
My poor boy, how very strong you do draw
your vintage for my melancholy little
Esther. Your letter of July 18 has just
reached me...Now let it die! To admit
the public to it would be almost
unendurable to me. I will not pretend
the book is not precious to me, but its
value has nothing to do with the public
who could never understand that such a
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book might be written in one's heart's
blood.
(Letters. Ill, 34)
Whatever revisionist views Adams developed about the
novel which so eerily anticipated his wife's suicide a year
later, he began work on Esther in early 1883 in part because
he wanted to experiment with repx*esenting an American woman
in narrative, and felt that neither James nor Howells had
done so successfully. Writing John Hay in 1883 after reading
the first section of The Bread-Winners, he congratulated Hay
on having represented women more successfully than his
famous American contemporaries.
Howells cannot deal with gentlemen or
ladies;he always slips up. James knows
almost nothing of women but the mere
outside; he never had a wife. This new
writer not only knows women, but knows
ladies; the rarest of literary gifts. I
suppose he has an eastern wife?...If the
author wrote 'Democracy' as is said, he
has made a great stride in every way
especially in humor, which is rather
conspicuously wanting in that overambitious and hard-featured book.
(Letters, II, 513)
Once again, Adams maintains his private fantasy that Hay had
written Democracy. He also feigns ignorance of the
author's identity.

"new"

Meanwhile, Adams read proof-sheets for

his own Estherf and kept the novel's existence a secret from
all of his friends. Adams's motives for writing are, as we
have seen, always complex; one is inclined always to recall
Brooks Adams's warning in his introduction to his brother's
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last essays that "Henry was never, I fear, quite frank with
himself or with others"

(Degradation. 1).

However, if

Democracy represents in embryo Adams's doubts about the
nature and direction of historical process and of America,
then Esther is his exploration not of any such simple
dichotomy as "science and nature," or "reason and faith,"
but of his growing sense that individuals were all
imprisoned within their private castles of mind and their
private systems of belief. No community of being or of
meaning either through art or language existed. Wharton's
handsome glass saints, to use the language of Mt. St. Michel
and Chartres.

preside over a dead church and a dead faith.

Hazard, the young minister who falls in love with Esther,
seems moved less by the mysteries of faith than by his power
over his flock.
He took possession of his flock, with a
general advertisement that he owned
every sheep in it,white or black, and to
show that there could be no doubt on
this matter, he added a general claim of
right of property in all mankind and the
universe. He did this in the name and on
behalf of the church universal, but
there was a self-assertion in the quiet
air with which he pointed out the nature
of his title, and then, after sweeping
all human thought and will into his
strong-box, shut down the lid with a
sharp click and bade his audience kneel.
The sermon dealt with the relations of
religion to society. It began by
claiming that all being and all thought
rose by slow gradations to God,— ended
in Him, for Him— existed only through
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Him and because of Him. The form of act
or thought mattered nothing...
(Esther. 189-190)
Hazard's first sermon denounces the claims of the Cartesian
cogito. Hazard asserts that while philosophers may claim to
know that they exist, the Church responds that they live and
move and have their being only within the bounds prescribed
by the Church:

"No! You are not, you have no existence of

your own. You were and are and ever will be only a part of
the Supreme 'I AM,' of which the Church is the Emblem”
(Esther, 190).

Through Hazard, Adams articulates the

problem of identity as he was coming to understand it. For
him, identity is a kind of perpetual state of contingent
being.

Adams recognizes that the idea of a personal self

requires the simultaneous existence of God and of world, and
that without these constructs our individual names and our
notions of identity are empty of meaning.45 What Adams, and,
through him Esther, seeks is the realm in which identity is
transpersonal and relational. That realm is available in
Esther, but only through the possibility of suicide offered
by the Falls. Esther's central problem is thus an
existential one. Hazard, whose name implies the danger he
poses to Esther's quest for an authentic existence,

is

almost disembodied. Even his desire for Esther is a longing
to claim and conquer her soul. George Strong, on the other
hand, and his profession— geology— suggest his more
instinctual approach to existence, but Esther's longings

move her toward Hazard, not George.

The other romantically

paired characters in this psychomachia are equally
allegorized.

Catherine Brook, Esther's orphaned friend who

comes from the West, is "nearer nature" than any woman
Wharton, the artist figure, knows. Wharton, for his part,
damaged by his unfortunate marriage,
since the collapse of his marriage"

"lives only in his art
(Esther, 228-229).

Catherine is thus unavailable to him. We later learn that
Wharton met his wife in a Paris hospital, where she was
suffering from an overdose of arsenic. Like Story's
Cleopatra, she is "fierce, splendid, a priestess of the
oracle! Tortured by agony and clinging to it as though it
were a delight "(Esther, 251). In reality, she has the
"temper of a Fury, and all the vices of Paris," and she
eventually abandons him. Wasted by his encounter Wharton
realizes Petrarch's secret: "I knew the secret of Petrarch
and I could not tell it. My wife came between me and my
thought. All life took form in my hands as a passion"
(Esther, 252). The primary characters in Esther are bits and
pieces of human beings— either all soul and thought, or all
body and instinct. Only Esther and Wharton have the capacity
to mediate between what Adams divides into two worlds.
Wharton has retreated into thought and art— which he sees as
an imitation of Petrarch's choice of the vita solitaria:
Esther is left to choose between the "physical life," which
she regards as the "unreal" part of existence; and a

spiritual life which she finds deadening and abhorrent. In
his passion for control of her being, Hazard finds himself
gazing into a "theological abyss"

(Esther. 275). Esther,

meanwhile, flees to Niagara and a room that overlooks the
cataract, where she feels "herself being swept over it.
Whichever way she moved, she had to look down into an abyss
and leap"

(Esther, p. 330). Her choice involves being swept

away by the Falls, or owned by Hazard, who admits that he
wants her "whole life, and even more."

Esther conflates the

two poles of her choice— death by drowning in the falls or
death by self-annihilation in religion. She imagines the
"thunders of the Church already rolling over her head, and
that her mind was

already shutting itself up under the

checks of its new surroundings"

(Esther, 3 31). For Esther,

the church is "all personal and selfish." It proposes to
extend the personal self into eternity.
I despise and loathe myself, and yet you
thrust self at me from every corner of
the church as though I loved and admired
it. All religion does nothing but pursue
me with self even into the next world.
(Esther. 332-333)
The cataract becomes a central symbol in Esther. and
just as generations of visitors to Adams's own memorial at
Rock Creek Cemetery have argued over the sex of St. Gaudens'
statue, Esther and her companion argue over the sex

of the

Falls. For Esther, the falls are masculine: "It isnot

a

woman! It is a man!...No woman ever had a voice like that"

(Esther, 318). At the same time, Esther describes the falls
as though they were feminine: "What a complexion, to stand
dazzling

white and diamonds in the full sunlight"

(Esther.

314). Esther's fascination with the Falls anticipates Kate
Chopin's vivid personification of the Gulf of Mexico which
calls Edna Pontellier in The Awakening with the same voice
and the same story that

Esther hears at Niagara. In

Chopin's novel, echoing, repetitive passages that mirror the
motion of the tides, center the novel in the stages of
Edna's awakening to a condition of subjectivity that has its
analogue but not its counterpart in a sense of physical
ecstasy that she can feel only when she is alone, in the
sea. Mrs. Pontellier's erotic visions,

like all such visions

in the universe of subjectivity are always onanistic. Adams
writes his own version of Madame Bovarv in his attempt to
problematize the issue of sexuality as a twin of the problem
of subjectivity. The males around Mrs. Pontellier,

like

Adams's emasculated modern American males, for whom he
repeatedly expressed his contempt, shrink from Edna's
budding physical passion and the magnetic power over others
that stems from it.

For Edna, the "voice of the sea is

seductive, never ceasing, whispering, clamoring, murmuring,
inviting the soul to wander in abysses of solitude."46 Edna
is able to hear the sea, because, like Esther, she has
"begun to realize her position in the universe as a human
being, and to recognize her relations as an individual to
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the world within and about her."47

Feeling embattled not by

the Church, but by lesser instruments of conventional
morality, a husband and children, Edna chooses the abyss of
solitude through drowning.

Adams leaves his heroine poised

for such a choice, but unable to make it. Adams draws a
distinction between the falls and the sea.
The sea is capricious, fickle, angry,
fawning, violent, savage, and wanton; it
caresses and raves in a breath, and has
its moods of silence, but Esther's huge
playmate rambled on with its story in
the same steady voice, never shrill or
angry, never silent or degraded by a
sound of human failings.
(Esther, 314)
Esther does not choose the abyss of solitude. She does not,
in fact, choose anything at all within the frame of Adams's
narrative, but whereas Edna Pontellier wants to drown in the
sea of introspection,

Esther, like Adams wants to escape it.

The Church is an abyss not because it involves a rejection
of the principle of identity, but because it seeks to
project identity into eternity. The central characters each
revolve in centers of their own.

Whartcn loves Catherine,

but is too damaged to claim her. Esther loves Hazard enough
to "sacrifice herself" for him, but she declines to dissolve
under the weight of the Church

for him. George Strong loves

Esther, but she loves him only as a favored brother. All of
the traditional routes out of the finite center of self are
blocked in Esther. Sex is linked with death and scandal;
marriage and convention with

ennui.

The realm of
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spontaneous desire is perpetually alienated

from those who

make it inaccessible by their very consciousness of its
existence.
Adams took Esther's name from the last of the four
stories that comprise Hawthorne's "Legends of the Province
House" in Twice-Told Tales.

Adams admired Hawthorne's

work,48 and in explanation of his futile attempts to locate
a copy of The Marble Faun in Rome in 18 60, wrote his brother
that "when Mr. Hawthorne describes or praises anything it is
time that other people should hold their tongues." "Legends
of the Province House" deals with the imaginative
restoration of the chronicle of New England history that is
also at the heart of The Scarlet Letter. In each of the four
stories Hawthorne explores the apparently lifeless surface
of an historical anecdote, bringing portraits and otherwise
uninteresting buildings to an unnatural life by drawing
"strenuously upon [his] imagination."49 Hawthorne's narrator
in the tetralogy is fascinated by how the "lapse of time"
affords "opportunities for many variations of the
narrative." "Despairing of literal and absolute truth" he
does not hesitate to make such "further changes as seem
conducive to the reader's profit and delight."50

History as

entity is dismissed; it is redesigned as a product of the
narrator's mind. "Old Esther Dudley" is the last of the four
stories. Hawthorne's Esther is an old royalist woman who
refuses to believe that King George has been defeated, and
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who continues to inhabit the abandoned mansion of a departed
government even after the

Revolution is over, and the last

British General, Sir William Howe has left for England.
As the General glanced back at Esther
Dudley's antique figure, he deemed her
well fitted for such a charge, as being
so perfect a representative of the
decayed past— of an age gone by, with
its manners, opinions, faith and
feelings, all fallen into oblivion or
scorn— of what had once been a reality,
but was now merely a vision of faded
magnificence...old Esther Dudley was
left to keep watch in the lonely
Province House, dwelling there with
memory; and if Hope ever seemed to flit
around her, still was it memory in
disguise.51
Esther is an artifact, a creature who is one of the walking
dead. The world in which she lived and moved and possessed
an identity has vanished.

When she beholds herself in her

mirror, which is popularly believed to have magical powers,
she sees an image that is "indistinct and ghostlike" in part
because she is constituted only through memory; she has no
part to play in any community made up of the living.

Old

Esther continues to inhabit the "old historic edifice" of
the Province House, and as the years pass a body of myth
surrounds both the house and her.

In the legends, Old

Esther became a sort of Merlin who could use "a tall antique
mirror" in the house to summon the shades of the past.
Among the time-worn articles of
furniture that had been left in the
mansion there was a tall, antique
mirror...it was the general belief that
Esther could cause the Governors of the
overthrown dynasty, with the beautiful
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ladies who had once adorned their
festivals, the Indian chiefs who had
come up to the Province House to hold
council or swear allegiance,the grim
provincial warriors, the severe
clergymen— in short all the pageantry of
gone days— -all the figures that had ever
swept across the broad plate of glass in
former times— she could cause the whole
to reappear and people the inner world
of the mirror with shadows of the old
life.52
As in so many of Hawthorne's stories there is an echo
of Spenser here. Spenser aimed in his Faerie Oueene to
provide Queen Elizabeth with a text that was also a "fair
mirror," capable of conjuring for her an "antique image" of
her "great ancestry."53

The Province House becomes an icon

of history; Old Esther becomes a type of the modern magus—
the historian who can conjure the simulacrum of the past in
her mirror and through it, direct the course of the future.
While, as Hawthorne adds, she is a "symbol of a departed
system," she also embodies "history in her person."
Esther's is a tragedy of the modern subject: "living so
continually in her own circle of ideas, and never regulating
her mind by a proper reference to present things,"54 Esther
appears to the world that has superseded her to be crazed.
When a new governor is finally elected, and presents himself
at the Province House, which is now refigured as the
Governor's mansion, Esther realizes that she is no more than
a ghost of a vanished past. The Governor's presence is an
intrusion of a living embodiment of the otherness of the
world outside the carefully constructed phantasm of life in

the Province House.

Her collapse at the feet of the newly

elected representative of a new order who confronts her with
the speech that forms the epigraph of this chapter
symbolizes her loss of access to meaning, both as character
and as symbol. The new governor is a member of a "new race
of men— living no longer in the past." If Esther is an
embodiment of history, the new governor is an embodiment of
the new religion of Progress. His duty is to move

his

fellow citizens "onward, onward," with the constant reminder
that they are not the "children of the past" any longer.55
There is very little humanity in his treatment of Esther;
there is no space reserved for sentiment in this newly
engineered order. While the Governor pays lip-service to
honoring the old world that Esther represents, Esther is a
curiosity— an object for scientific examination— whose death
evokes not pity, but a hymn to progress.
Though Hawthorne's narrator and the "old Loyalist" who
tells Esther's story lack her mysterious mirror, they too,
can conjure the shapes of the past. Hancock's statement
about Esther— "she hath done her office"56

also refers to

the agency of the Province House. It has summoned the
simulacrum of the past in such a way that the very clocks
seem to strike in a "bygone century." Like Adams, Hawthorne
conflates the related powers of memory and historiography
with a sort of sorcery. His narrator leaves the Province
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House determined not to revisit it "for a good while hence— ■
if ever."57
Throughout his life, Henry Adams felt that he, too, was
a sort of ghostly being. In his Education. Adams describes
himself as a "child of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries."

His name carried with it an "eighteenth-century

inheritance;" he is

brought up in an atmosphere that is

"colonial, revolutionary, almost Cromwellian" and yet, "for
him alone, the old universe was thrown into an ash heap and
a new one created"

(Education. 723-2 6).

Hawthorne's Esther

is one of Adams's doubles, and both she and he are literally
and figuratively doubled again in Adams's Esther through the
agency of Adams's narrative imagination. While Adams's
Esther founders on the rock of an identity she is neither
willing to relinquish nor affirm, her double and predecessor
in Hawthorne help place the novel squarely in Adams's study
of modern intellectual history as the record of a continuing
crisis of subjectivity. Adams's habitual indirection about
his motives is at play again. There is more of Adams and of
the dilemma he was addressing in Esther in Old Esther Dudley
both as story and as character than there is in his own
novel.
In both Democracy and Esther Adams explores the
problems of the historian of modernity that were
crystallizing in his mind as he revised the History of the
United States. At the end of the previous chapter, I

suggested that the enterprise of writing an authoritative
history was intimately connected in Adams's imagination with
the idea of self-representation. Esther as text scarcely has
an identity of its own. It is rather a composite of other
texts, a narrative discordia concors in which

other

authorial voices and other authorial dilemmas are refigured
by Adams's magisterial imagination. Esther and Hazard,
Catherine and Wharton are latterday configurations of other
pairs of thwarted artists and lovers from the historical
past. In Wharton's anguished imitations of Petrarch's
uncertainty over whether life was best lived in the pastoral
spaces of contemplation and retirement at Vaucluse, or amid
the stench and chaos and excitement of the active life in
Avignon, the novel invokes the origins of modernity. The
corpus of Petrarch's work centers in his awareness of
himself as an isolated subject at the culmination of a
history from which he feels alienated. Modelling in small
the progress of the entire corpus of Adams's work, Esther
traces the self-conscious subjectivity of Petrarch to
Spenser's passionate post-Reformation endeavor to

mirror a

usable past through art. It revisits Hawthorne's retelling
of Spenser as part of the tragedy of America, and it reminds
us always of Adams's self-conscious manipulation of all the
texts of the past. Petrarch and Spenser, Adams and Hawthorne
are unified by what Adams perceived as the haunting disease
of modern historical consciousness. The very Petrarchan

canzoniere that Wharton employs as images of

his personal

tragedy in Esther underscore the warning that Petrarch as
writer has Augustine offer the fictional Francesco of the
Secretum:"the story of Narcissus has no warning for you."58
Petrarch's curious modernity as autobiographical subject, as
poet, and as historiographer stems from his tendency to
mediate his experience through writing. Not only did
Petrarch write autobiographical letters to posterity; he
also wrote letters to the dead ancients with whom he desired
to establish a "living" connection through writing and
reading. As in Adams's own letters, fictive, historical, and
living beings exchange places readily in Petrarch's
Epistolae Familiare. and like the Laura whose actual death
scarcely disturbs the progress of the poems she inspires,
they are dependent on Petrarch's fantasia which breathes
life into them all. Petrarch calls his recipients to him, as
subjects, and moulds them into simulacra of themselves
through writing and through memory. His autobiographical
letters to posterity along with the Secretum. reflect his
need to represent experience through the written word that
mirrors Adams's own. "I desire to write but I know not about
what or to whom to write."59 William Kerrigan and Gordon
Braden note that in Petrarch's writing "the myth of Apollo
and Daphne intersected the myth of Narcissus and Echo."60
The same is true of Adams, and he saw in the tangle of
literary and historical allusions that comprise the

narrative shape of Esther an emblem of the tangled web of
his own identity, a composite of writing and speech, of
texts and experience remembered and reconstituted— consumed
by the subject in the recesses of the sepulchre of mind.
Adams chose Petrarch as the central symbolic literary figure
in Esther as self-consciously as he chose Hawthorne. Hans
Blumenberg marks April 26, 1336, when Petrarch may or may
not have ascended Mont Ventoux, as the "one of the great
moments that oscillate indecisively between the epochs" of
the medieval and modern worlds. The letter epitomizes the
conflict between the inner and outer man, between "outside
and inside," between "the world and the soul"61 and its
resolution in self-contemplation that preoccupies Petrarch
in La Vita Solitaria.

Nature shrinks into insignificance in

comparison to the "loftiness of human contemplation," in
Petrarch's letter, as it had for his model Augustine, but
for radically different reasons. Petrarch sacralizes
Augustine's vision of the life of religious retirement, as
well as the idea of contemplation. Petrarch seeks
contemplation not because he seeks the infinite, or because
he seeks a dialogue with God, but because "this pursuit of
literature (my italics) by means of which we consecrate our
own name to that of another, carving statues of illustrious
men much more enduring than bronze or marble, can be carried
on nowhere more successfully or freely than in solitude."62
Petrarch uses the authority of Augustine, of the saints'

lives, and of the exemplary figures of solitude to advance a
concept of secularized retirement. His vision of the retired
life of a man of letters is the life of a monk in which the
interior spaces of mind have supplanted the cloister.
Petrarch's use of ecclesiastical authorities affords a
priestly dimension to the scholar's vocation; his use of
secular ones places his endeavor within the framework of
human history— the spaces in which the individual life
acquires real unity and meaning. After Petrarch, as Adams
knew, unity and meaning are earned through the practice of
interpreting and writing historical and literary letters to
the world.

If Petrarch's mission was to establish a vital

continuum between his own age and that of the historical
past through the literary vocation, Adams's mission is to
assert that such connections are entirely subjective, and
that the continuity they provide is bought at a price of
imprisonment in the echoing halls of the past that doom
Quentin Compson.
In the previous chapter, I alluded to Adams's decision
to destroy sections of his diary as sections of his History
were

published. The surviving fragments of

Adams's diary

center in Adams's mother's illness, senility, and death; his
own darkening depression; and his

steady work on the

"deadly routine" of history-writing. The routine was
"deadly" not because Adams was bored. On the contrary, he
was immersed in the battles of the War of 1812, and in the

drafting of the Treaty of Ghent. The work was "deadly"
because Adams was writing about the man who had been the son
of Abigail Brooks and Charles Francis Adams, and who had an
extended identity as an Adams in Boston and in history out
of existence. The History was his monument to that self. He
had fulfilled his filial duty. Self-generated selves awaited
him. On September 9, 1888, Adams wrote that he was "nearly
Buddha"

(Letters, III, 139).

Aware that he was nearly

finished with the history, he brought his diaries from
Boston to Quincy, and in "long meditated action," he began
their "systematic destruction."

On 16 September, when he

actually finished his narrative, and "walked in the garden
among the yellow and red autumn flowers" "in imitation of
Gibbon," he was finished not only with the narratives of
Jefferson and Madison, but with the narrative of the
original version of Henry Adams. The contrast between his
"beginning and end"— something "Gibbon never conceived"—
required the death of the self, and in the haunting phrase
that would characterize the rest of his writing career,
Adams wrote that he meant "to leave no record that can be
obliterated."

The only "serious undertaking" that remained

was for him to communicate with St. Gaudens about the
sculptural monument at his wife's grave (Letters. Ill, 143).
By September 20, Adams wrote that he was

"steadily working

towards my demise...I have read and destroyed my diary to
the autumn of 1861" (Letters, III, 146). Obviously he never
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destroyed the rest of the diary, and perhaps the point that
he intended to make— that the completion of the history was
the end of his first life— is better made because the
fragments of the diary remain to guide us readers as we poke
about among his literary remains. Fragments remain from the
rest of 1888 and end in 1889, shortly after the death of
Adams's mother in early June. The last entry is for July 7,
1889. In December, 1888, Adams recorded in the diary that "I
am launched and must take my final course"

(Letters. Ill,

161). The death of Adams's mother, references to his
dealings with St. Gaudens about "the Buddha"

for Rock

Creek, and the endless and tedious efforts that attended the
publication of the History dominate the last of the entries,
as they had dominated the fragments that record Adams's
planned suicide through destruction of the literary texts of
his outworn self. With these dealings accomplished, Adams
was ready to make his exit.
Ernest Samuels appropriately calls the paired
activities of publication and metaphorical self-destruction
a "macabre ritual,"63

but for Adams this strange

consignment of the textual self to flames was perhaps not
"macabre" at all, but the flight of a phoenix that was to be
consumed only to be reborn. Adams's destruction of his
diaries symbolized a Nietzschean destruction of the old
version of a personal self that must die in order for the
man of the future to be born. Adams enacted his private

rites at the fireplace in his study in September,

1888,

during the publication of successive chapters of the
History. The ritual was the fulfillment of his affirmation—
recorded in a surviving fragment of the diary from May,
1888— that he saw "the day near when I shall at last cut
this only tie that still connects me with my time"

(Letters.

Ill, 114). The text of personal history that had enchained
Adams from the time of his birth "under the shadow of Boston
State House" to the time he completed his own version of
American history from 1801-1817 was to be abandoned at last.
Adams did not, it is to be noted, destroy his letters, or
want them to be destroyed.

On the contrary,

he took pains

to see that they survived. He chose rather to destroy his
diaries, with all their evocation of what Porter Abbott
calls an "intensity of privacy, cloistering,

[and]

isolation." Diaries are a ground of reflexive drama, and
"creative cumulatively the effect of a consciousness thrown
back on its own resources, abetted only by its pen."64 Adams
burned the diaries in order to escape the idea of a

self

that he had inherited with his pew at Quincy, an idea of a
self whose being was continuous with history, and which

had

been enshrined in the creation of the American republic.
At about the same time that he finished the History, he
wrote Sir Robert Cunliffe that his "last long volume" was
drawing to a close, and that he could foresee a time when he
would be "free forever from my duties in life, as men call
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the occupations they are ashamed to quit, but are sorry to
follow". Adams also told Sir Robert that,

"once free," he

intended to "begin a new life, in which the old one can
hardly have any sequence"

(Letters, III, 115). That his

escape was prefigured in fiction and was to be constituted
through a flight into other kinds of texts is but one of the
many difficulties in framing an understanding of the complex
of paradoxes that, taken together, were and are Henry Adams.
Like Hawthorne's narrator in "Old Esther Dudley," Adams was
ready to quit the Province House of history for a world
that,

if not broader, was at least different than the one

Adams had inherited with the enlightenment project of his
ancestors. A new self was required for such a world, and in
the works that follow the history, Adams fashions a sequence
of doubles in which the personal self is at last
transcended. Adams's line of flight toward the world of
sense took him first to the American West, and later, and
more importantly to a literally new name and a new identity
in Tahiti. The completion of the novels and histories
combined with the destruction of his diaries to provide
Adams with a kind of fictional and symbolic closure for his
old life— the suicide through writing that is also a birth
into a new life. Adams's ritualized suicide

functions as a

sharp divide between the old self and the old life and their
replacements. Esther's dilemma at Niagara Falls, and
Wharton's dilemma as he tries to provide a living art for a

dead church refigure not only Petrarch's dilemma in the
Secretum. but also Adams's dilemma as artist and historian
in a textual arena that he perceived as modern in a very
different sense than Petrarch did. His dilemma

is partially

resolved in the destruction of the diaries that embody a
personal self and in the writing of the autobiographical
works that offer a new and transpersonal identity. While the
surviving portions of the diary are a sort of extended
suicide note, the actual disappearance of Henry Adams is not
recorded in them. That remained for the final and more
explicitly autobiographical enterprise that is the subject
of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4

H E N R Y A D A M S AN D THE U N N A M E A B L E

'I'

Nietzsche acutely observes that we are
more influenced by what does not happen
to us than by what does, and, according
to the Egyptian ritual of the dead, when
the 'double' abandons the corpse and has
to perform its feat of self-definition
before the judges of the world beyond
the grave it makes its confession
contrariwise, that is to say, it
enumerates the sins it has not
committed.1
Ortega y Gasset, "The Sunset
of Revolutions"
Is not this rather the place where one
finishes vanishing?2
Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable
Adams's quest for a deterritorialized self and,
consequently, his more overt treatment of the problem of
subjectivity, assumed an experimental form in the 1890s when
he undertook to write the deposed Queen of Tahiti's memoirs.
Having killed off his old identity, his unbounded
consciousness was in search of a new mode of self
definition, which was, in its turn, to be recreated and then
destroyed in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The Education of
Henry Adams. and the various essays and letters on history
that he wrote between 1894 and 1910.
During and after the publication of the History of the
United States. Adams,

like many other literary figures of

his day, undertook a journey to the tropics. Adams had been
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interested in Buddhism and in Japanese art for some time,
and he had travelled to Japan with John La Farge in the
summer of 1886 in pursuit of both interests. The trip had
whetted his appetite for further adventures outside the
bounds of western civilization. As the publication of the
History

drew to a close, he planned a journey to what was

then called Polynesia. On 8 July, 1890, Adams wrote W.C.
Brownell that he had sent the title-page to his history away
(Letters, III, 249). He wrote John Hay the next day that he
was "melancholy," and that "life seems strangely unreal and
weird on this ill-balanced perch. One can so easily drop
out"

(Letters, III, 250). In mid-August Adams set out for

the long western journey through the United States that
would make his further journey to what he imagined as a land
of exotica possible. He went first to Honolulu, and then set
out for what was then known as Polynesia. In Hawaii, Adams
took to painting again, producing what he called "a very bad
copy of my own ignorance" which nevertheless had "the charm
that I felt as a boy going about fishing."

(Letters. Ill,

270-71). He found himself enjoying "much that is not to be
set down in literary composition" as well as the landscape.
I get softly intoxicated on the soft
violets and strong blues, the masses of
purple and the broad bands of orange and
green in the sunsets, as I used to
qriser myself on absynthe on the summer
evenings in the Palais Royal before
dining at Vefour's, thirty years ago.The
outlines of the great mountains, their
reddish purple glow, the infinite
variety of greens and the perfectly
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intemperate shifting blues of the ocean,
are a new world to me. To be sure, man
is pretty vile, but perhaps woman might
partly compensate for him, if one only
knew where to find her. As she canters
about the roads, a-straddle on
horseback, with wreaths of faced yellow
flowers, and clothed in a blue or red or
yellow night-gown she is rather a riddle
than a satisfaction.
(Letters. Ill, 280-81)
Adams was recovering— o r , more accurately, discovering— his
ability to live in a realm of pure sensation. He was
learning, in Deleuze's terms, to experience the world as
pure event. In his journey to Honolulu, Samoa, and Tahiti,
Adams was able to experience what he saw not as "persons,
characters, or subjects" but as "atmospheric variation, a
change of hue, an imperceptible molecule, a discrete
population, a fog, or a cloud of droplets." For the death
wish that had accompanied the destruction of his diaries, he
substituted a Deleuzian death-wish which was simultaneously
an "apotheosis of will"3 and a declaration of a new mode of
existence. On horseback-riding expeditions outside Honolulu,
Adams recovered a delight in the "scenery, the sky and the
ocean, the mountains, the valleys and ravines, the lights,
and the constant pleasure of breathing" that he had "never
expected ever again to feel" (Letters. Ill, 282) . By late
September he was writing Elizabeth Cameron that he was "glad
to be dead to the old existence, which was a torture, and to
forget it, in a change as complete as that of another
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planet.11(Letters. Ill, 285).

When he resumed his journey he

wrote from the Equator that he was "now fairly dead"
(Letters, III, 288). On Samoa he saw girls "with their
dripping grasses and leaves and their glistening breasts and
arms" seem to "come out of the sea" in the Siva dance. After
the dance--and Adams was to see many versions of it in
Samoa— Adams found himself and LaFarge lying about with the
young native women "sprawling over the mats, smoking,
laughing, trying to talk, with a sense of shoulders, arms,
legs, cocoa-nut oil, and general nudeness most strangely
mixed with a sense of propriety."

Adams felt "that at last

the kingdom of old-gold was ours" and that "no future
experience, short of being eaten, will ever make us feel so
new again."

(Letters, III, 291).

Later, as Adams developed

a friendship with a Samoan village princess named Fa-a-uli,
he also developed fascination with her splendid strong body
and cat-like movements. Adams wrote that "Clarence King
would go wild with envy if he could see me lying on the
floor watching Fa-a-uli peeling sugar-cane for me to eat,
then going through a whole cane on her own account...I never
tire of watching her."

Admiringly, Adams took the young

princess's measurements, and was delighted to find a kind of
physical double in her, a counterpart to the doubles in
spirit that he had encountered in history and created in
novels; her head measured exactly the same as his own.
(Letters, III, 316-17). He fantasized about marrying "some

splendid creature, six feet tall, who would carry me in her
arms like a child."

Adams was fascinated by what he saw as

the peculiar but unconfining sexual mores of the Samoans,
which he described as "the strangest compound of laxity and
strictness, of absolute freedom, and rigorous restraint, of
charm, and repulsion"

(Letters, III, 324). In the Samoan

woman Adams saw a remnant of primitive reverence for woman
as nature goddess that was to preoccupy him in M t . S t .
Michel and Chartres. In language that oddly anticipates his
treatment of the power of the Virgin in the Middle Ages he
writes that a princess like Fa-a-uli even "leads the
warriors even to battle," wearing a "showy war-costume." The
androgynous ideal that informs the St. Gaudens monument and
shapes the tension between Virgin and Archangel in M t . S t .
Michel and Chartres seems to have been born in Samoa.
As Adams became more used to his new surroundings, he
began to feel more and more that he had escaped his own
consciousness of himself. He wrote that he found himself
"now and then regaining consciousness that I was once an
American supposing himself real...my own identity becomes
hazy"

(Letters, III, 292) . Adams's identity was not so

easily routed, however. He discovered on a visit to King
Malietoa that he possessed status as a great al i . or
nobleman, because all of the natives "knew the frigate
'Adams," a warship that had been commissioned by the United
States to give medical aid to Malietoa's faction in 1887

during a civil war in which British, American, and Samoan
interests opposed German interests which had temporarily
succeeded in toppling Malietoa from his throne (Letters.
Ill, 293). The Adams name and with it a fragment of his old
identity had followed him even to Samoa. The irony was not
lost on Adams. He was aware that his journey to Samoa for
pleasure was not without its penalties for the Samoans. The
missionaries, who had forbidden the Siva dance, excluded Faa-uli and other princesses from church membership. Adams
realized, long before Levi-Strauss that the intrusion of
Adamses— both frigate and man— signalled, along with the
arrival of missionaries, the end of the life lived in
harmony with nature and with one's fellow man that had been
the Samoan past. If in Adams's view, missionaries proffered
the apple which taught the natives about sexual shame
(Letters. Ill, 324), his presence also added to the problems
inherent in the inevitable collision of native and European
culture. Nevertheless,

in his account of his tropical

sojourn he self-consciously lapses into Madeleine Lee's and
his own earlier tendency to turn the people who came beneath
his gaze into objects for scientific study.

His sketches of

Samoan society are designed to provide "entertainment" for
himself and his western epistolary audiences. In attempting
to translate his experiences into the language of his
friends who tied him to late nineteenth-century America—
Mrs. Cameron had replaced his History as his one remaining

"tie” to life in the modern world— Adams lapses back into
the language of a self and the systems of value that he
thought he had left behind. As he writes about the ecstatic
moments when he felt that he had truly escaped the sense of
discontinuity that had characterized the late 1880s, he
exhibits a marked tendency to assume a kind of superiority
over the "child-like" Samoans. Adams asserts his sense of
personal superiority over the Samoans even when he admires
them. The "back of a Samoan woman when she is in motion" is
a

"joy forever," and he "never tires of watching the swing

of their arms and the play of light over the great round
curves of their bodies"

(Letters, III, 298) but they are

like splendid animals to him. When Keats wrote that a "thing
of beauty is a joy forever," he was being somewhat ironic.
Keats knew that "things"— aesthetic objects— are necessarily
devoid of a life of their own. They acquire life only in the
imagination of the beholder. For Adams the Samoan women, are
indeed, "things" of beauty. Because he can transform them
into objects for study, he can draw analogies between them
and "ivory image[s] of Benvenuto's;"

(Letters, III, 316).

The men are creatures out of Homer (Letters, III, 319); the
women summon images of a "dozen Rembrandts intensified into
the most glowing beauty of life and motion"
3 01).

(Letters. Ill,

Despite his suggestions that Samoa is the last

retreat of man in his most perfect form, Adams feels
comfortable in asserting that "'love'" for the Samoan women

"is not a deep emotion," and that they "have no deep
emotions or strong passions"

(Letters. Ill, 326). At times

in his letters he feels capable of narrating their
otherness, and of asserting the control over them that only
the values of scientific rationalism could provide. The
Samoans are reduced to interesting creatures that serve as
rewarding objects for Adams's aesthetic and sensual
contemplation. Adams seems to have been aware of the
paradoxes inherent in the very writing of the serial letters
that record is time in Samoa and Tahiti for his closest
friends. He wrote Lucy Baxter that he had discovered a world
"so unlike anything I imagined that I can write a book more
easily than a letter"

(Letters, III, 323) . Communicating his

experience in any form was problematic. Even photographs
were unsatisfactory to Adams; they

"take all the fun out of

the tropics." They "vulgarise the women" and destroy the
"softness of lights and colors, the motion of the palms, the
delicacy and tenderness of the mornings and evenings"
(Letters. Ill, 307). He sent John Hay some photographs, but
wrote that Hay would have to supply for himself "the color,
the movement, the play of muscle and feature, and the whole
tropical atmosphere, which photographs kill as dead as their
own chemicals"

(Letters, III, 304). Photographs, which

provide a "scientific" version of reality, had as little
capacity to communicate the richness of Samoa, where Adams
claimed to lose track of both self and clock time, as
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Adams's western language and his letters. They reduced
everything in Adams's words to "type." Adams, of course, had
had occasion to note the death-wielding capacities of
photography before, when his wife had died after drinking
her own developing fluids. In his more characteristic moods,
Adams believed that "the Samoans have an entire intellectual
world of their own, and never admit outsiders into it. I
feel sure that they have a secret priesthood more powerful
than the political chiefs, with supernatural powers."
Marvelling at the way the Samoans were "masters at playing
the missionaries off," Adams seems to have realized that the
Samoans were finally as impenetrable and mysterious as
westerners. However, he seems also to have believed that he
had encountered the world of sense that he had sought when
he set out on his Polynesian idyll.
Here are these superb men and women,—
creatures of this soft climate and
voluptuous nature, living under a
tropical sun, and skies of divine purple
and blue,— who ought, on my notion, to
be chock-full of languid longings and
passionate emotions, but they are pure
Greek fauns. Their intellectual
existence is made up of concrete facts.
As La Farge says, the have no thoughts.
They are not in the least voluptuous;
they have no longings and very brief
passions; they live a matter-of-fact
life that would scare a New England
spinster. Even their dances... always
represent facts...The dancers play at
ball, or at bathing, or a cocoa-nut
gathering, or hammer, or row, or
represent cats, rats, birds or devils,
but never an abstraction...They have the
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virtues of healthy children— and the
weaknesses of Agamemnon and Ulysses.
(Letters, III, 346)
What the natives represented for Adams was man freed from
the disease of self-consciousness, and its accompanying
prisons of sentimentality and artifice. Intent on becoming a
Polynesian, Adams responded vaguely to Mrs. Cameron's news
in January,

1891, of the world left behind. To her remark

that the later volumes of his History were "more critical"
than their predecessors, Adams responded in his role of the
walking dead man, that "they were written...in avery
different

frame of mind from that in which the work

was

begun. I found it hard to pretend either sympathy of
interest in my subject."
If you compare the tone of my first
volume— even toned down as it is, from
the original— with that of the ninth,
when it appears, you will fell that the
light has gone out. I am not to blame.
As long as I could make life work, I
stood by it, and swore by it as though
it were my God, as indeed it was.
(Letters. Ill, 382)
Adams's epistolary record of his quest for a new self
continues the obituary to a lost self and a lost world that
ends the decade of the eighties, with its focus on
histories, biographies, and novels. The public record of his
new strategy for being was not about Samoa, but about
Tahiti, and the "memoirs" were not about Adams, though they
are, as we shall see, also his memoirs, but about the

surviving members of the Tahitian royal family, who had
adopted Adams as one of their own. The narrative web in
Tahiti; Memoirs of Arii Taimai. et. al. is thus a tangled
one, for the memoirs are not really those of the former
queen, Marau Taaroa, but of her mother, Ariitamai, the
elderly widowed "chiefess," as Adams called her, of the Teva
clan (Letters. Ill, 407). They are the memoirs of a family
that is also a community in which life acquires meaning
through relationships rather than a story of the solitary
individuation of a personal self. In an effort that
anticipates the narrative experiments of Gertrude Stein,
Adams, who had been adopted by Ariitamai,4 merges his
identity with that of the "Chiefess" and her extended
family. Early in their visit, Adams and his friend John
LaFarge

exchanged names with Ori, one of the Teva

chieftains. At that point, Adams found the idea amusing, but
as he became increasingly fascinated with Ariitamai's family
history and its inevitable progress toward decay and
decadence, he came to realize that names in Tahiti still had
a serious meaning, and an extension in place. As their
relationship evolved, Ariitamaii bestowed personal family
names on Adams and LaFarge in addition to their tribal
names. Adams was not only "Ori," which signified

membership

in the general body of the clan; he acquired personal
identity with

his new name of "Taura-atua," which means

"Bird Perch of God."

He had been adopted by Ariitamai.

Thenceforward, she was his mother, and her family history
was also his. Adams had found a literal replacement for his
abandoned self. The title page of the original, privately
circulated version of Tahiti,

in characteristic Adamsian

word play reads "Memoirs of Arii Taimai e/ Marama of Eimeo
/Teriirere of Tooarai/Teriinui of Tahiti/ Tauraatua I Amo."
Adams's actual name appears nowhere. In later editions of
the memoir, the title page reads "Tahiti/ by Henry Adams/
Memoirs of Arii Taimai e Marama of Eimeo/ Teriirere of
Tooarai, Terrinui of Tahiti/ Tauraatua i Amo."5

Adams

shares equally in the memoirs with the other members of his
acquired "family." By including his Tahitian name—
"Tauraatua i Amo"— in the title he becomes not only the
author of the memoir, but the agent through which the
narrative of his adopted family's history is made accessible
to western history. Just as Ariitamai gave Adams a name in
Tahiti, Adams bestows a western identity upon the family
through writing her life. At the same time, Adams became a
mediating spirit, moving between two worlds and two kinds of
consciousness.
Ariitamai's existence had hardly been a scene of
uninterrupted pastoral. The complications of the intrusion
of European life were everywhere,

including Ariitamai's

marriage to Alexander Salmon, a Londoner who had founded a
kind of Tahitian dynasty through his wife's connections.
Adams came to see the symbolic possibilities in

his
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adoption, and took it quite seriously. The deposed queen,
who assisted in compiling the notes and stories that make up
Tahiti. is his "sister"

(Letters. Ill, 471) and he writes to

his Tahitian "family" of "our ancestors," while feeling
"dead as Adam" to his old life (Letters. Ill, 479) .

Adams's

active quest for a new anchor in history thus begins with
the book that is most often called simply Tahiti, and which
has frequently been dismissed as a tangential piece of
travelogue.

In fact, as the title pages suggest, Tahiti is

the first installment of Adams's autobiographical
enterprise, the first version of a new state of being. In
writing it, and in examining the curious mixture of European
education and Tahitian tradition that were the life of the
Teva clan, Adams found no escape from the dilemmas of modern
life. Indeed, he may have chosen to write a Tahitian rather
than a Samoan memoir because the Samoans were still
sufficiently free of self-consciousness to lack a historical
sense; their experience could not be communicated through
the alienating medium of language. In the Teva clan, he
found a record of the confrontation of European and
Polynesian culture, and he also found an

occasion for

contemplating the problem of identity from the vantage point
of the imperial traveller. In Tahiti, Adams explored all of
the difficulties that his months in Samoa had presented.
Adams later claimed that his "historical neck" had been
"broken" at the Chicago Exhibition of 1893. In reality, his
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visit to the South Seas seems to have raised a number of
questions about colonialism and imperialism, about
individual identity and community, as well as about the
nature of personal and political power which took final
shape at the Chicago Exhibition and in his "Letter to
American Teachers of History," which is treated in the next
chapter.
*********

If Adams had embalmed and buried his old self in the
text of his History and escaped it in Samoa, he turned to it
as an object of study in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. There,
Adams undertook an examination of Christianity's fostering
of the concept of the self, which he had left unresolved in
1884 in Esther.

Mt. St. Michel thus is vehicle for

exploring the concept of self-doubling through narrative
that had originated in the novels, and continued in Tahiti.
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres is a response to Adams's growing
interest in medieval history and art and a reversal of the
motion of his Tahitian quest. Rather than explicitly seeking
escape from his western identity, he sought to restore that
identity through an immersion in the origins of modern
history. Mt. St. Michel entwined in Adams's mind with what
for him were the perennial questions of subjectivity,
biography, biographers, and self-representation.

By 1899,

Adams's interest in twelfth-century architecture and glass

and his fondness for translating chansons de qeste— an
occupation that dated back at least to 1893, had resulted in
a plan for a experimental kind of history, one which would
endow history with a sense of literary form.6

In an

extension of the equation between autobiography and history,
he seems always to have conceived of Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres as a kind of personal memoir, if not as an
autobiography.

And for Adams, autobiography was always

biography, a cage of form, in which a reified self could
come under the scrutiny of the presiding deity of the
historian's consciousness. By 1902

the new work had taken

full form, and Adams was planning its sequel, which he
cryptically described as an "historical romance of the year
1200" (Letters. V, 378). The new "romance" would eventually
take shape as the Education of Henry Adams. Adams's typical
epistolary pose for writing both Mt. St. Michel and the
Education

was that of a "sexagenarian Hamlet."7

Adams was

trying to make his peace with history, and, like his
favorite literary character Hamlet, he was ready to announce
his death to whatever Horatio was present to read him. Adams
differs from Hamlet in that Adams wanted to tell his own
story, and in so doing take his own portrait for the gallery
of history. He was nearly finished with Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres when he communicated the doubts about James's
version of William Story and Morley's version of Gladstone
that we have discussed elsewhere, but his doubts about
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biography had haunted him all along. In March of 1900,
shortly after he had begun serious work on what was to
become Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams wrote Elizabeth
Cameron in his guise of "twelfth-century monk" who had a
"habit of tumbl[ing] into black holes" of his pain and
disgust at trying to read his brother Charles Francis's life
of their father.
I've been trying to read my brother
Charles's Life of our father, and it
makes me sick. Now I understand why I
refused so obstinately to do it myself.
These biographies are murder, and, in
this case, to me, would be both
patricide and suicide. They belittle the
victim and the assassin equally. They
are like bad photographs and distorted
perspectives...I have sinned myself, and
deeply, but thank my diseased and
dyspeptic nervous wreck, I did not
assassinate my father.
(Letters, V, 102)
Adams's disapprobation of any verbal monuments extended even
to collections of letters, and, recording his reaction to
the publication of Robert Louis Stevenson's letters, he
urged Elizabeth Cameron in an uncharacteristic moment to
destroy his own to her: "Do not leave them knocking about,
as a mash for female pigs who feed out of the magazinetroughs at five dollars a page, to root in, for scandal and
gossip"

(Letters, V, 103).

The schizoid focus of Adams's existence— part medieval
philosopher, part shrewd political analyst— is nowhere more
apparent than in the disparity between the imagined twelfth-
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century romance of Mt. St. Michel and the letters that
record Adams's immersion in the centers of political power
in the Washington

of the first years of the twentieth

century. However, in its way, Mt. St. Michel is as political
a work as the Education or Tahiti; it is an exploration

of

the remains of a time when the State was still the subject
of the church, and the personal self was the subject of
both.

Unlike the modern subject, who shapes his forms of

government arbitrarily and changes them at will, the
medieval subject was a part of a foreordained hierarchy of a
vision of world order that doubled as source of social order
and as an affirmation that words were the true coin of the
meanings that they sought to represent.
While Adams may have seen

Mt. St. Michel and Chartres

as an "historical romance," he also wrote Elizabeth Cameron
that he was the "Virgin's biographer"

(Letters, V, 448), a

curious claim given his usual assertion that "these
biographies are murder." He seems to have seen this
biography as life-giving. When he began to prepare the work
for printing, he wrote that he was "so much absorbed in
babies that I dreamt last week that I was going to have
one." Adams goes on to explain that "one of [his] minds" was
"rather surprised," but that his "other mind" had replied
that "men always had babies."

The dream is a sort of

allegory of what Adams was actually trying to communicate.
He was completing his manuscript, which had "swelled to the
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size of an ox" (Letters, V, 452-453).
the creation

Adams always regarded

of a literary double as either a pregnancy and

birth, or as a wake and funeral for a self. He had regarded
the publication of his history as an occasion to engage in
ritual destruction of the literary self that had been
preserved in his diaries.

Similarly, but with curiously

opposite intent, he had felt compelled

to announce that

John Randolph was "just coming into the world" when he
finished the Randolph biography. As he prepared to circulate
a few copies of Mt. St. Michel.

he felt that he was once

again with child, and ready to give birth to a new version
of himself.

After his hundred copies were printed, Adams

wrote that he had just finished his Miracles de la Vierqe.
and that he was reconciled to the "premature demise" of
Thomas Aquinas and "the late Duns Scotus"(Letters, V, 618).
The meaning of the work, Adams explained to Henry Osborn
Taylor, was couched in the last three chapters, which, Adams
claimed, were his declaration of anarchy.

(Letters, V, 624).

I am trying to work out the formula of
anarchism; the law of expansion from
unity, simplicity, morality, to
multiplicity, contradiction,
police....The assumption of unity which
was the mark of human thought in the
middle ages has yielded very slowly to
the proofs of complexity... Yet it is
quite sure...that, at the accelerated
rate of progression shown since 1600 it
will not need another century or half
century to tip thought upside down. Law
in that case would disappear as
theory...and give place to force.
Morality would become police. Explosives
would reach cosmic violence.
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Disintegration would overcome
integration. This was the point that
leads me back to the twelfth century as
the fixed element in the equation. From
the relative unity of the Prime Motor, I
can work pretty safely down to Karl
Pearson's Grammar of Science or
Wallace's Man's Place in Nature or to
Mach and Ostwald and the other Germans
of today. By intercalating Descartes,
Newton, Dalton, and a few others, I can
even make almost a time-ratio. This is
where my middle-ages will work out. I
tell you this in order that you may
explain...why the volume is not offered
to the public...
(Letters, V, 627)
Adams's plan for Mt. St. Michel involved not "accuracy,"
which was "relative," but a sense of the necessity of
bringing the "picture" of the Middle Ages "into relation
with ourselves."

Adams's desire was activated not by his

fascination with the medieval world as much as it was
necessitated by the fact that "nothing in all nature [is] so
iconoclastic, miraculous and anarchistic as Shakespeare"
[Letters. V, 628). As his letter suggests, he was already
hard at work on tracing western intellectual history as the
arc of subjectivity, and he saw Shakespeare as
representative of the sensibility of 1600, the moment when
he believed that all unity as having been finally lost.
After 1600, in Adams's view, man stood on the precipice
overlooking an abyss of modernity. Beginning with the
artificial assumption of medieval unity, then, Adams would
move toward the triumph of law as "theory," and the point at
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which "morality becomes the police." Adams offered a more
personal view to Elizabeth Cameron.
...I deny that it is a book; it is only
a running chatter with my nieces and
those of us who care for old art. Vanity
is a danger I can hardly fear
now;... self-depreciation has always been
my vice, and morbid self-contempt my
moral weakness, as it was that of the
12th century mystics, which is the bond
of sympathy between us; but we each
recoup ourselves by feeling a calm,
unruffled, instinctive, unfathomed
scepticism about the existence of a
world at all... we are all that is; we
know no other world...We never despised
the world or its opinions; we only
failed to find out its existence
...Philosophy has never got beyond this
point. There are but two schools; one
turns the world into me; the other turns
me into the world; and the result is the
same.
(Letters. V,

659-660)

In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams turns the mirror on
the world, conjuring simulacra of the shapes of time in much
the same way that Hawthorne's Old Esther does in "Tales from
the Province House" and with much the same end— that of
forging vital links between past and present— that
preoccupied Petrarch in his efforts to link himself with
classical antiquity. Adams begins, however, with the notion
that the past in itself is not recuperable, and that the
links, like the story, will necessarily be both subjective
and fictional. Thus Adams also turns the mirror on himself.
For once, Adams was being straightforward when he told Henry
Osborn Taylor that he was not interested in accuracy. He was
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interested in enabling his imaginary audience, the
companions of his own voyage, to become "prematurely young,"
so that they can cross the "bridge of ages between us and
our ancestors" (MSM, 343-344).

The uncle says that the

point of the voyage is not to recover the facts of medieval
history, but the feeling. Our aim, he announces,

is to use

our "ignorance" to help us "feel what we cannot understand"
(MSM, 394).
Upon the book's publication by Houghton Mifflin under
the auspices of the American Institute of Architects in 1913
Ralph Adams Crum read the work as Adams's affirmation of the
"revelation of the eternal glory of mediaeval art and the
elements that brought it into being."8

Later readers have

tended to follow Crum's lead; even more skeptical readers
have read the work as a sort of Ruskinian glorification of
the unity of the Middle Ages. In fact, Mt. St. Michel
consumes itself at every turn, pointing not to the
possibility of recovering history through imagination, but
to the impossibility of escaping our imposition of self upon
history. In this work, Adams does not recapture the Middle
Ages at all, but merely reconstitutes himself as a twelfthcentury monk. In keeping with his pose and with the supposed
medieval ideal of pictor iqnotus. the one hundred quarto
volumes that were issued privately in 1905 gave no
indication of authorship. The title page read simply "MontSaint-Michel and Chartres/Travels/France."

As we have seen
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of course, Adams as Adams had absented himself from title
pages before— specifically, from the first edition of the
Tahiti where he is both subject and author of the memoir—
but not as Henry Adams. In this case, however, he absents
himself in part because he had aimed to pursue the school of
thought that "turned me into the world" rather than the
reverse. Thus, in writing this volume and its sequel, Adams
had drowned in the seas of time and imagination. Having done
so, he could proclaim three months into the first world war
that "I am Saint Augustin! Read him! You will see me all
through"

(Letters, VI, 666).

The first warning that this is

to be a perilous text

for the reader comes in the Preface, as Adams examines the
tenuous relationship between the modern writer and his
audience. Quoting an anonymous Elizabethan "poet or
playwright", Adams begins by

saying that he "who reads me,

when I am ashes is my son in wishes." Adams muses that this
sort of relationship is impossible; it is much too close for
any relationship in the modern world. The closest kinship
we as an audience can claim to him is nephews, but since
modern nephews tend not to read, nephews will not do either.
Besides, Adams adds, "the metre does not permit it. One may
not say:— 'Who reads me when I am ashes is my nephew in
wishes.'"

Nieces are a possibility, however. The "change

restores the verse," and they have been known to "read their
uncles." Furthermore,

they are like to "carry a kodak." The
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relationship is an easy one, "capable of being anything or
nothing, at the will of either party."

(M S M . 341).

Surprisingly, this preface has usually been seen as
disarming or comforting.9 In fact, it is a nominalist
manifesto. The aim of Adams's elaborate stage management of
uncle and nieces is of a piece with Nietzsche's claim to
Jakob Burckhardt in 1889, that "every name in history is
' I .' "

Actually, I would much rather be a Basel
professor than God; but I have not
ventured to carry my private egoism so
far as to omit creating the world on his
account... The unpleasant thing, and one
that nags my modesty, is that at root
every name in history is I; also as
regards the children I have brought into
the world, it is a case of my
considering with some distrust whether
all of those who enter the 'Kingdom of
God' do not also come out of God. This
autumn, as lightly clad as possible, I
twice attended my funeral, first as
Count Robilant (no, he is my son,
insofar as I am Carlo Alberto, my nature
below) but I was Antonelli myself. Dear
professor, you should see this
construction; since I have no experience
of the things I create, you may be as
critical as you wish; I shall be
grateful, without promising I shall make
any use of it. We artists are
unteachable.10
In Nietzsche's now infamous letter, the subject that is
Nietzsche embraces centers of subjectivity other than his
own in his frustrated guest for a place in the community of
humanity.

Consuming all the names in history, Nietzsche,

like Adams after him, functions as an imperial subject who,
in a newly acquired status as narrative god, imposes his "I"
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on all he encounters,

including his readers.11

Adams's

quest is a more extended one, however. By the time he wrote
Esther. he had become disgusted with the perennial baggage
of self-consciousness. Esther's primary complaint about the
Church is that it wants to extend the personal self, which
she "loathes," into infinity. Adams is moving in M t . S t .
Michel toward his self-erasure in the Education, and,
ultimately toward the quest that Beckett outlines in The
Unnameable for the point where "one finishes vanishing.1,12
In the Preface to Mt. St. Michel. Adams obliquely announces
that he will explore the origins of the universe of
subjectivity, and the nature and powers of language within
that universe. The linguistic play of the Preface casts an
ominous shadow over the text that follows.

Adams as pilgrim

and uncle has already made his voyage through the
intellectual history of the modern world, and he knows that
not realism, but nominalism has triumphed in language, and
that the simplicity of the closed universe of the medieval
world has given way to the infinite complexity of the
twentieth century.

Adams's audiences are thus whomever he

decides they will be, and his words,

like Humpty Dumpty's,

mean what he alone decides they will mean.
Mt,. St. Michel does not grow more encouraging or
comforting as we move through it. Not only are we asked to
surrender our own personal selves to become Adams's nieces;
in the first chapter, we are asked to heed Wordsworth's

"practical" suggestion from the ninth section of the
Intimations ode, and embark "in a season of fair weather" on
that "'immortal sea' which brought us hither from the
twelfth century.'" Travelling backward over the tides of
history, we are to reverse our motion and "travel thither"
and "see the children sporting on the shore." Wordsworth's
Ode was a response to a realization of the self's isolation
from the realm of nature in the interiors of mind. However,
Wordsworth not only accepts but celebrates the inwardness of
being that Adams was trying to escape.

Wordsworth can make

the imaginative leap between self and world that Adams maps
but cannot span in Mt. St. Michel. Wordsworth explains in
the headnote to the poem that in childhood he was "unable to
think of external things as having external existence;" he
"communed with all that [he] saw as something not apart from
but inherent in,

[his] own immaterial nature."13 Wordsworth

celebrates the "perpetual benediction" that comes from
"those obstinate questionings/ of sense and outward things,/
Fallings from us, vanishings." Wordsworth finds an
affirmation of his place in a community of being and a sort
of benediction through the power of mind. Adams transforms
the passage; the source of Wordsworth's hope is the source
of Adams's despair.

While we may be able to see the

children of the Middle Ages sporting on the distant shore of
the twelfth century, we will see them not as they were, but
as they are recreated and reshaped into doubles of
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ourselves. Having extended the promise of an imaginative
recreation of the past, Adams immediately proceeds with his
customary action of doubling. The view from the Abbey Church
is not simply itself; it "recalls the coast of New England,"
and Adams reminds us that "if you have any English blood at
all, you have also Norman." This fact is multiplied into the
presence of some "two hundred and fifty million arithmetical
ancestors of the eleventh century." Adams's conditional "if
we could go back and live again in...our ancestors" at first
seems to complete the action of doubling. Unless we are
reading very carefully, we find ourselves engaged in
"ploughing most of the fields of the Cotentin" and going to
Mass in "every parish church in Normandy." Moreover, we are
"helping to build the Abbey Church at Mont-Saint-Michel."
We are not visiting an alien land at all, but looking out
over "hills and woods, the farms and fields of Normandy"
which are suddenly "so familiar, so homelike" that we feel
that we have "known life once in them," and "never so fully
known it since." The Uncle's "we" enfolds not only the
present audience of nieces, but all of the arithmetical
ancestors that Adams has conjured in his mirror of history.
In the first three paragraphs of the first chapter, Adams
has apparently managed to expand the Uncle-narrator and a
single niece into a majestic "we of the eleventh century."
The complication is that we have only journeyed in the
conditional mode. The imaginative union of ourselves and our

numerous imaginary ancestors hangs on Adams's "If we could
go back and live again" and its complement— "we should find
ourselves doing many surprising things." Even if we miss the
conditional base that this edifice of imaginary flight is
built upon, we should notice that the tense has shifted to
the past. From the moment we conditionally cross the "bridge
of ages" and claim the coast of Normandy as an extension of
the coast of New England, we are in the lost terrain of the
past. We "were" a "great part" of the Church. We "stood" at
the "world's center." "We were a serious race." And yet, we
have not made the journey at all. Adams has trapped us in a
web of words: "All this time we have been standing on the
parvis. looking out over the sea and sands...or turning at
times towards the church door which is the pons seclorum.
the bridge of ages between us and our ancestors"

(MSM, 347)

We are like Esther, looking down into the falls at Niagara,
and feeling the waters roar over us, but unable to leap.
Yet, "for the present, we are in the eleventh century,"
"tenants of the Duke or of the Church, or of small feudal
lords." We are "helping to quarry granite for the Abbey
Church." Adams recreates the life of a world in which we,
like Old Esther Dudley, move as ghosts: "the year is 1058,"
but we have only begun to "get our minds into a condition"
to cross the fatal bridge over time. What follows is not the
completion of a Wordsworthian journey, but a sort of
Adamsian crash landing. Adams moves from our stance on the
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parvis not to some reunification but to a tale of builders
who overreached themselves.
Yet in 102 0 Norman art was already too
ambitious. Certainly nine hundred years
leave their traces on granite as well as
on other material, but the granite of
Abbot Hildebert would have stood
securely enough if the Abbot had not
asked too much from it. Perhaps he asked
too much of the Archangel, for the
thought of the Archangel's superiority
was clearly the inspiration of his
plan...the structure might perhaps have
proved strong enough...had not fashions
in architecture changed in the great
epoch of building...when Abbot Robert de
Torigny thought proper to reconstruct
the west front, and build out two towers
on its flanks. The towers were no doubt
beautiful... but their weight broke down
the vaulting beneath, and one of them
fell in 1300. In 1618 the whole facade
began to give way, and in 1776 not only
the facade but also three of the seven
spans of the nave were pulled down. Of
Abbot Hildebert's nave, only four arches
remain.
(MSM, 347-48)
Just as we as the niece-audience have failed to bridge the
seas of self and past, the abbots sought to erect overly
ambitious architectural enterprises that were doomed to fail
and fall. The legend of Babel, with its tower that was to
have its "top in the heavens"14 informs Adams's account of
the falling towers of medieval cathedrals, partly because
Adams's medieval towers are used to suggest the
fragmentation

of Aquinas's

synthesis of the possibilities

of reason and revelation. After Babel, the single language
which had represented unity among all men was lost. After

the nominalists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries, universality of meaning in language was lost; the
via antiqua of Aquinas and those who followed him gave way
to the via moderna of Scotus, and, in particular, of Ockham.
Through the conditional phrasing that forms the bridge into
our journey, Adams has taken us to the heights of a tower
that is built on an insufficient linguistic foundation.

We

fall as it falls, and see our fall emblematically mirrored
all around us. And, as readers, we have to pause over
Adams's dates. In 13 00, the Papacy was on the eve of the
crisis known as the Babylonian Captivity. The compromise
provided by Aquinas had come to seem somewhat insufficient.
Meister Eckhart was active, and in the more intellectual
reaches of the Church, the philosophic quarrel over
nominalism, which dominates the last three chapters of M t .
St. Michel and Chartres, was about to erupt— a crisis which
would

continue in overt form until at least 1500.

second date, 1618, marks

Adams's

the advent of the heyday of

European colonization in the new world as well as any date
in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, while
1776, for an American historian and an American niece, is
the inescapable moment when an entire country was embodied
as a construction of mind. The failure of the medieval
architects is replicated in the failure of the architecture
of the modern world.

Adams has constructed a parable of

late medieval and early modern intellectual history. The

fallen towers and the fallen choir, which gave way in 1421
"in the midst of the English wars," were replaced by "an
exuberant choir of latest gothic, finished in 1521" (MSM,
351) . Adams compares the Romanesque arches of .1058 to an
elderly man who lives pleasantly with the "beautiful woman"
of the choir of 1521. The primary difference between the
two, who harmonize pleasantly enough, is produced by the
displacement of the "simple, serious, silent dignity and
energy" of the eleventh century by "something more
complicated...graceful, self-conscious, rhetorical, and
beautiful as perfect rhetoric." The self-consciousness of
the tower mirrors the emerging shape of self-conscious
individualism in being and language alike, and replaces the
"naivete" of the masculine principle of pure action
represented by Saint Michael the Archangel. The
complications of the sixteenth-century choir cannot be
explored; our present journey awaits us, even though we have
just seen that we will never be able to embark upon it.
...we have no time to run off into the
sixteenth century: we have still to
learn the alphabet of art in France. One
must live deep in the eleventh century
in order to understand the twelfth, and
even after passing years in the twelfth,
we shall find the thirteenth in many
ways a world of its own, with a beauty
not always inherited, and sometimes not
bequeathed.
(M S M . 352)
The attraction of these medieval regions— if only we could
reach them— is that, for those whose "lives have been a
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broken arch," the simplicity of the Norman style has an
attraction. They "feel this repose and self-restraint as
they feel nothing else."
The quiet strength of these curved
lines, the solid support of these heavy
columns, the moderate proportions, even
the modified lights,the absence of
display, of effort, of selfconsciousness satisfy them as no other
art does. They come back to it to rest,
after a long circle of pilgrimage,— the
cradle of rest from which their
ancestors started. Even here they find
the repose none too deep.
(MSM, 349)
Looking at the simplicity of the Romanesque more closely,
however, the uncle and his nieces find not repose, but a
fierce and combative assertion of the unity of "Church and
State, Soul and Body, God and Man." We feel only "the
Archangel and the Unity of God" (M S M . 349). The realm of
"private affairs," of the modern and alienated subject, is
completely secondary in this irrecoverable world to the
single mission of God, Church, and Sovereign. Unfortunately,
all that presents itself to Uncle and niece are the ruins of
that lost world of unity. "The simple, serious, silent
dignity and energy of the eleventh century have gone"(M S M .
3 52). Rather than a landscape of artifacts restored through
imagination, we find only "a mutilated trunk of an eleventhcentury church"

(M S M . 351). At Mont-Saint-Michel we have

attained not to a vision of unity, but to Browning's ruined
chapel in a landscape that is empty of meaning.

Adams next proposes to restore the Chanson de Roland
for us. This venture looks more hopeful; the study of
literature rests on the assumption that we can reclaim
texts, and poetry, we assume, can be restored to at least a
semblance of meaning. Moreover, we know that Adams made all
of his own translations in the most exacting manner
possible. Having been assured that "the Chanson is in poetry
what the Mount is in architecture"

(M S M . 3 53) we prepare to

attempt a second journey, this time into a literary
landscape.

Adams begins his second chapter not with the

Chanson de Roland, but with the Roman du Mont Saint Michel.
As uncle, he cheerfully advises us nieces that "if the
spelling is corrected, the verses read still almost as
easily as Voltaire; more easily than Verlaine, and much like
a nursery rhyme"

(M S M . 354). Adams hesitates over the

translations; translation is a necessary "evil," provided
only in order to "lift" lazy tourists and nieces "over the
rough spots, even when roughness is beauty." Having
nonetheless provided a translation, Adams then announces
that "one's translation is sure to be full of gross
blunders, but the supreme blunder is that of translating at
all when one is trying to catch not a fact but a feeling"
(M S M . 354-55). Adams then proceeds to provide a translation
of another fragment of a roma n . only to tell us that if we
are "not satisfied with this translation, any scholar of
French will easily help make a better, for w e . ..would rather
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be inaccurate in such matters than not" (M S M . 356). As
readers and mental travellers, we are awash in translations
whose worth is questioned even in the moment they appear
before our eyes. Adams claims that he wants to demonstrate
in the poetry the qualities that he admired in the Abbey
Church.
The qualities of the architecture
reproduce themselves in the song: the
same directness, simplicity, absence of
self-consciousness; the same intensity
of purpose; even the same material.
(M S M . 369)
Adams presents us with fragments of the poems, while
continuing to remind us that it is almost as futile to try
to read medieval French poetry as it is to try to translate
it. Adams then translates the Chanson de Roland while
extending his discussion of the "evil" of translation. He
informs us that the Chanson and its language belong to a
separate narrative universe.
Of course the full value of the verse
cannot be regained. One knows neither
how it was sung nor even how it was
pronounced. The assonances are beyond
recovering; the 'laisse,' or leash of
verses or assonances with the concluding
cry,'Aoi,' has long ago vanished from
verse or song.
(M S M . 364)
Our journey through seas of imagination is taking us only to
ruined, "truncated" churches and presenting us only with
poems

full of the archaic sounds of lost words from dead

languages.

In the discussion of Gothic art which begins in
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Chapter III, Adams once again portrays the shift from
Romanesque to Gothic architecture in terms of sex.
The difference of sex is not imaginary.
In 1058 when the triumphal columns were
building, and Taillefer sang to William
the Bastard and Harold the Saxon, Roland
still prayed his mea culpa to God the
Father and gave not a thought to Alda
his betrothed. In the twelfth century
Saint Bernard recited "Ave Stella Maris”
in an ecstasy of miracle before the
image of the Virgin, and the armies of
France in battle cried Notre-Dame-SaintDenis-Montjoie. What the roman could not
express flowered into the gothic; what
the masculine mind could not idealize in
the warrior, it idealized in the
woman...
(M S M . 372-373)
Adams saw in the architectural compromise between Romanesque
and Gothic an emblem of erotic conjunction between male and
female: "the strength and the grace join hands; the man and
woman love each other still." In this harmony of masculine
force of will and feminine receptivity

there was the

strength of the mvsterium coniunctionis. For Adams,
modernity is conceived in the decadence that attends the
loss of balance between the inner world of the Virgin and
the outer world of the Saint.
When men no longer felt the passion,
they fell back on themselves, or lower.
The architects returned to the round
arch, and even further to the flatness
of the Greek colonnade, but this was not
the fault of the twelfth or thirteenth
centuries. What they had to say they
said; what they felt they expressed; and
if the seventeenth century forgot it,
the twentieth in turn has forgotten the
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seventeenth. History is only a catalogue
of the forgotten.
(M S M . 373)
Even as he affirms the world of the Archangel and the
Virgin, however, Adams relentlessly carries us through
buildings whose rooms have lost their names. The levels of
the refectory, for example, look promising, but "every
writer gives these rooms different names, and assigns them
different purposes." In other words, the tourist brings

a

ready-made set of names for what he will encounter with him,
in his travel bag. With the cathedral and the abbey, the
refectory has the capacity to provide "an exceedingly
liberal education for anybody... and would make the fortune
of an intelligent historian,

if such should happen to

exist." Unfortunately, this medieval Scarlet Letter of a
structure cannot perform its office at all. Adams insists
that we are not looking for education, but for "poetry," but
even that is not available; "here is only the shell— the
dead art— and silence"

(MSM, 377-78).

When we finally reach Chartres, we find that this
journey is no more rewarding than the previous ones.

With

grim irony, Adams notes that, children of modernity that we
are, we will no doubt prefer the more elaborate— and more
modern— northern spire to the southern spire. The architect
of 1500 has committed a sort of atrocity,

in Adams's eyes,

in order to keep his "self-respect." The newer spire

introduces the element of self“consciousness; the old
affirms the original architectural unity of the church as a
whole.

And, once in the Church, unless we accept the

"divine right in the Queen of Heaven, apart from the
Trinity, yet one with it, Chartres is unintelligible"
414).

(M S M .

Adams evokes the image of the ubiquitous presence of

the Virgin in the building of the Church, and the careless
reader is almost seduced into believing that Adams is once
again using the magical capacities of language to evoke her
presence. The Uncle affirms for

us that "the Virgin was

actually and constantly present in the building of
Chartres...directing the architects"

(M S M . 438). He also

tells us that "it is this direction that we are going to
study if you have now got a realizing sense of what it
meant"

(M S M . 438). Of course, Adams has taken pains to show

us that the "burden of custom"

(M S M . 424) and of our self-

consciousness prevents our ever being able to acquire such a
sense. The success of our journey depends on yet another
conditional construction. If we are able to sense the truth
of what we see, then we can study. If not, another abyss
looms before us, for "without this sense, the church is
dead," and the "pleasure consists not in seeing the death,
but in feeling the life" (M S M . 438). Far from seeing the
children "sport upon the shore" we move only from abyss to
abyss. The possibility of meaning is forever being
proffered, but is always deferred.
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By the time the Uncle is ready to tell us about the
glass at Chartres, he warns us that we "had better stop
here...unless you are willing to feel that Chartres was made
what it is, not by the artist, but by the Virgin"

(M S M .

459). We do not stop, however, even when the Uncle warns
again that we are doomed to failure.
Therefore, let us plod on, laboriously
proving God, although, even to Saint
Bernard and Pascal, God was incapable of
proof; and using such material as the
books furnish for help. It is not
much...One knows not even where to seek.
(M S M . 459-60)
We are reduced to a quest for fragmentary works which might
make the glass easier to understand, although Adams warns us
that since modern viewers tend to expect everything to
depend on perspective, our attempts to understand are flawed
at best, for "perspective does not enter into a twelfthcentury window more than into a Japanese picture"

(M S M .

463). The difficulty of the modern audience is that
"everyone who has lived since the sixteenth century has felt
deep distrust of everyone who lived before it" (M S M . 46970). The Uncle claims to believe that the Virgin answered
both pleas and questions, but even though he assures us that
we, too, will feel her presence if we will "only consent to
feel like a child," (M S M . 504-05) he assumes that we are
incapable of feeling like children. Yet another conditional
phrase intrudes.
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...you, or any other lost soul, could,
if you cared to look and listen, feel a
sense beyond the human ready to reveal a
sense divine that would make the world
once more intelligible, and would bring
the Virgin to life again, in all the
depths of feeling which she shows
here,...more eloquent than the prayerbook, and more beautiful than the autumn
sunlight; and any one willing to try
could feel it like the child, reading
new thought without end into the art he
has studied a hundred times.
(M S M . 505)
The revelation once again depends on a willingness to lose
ourselves in the mysteries of faith through the Church— the
same possibility that faced Adams's Esther. And, in the
familiar formulation,

if we fail to make that choice we

"shatter the whole art by calling into it a single motive of
[our] own" (M S M . 505) .

The phenomenon that dooms the

medieval sense of unity and separates us from it is that of
self-conscious individualism.
Throughout Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams presents
us with the impossibility of recapturing the faith that made
the architecture and glass of medieval France possible. The
modern reader imposes the alien values of perspective on
medieval art. Worse, he carries the alienating phenomenon of
self-consciousness with him, and unintentionally imposes
himself on the already nebulous centuries, thereby placing
whatever it was they had to show him out of reach. A
prisoner of the ideology of enlightenment, he demands facts
and figures and accurate translations. As a result, when we
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leave the Court of the Queen of Heaven, we have failed
entirely in our effort to cross the pons seclorum to our
ancestors.
We have done with Chartres. For seven
hundred years Chartres has seen
pilgrims, coming and going more or less
like us, and will perhaps see them for
another seven hundred years; but we
shall see it no more, and can safely
leave the Virgin in her majesty, with
her three great prophets on either hand,
as calm and confident in their own
strength and in God's providence as they
were when Saint Louis was born, but
looking down from a deserted heaven,
into an empty church, on a dead faith.
(M S M . 522)
Adams's project in the next three chapters is to take
us away from the shrines of Gothic into the literary
landscape of the medieval romance and the legends of the
miracles of the Virgin. The uncle tells us that this should
not be an alien terrain.
After worshipping at the shrines of
Saint Michael on his Mount and of the
Virgin at Chartres, one may wander far
and wide over France, and seldom feel
lost; all later Gothic art comes
naturally, and no new thought disturbs
the perfected form.
(M S M . 523)
Unfortunately "tourists of English blood and American
training" tend to get lost anyway. Their tendency to
rationalize defeats their study of secular literature as
surely as it defeated our study of architecture and glass.
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
studied in the pure light of political
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economy are insane. The scientific mind
is atrophied, and suffers under
inherited weakness, when it comes in
contact with the eternal woman,— ■
Astarte, Isis, Demeter, Aphrodite, and
the last and greatest deity of all, the
Virgin...
(M S M . 523)
Adams's avowed concern in these chapters is the "whole
subject of sex," and he intends to reverse Pope's claim that
the "proper study of man is man" by announcing that the
"proper study of man is woman"

(M S M . 523). Adams's

fascination condemns him to bask in ignorance:

"we do not,

and never can, know the twelfth-century woman, or for that
matter, any other woman"

(M S M . 537). The legends of medieval

woman that Adams spins are tales of power, in which women
whom he overtly describes as "masculine" rule in triumph. In
the androgyny of the medieval warrior woman Adams sees a
figuring of the world of sense, and it is that wholeness
that is lost for him in the Reformation. Adams's claim that
the Virgin sealed mankind and God in an unbroken circle is
not so different from Steven Ozment's recognition that the
Protestant Reformation

was a "revolution in religion" that

opened up an abyss between man and God which had been filled
with a host of ritual practices that were designed to take
the believer from birth to death.
In the first half of the sixteenth
century cities and territories passed
laws and ordinances that progressively
ended or severely limited a host of
traditional beliefs, practices, and
institutions that touched directly the
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daily life of large numbers of people:
mandatory fasting; auricular confession;
the veneration of saints, relics, and
images; the buying and selling of
indulgences; pilgrimages and shrines;
wakes and processions for the dead and
dying; the doctrine of purgatory; Latin
Mass and liturgy; traditional
ceremonies, festivals, and holidays;
monasteries, nunneries, and mendicant
orders; the sacramental status of
marriage; extreme unction, confirmation,
holy orders, and penance; clerical
celibacy; clerical immunity from civil
taxation and criminal jurisdiction;
nonresident benefices; papal
excommunication and interdict; canon
law; papal and episcopal territorial
government; and the traditional
scholastic education of the clergy.15
The spirit of reform affected virtually every country
in Europe, whether its people remained loyal to Rome in the
traditional sense or became

reformers. All the beliefs,

practices, and institutions of the medieval world whose
conceptual unity Adams had admired and which had given
security and foreordained meaning to the lives of the
faithful for a millennium were either called into question
or displaced.

The Protestant quest for a disenchanted world

paved the way to a belief in God that was dependent upon the
subject's ability to

conceive of him, rather than upon

those reliable systems of ritual and sacrament that led man
by certain steps back to the Augustinian country of the
soul. Adams is probably quite right when he insists that the
Virgin was the tangible embodiment of the accessibility of
the realm of the sacred.
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The fact, conspicuous above all other
historical certainties about religion,
that the Virgin was by essence
illogical, unreasonable and feminine, is
the only fact of any ultimate value
worth studying, and starts a number of
questions that history has shown itself
clearly afraid to touch. Protestant and
Catholic differ little in that
respect... Why were all the Protestant
churches cold failures without her help?
Why could not the Holy Ghost,— the
spirit of Love and Grace,— equally
answer their prayers? Why was the son
powerless? Why was Chartres Cathedral,
like Lourdes today— the expression of
what is in substance a separate
religion? Why did the gentle and
gracious Virgin Mother so exasperate the
Pilgrim Father? Why was the Woman struck
out of the Church and ignored in the
State? These questions are not
antiquarian or trifling...they tug at
the very heartstrings of all that makes
whatever order is in the cosmos. If a
Unity exists, in which and towards which
all energies centre, it must explain and
include Duality, Diversity, Infinity, —
Sex!
(M S M . 582-83)
For Adams, the Virgin,

"illogical, unreasonable, and

feminine," "struck out of the Church and ignored in the
State" was everything that the enlighteners, starting with
the Reformers, had wanted to weed out of human existence. In
old age, Adams claimed to have been "struck by Zeno's
arrow," and avowed his faith in the Stoics. His attraction
to the Virgin is of a piece with his attraction to the
Stoics. Adams's commentary on the miracles of the Virgin and
her mysterious presence in medieval life is part of his
private effort to reverse the dualistic bent of western
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philosophy.

In The Logic of Sense. Gilles Deleuze explains

that the philosophy of the Stoics "displaces all
reflection." The Stoics, like Adams himself, were in search
of the Something that "subsumes being and non-being,
existence and inherence."
...the Stoics were the first to reverse
Platonism...for if bodies with their
states, qualities, and quantities,
assume all the characteristics of
substance and cause...the
characteristics of the Idea are
relegated to the ...[the realm of]
impassive extra-Being, which is sterile,
inefficacious, and on the surface of
things: the ideational or the
incorporeal can no longer be anything
other than an 'effect.'16
Adams was, of course, not entirely accurate in saying that
the Middle Ages exalted women. As David Noble has shown in
A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of
Western Science, women did play a significant role in the
first millennium of the Christian era, particularly in the
"culture of learning." Priests were commonly married during
this period, and the androgynous ideal of Johannes Scotus
Erigena— the idea that at the Resurrection, sex would be
abolished and nature reunified— was viewed seriously. All of
this, as Adams suggests in his images of vaulting towers and
the gradual emergence of self-consciousness in Gothic
architecture, began to change as the ideal of clerical
asceticism evolved.

As the works of Aristotle were

recovered, and as Aquinas engaged in what William Wallace
calls the "aristotelianization of Christianity"17 which,
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once entrenched in universities, spread outward, the power
and position of women receded.

In the Renaissance, as the

state gradually merged with or replaced the Church, women
were, in fact eclipsed in exactly the way that Adams
suggests that they were. There was no counterpart in
Renaissance society as constituted by the state for the
powerful feudal noblewoman of an earlier century.
'As the state came to organize
Renaissance society...a new division
between personal and public life made
itself felt...the bourgeois sex-role
system, placing man in the public sphere
and the patrician woman in the home . '
Cultural and political power fell
increasingly into the hands of men.18
Adams recognized the tremendous losses that had attended
upon the emergence of what would eventually triumph as
bourgeois individualism, and he found the roots of the loss
in the philosophy that dominates the final three chapters of
Mt. St.

Michel and Chartres. Adams begins

the philosophic

journey

that leads to the Reformation and

modernity's

deification of empirical science with Abelard. In Abelard,
Adams finds the same questions that haunt him, as well as
one of the last of

his doubles of himself.

Time has settled few or none of
the
essential points of dispute. Science
hesitates, more visibly than the Church
ever did, to decide once for all whether
unity or diversity is the ultimate law;
whether order or chaos is the governing
rule of the universe, if universe there
is; whether anything except phenomena,
exists. Even in matters more vital to
society, one dares not speak too loud.
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Why, and for what, and to whom is man a
responsible agent?... Science only
repeats what the Church said to Abelard,
that where we know so little, we had
better hold our tongues.
(M S M . 611)
For Adams, Abelard is the "portal of approach to Gothic
thought," just as the "west portal of Chartres is the door
through which one must of necessity enter the Gothic
architecture of the thirteenth century."

In Adams's vision

of the history of western philosophy, Abelard's work is
extended and completed in the work of Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aguinas (M S M . 607). The convulsion in medieval
schools of philosophy that Adams centers in Abelard was the
debate over Universals which Adams also sees as having been
at the root of the emergence of modern philosophy.
According to the latest authorities, the
doctrine of Universals ...has never
received an adequate answer. What is a
species? What is a genus or a family or
an order? More or less convenient terms
of classification, about which the
twelfth century cared very little, while
it cared deeply about the essence of
classes! Science has become too complex
to affirm the existence of universal
truths, but it strives for nothing else,
and disputes the problem as earnestly
as in the twelfth century, when the
whole field of human and superhuman
activity was shut between these barriers
of Substance, Universals, and
Particulars. The schools knew that their
society hung for life on the
demonstration that God, the ultimate
Universal, was a reality, out of which
all other universal truths or realities
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sprang. Truth was a real thing, outside
of human experience.
(M S M . 611)
In Adams's explanation of the nominalist controversy, the
nominalists, or terminists,

and the realists found their

philosophic origin at opposite points: "one, from the
ultimate substance, God,— -the Universal, the Ideal, the
Type;" and the other from "the Individual, Socrates, the
Concrete, the observed Fact of experience"

(M S M . 613). The

realists, whom Adams represents in the person of William of
Champeaux, asserted that the Universal was "a real thing."
Abelard declared that the "Universal was only nominally
real." Truth for Abelard was merely the "sum of all possible
facts that are truth;" while truth for William of Champeaux
was, like "virtue" and "humanity," a real "unit and
reality."

As he contrasts the two thinkers, Adams performs

another of his imaginative feats, extending his discussion
outward in the history of philosophy.
The Ideal bed is a Form, made by God,
said Plato. The Ideal bed is a name,
imagined by ourselves, says Aristotle.'I
start from the Universe,' said William.
'I start from the Atom,' said
Abelard...William of Champeaux,
lecturing on dialectics or logic comes
to the question of Universals, which he
says are substances. Starting from the
highest substance, God, all Being
descends through created substances by
stages...Humanity being like other
essences or substances, indivisible,
passes wholly into each individual,
becoming Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle...Abelard turns the idea
round, and infers from it that since
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Socrates carries all Humanity in him, he
carries Plato, too, and both must be in
the same place, though Socrates is at
Athens and Plato in Rome.
(M S M . 614)

As Adams points out, in the universe described by the
Nominalists, truth and virtue and charity did not exist,
and, while individual identity was a starting point, God
could only exist as "an echo of your own ignorance;" the
Trinity could be said to exist only "as a sound or a
symbol."
In truth, pure Nominalism-— if, indeed,
anyone ever maintained it,— afforded no
cover whatever. Nor did Abelard's
Concept help the matter... Conceptualism
was a device, like the false wooden
roof, to cover and conceal an inherent
weakness of construction. Unity either
is, or is not. If soldiers, no matter in
what number, can never make an army, and
worshippers, though in millions, do not
make a Church, and all humanity united
would not necessarily constitute a
State, equally little can their
concepts, individual, or united,
constitute, the one or the other. Army,
Church, State, each is an organic whole,
complex beyond all possible addition of
unity, and not a Concept at all, but
rather an animal that thinks, creates,
devours, and destroys. The attempt to
bridge the chasm between multiplicity
and Unity is the oldest problem of
philosophy, but the flimsiest bridge of
all is the human Concept, unless,
somewhere, within or beyond it, an
energy not individual is hidden; and in
that case the old question instantly
reappears:— -What is that Energy?
(M S M . 620-21)
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In this single paragraph Adams outlines the entirety of his
philosophic quest. From Abelard, Adams makes an easy jump to
Descartes and Pascal:

"The twelfth century had already

reached the point where the seventeenth stood when Descartes
renewed the attempt to give a solid, philosophical basis for
deism

by his celebrated "Coqito ergo sum."
Although that ultimate fact seemed new
to Europe when Descartes revived it as
the starting point of all his
demonstrations it was as old and
familiar as Saint Augustine to the
twelfth century, and as little
conclusive as any other assumption of
the Ego or Non-Ego. The schools argued
according to their tastes from Unity to
Multiplicity or from Multiplicity to
Unity; but what they wanted was to
connect the two. They tried Realism and
found that it led to Pantheism. They
tried Nominalism and found that it led
to materialism. They attempted a
compromise in Conceptualism...Then they
lay down, exhausted. In the seventeenth
century the same violent struggle broke
out again, and wrung from Pascal the
famous outcry of despair in which the
French language rose, perhaps for the
last time, to the grand style of the
twelfth century.
(MSM, 639-40)
Adams's treatise on the mystics, which forms his bridge

between Abelard and Aquinas is less focused on medieval
mysticism than it is on Pascal and Descartes and the despair
that accompanies the "true Promethean lyric" of modernity.
And the chapter ends not with any affirmation, but with
Saint Francis's remembering to thank "our sister death," the
"long-sought, never-found sister of the schoolmen, who
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solved all philosophy and merged Multiplicity in Unity”
(M S M . 661).
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres concludes with Adams's
treatment of the thirteenth century, and the vast
architectonic structure of Aquinas's philosophical
compromise. "What the schools called Form, what science
calls Energy, and what the intermediate period called the
evidence of Design, made the foundation of Saint Thomas's
cathedral"

(M S M . 608). Aquinas followed Abelard in insisting

that "dimensional quantity is a principle of individuation."
The soul is thus an energy that exists in matter. This was
of course, a controversial stance, and it was one that
Aquinas proceeded to modify, but the initial assertion was
enough to ensure the emergence and triumph of fourteenthcentury nominalists like Duns Scotus and Ockham. In the
renewal of the quarrel over the duality of mind and matter
of body and spirit, Adams saw even in the midst of St.
Thomas's unity the demise of the medieval world.
As early as the fourteenth century signs
of unsteadiness appeared, and before the
eighteenth century, unity became only a
reminiscence...The architects of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries took
the Church and the Universe for truths,
and tried to express them in a structure
which should be final. Knowing by an
enormous experience precisely where the
strains were to come, they enlarged
their scale to the utmost point of
material endurance, lightening the load,
and distributing the burden until the
gutters and gargoyles... all do work
either for the arch or for the eye; and
every inch of material, up and down,
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from crypt to vault, from Man to God,
from the Universe to the atom, has its
task, giving support where support was
needed or weight where concentration was
felt, but always with the condition of
showing...to the eye the great lines
that led to Unity and the curves which
controlled divergence...one idea
controlled every line; and this is as
true of Saint Thomas's Church as it is
of Amiens Cathedral... the result was an
art marked by singular unity, which
endured and served its purpose until man
changed his attitude toward the
universe.
(MSM, 694-95)
In the final passages of "Thomas Aquinas" Adams achieves a
unity of his own, but it is a nominalistic assertion of the
power of the artist to assert what he wants on his material.
The shape of the cathedral and the claims of Saint Thomas's
philosophy are revealed explicitly to be what Adams has
shown them to be throughout our failed voyage--mirrors of
one another and of a world view in which meanings were
engineered by man, not created by God.
Adams intended Mt. St. Michel and The Education of
Henry Adams to be read together. As he prepared one hundred
quarto volumes of Mt. St. Michel for private distribution he
wrote one recipient that "the two volumes go together, as I
think of them, and the one is meaningless without the other"
(Letters. VI, 102). While he was sending the volumes out
for "correction," as he claimed, he also wrote his niece,
Louisa Hooper, whose sister had just had a baby, that
"nieces are fatal in the long run" (Letters. VI, 106).
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Adams had found St. Francis's and Quentin Compson's little
sister death on his journey in the company of constructed
nieces in Mt. St. Michel, and intended to bring her home to
America in the Education.

His plan for the Education was

characteristically cryptic, and ambitious. In thanking James
Ford Rhodes for his "gratifying comments" on his "attempt to
realise the Unity of Thought in the Thirteenth Century,"
Adams explains that the Education is a much more "risky
experiment."
If you can imagine a centipede running
along in twenty little sections (each
with a little mathematical formula
carefully concealed in its stomach) to
the bottom of a hill; and then
laboriously climbing in fifteen sections
more (each with a new mathematical
problem carefully concealed in its
stomach), till it can get up on a hill
an inch or two high, so as to see ahead
a half an inch or so,— you will
understand in advance all that the
Education has to say. You will
understand also why I believe the
literary problem insoluble, and keep the
experiment private.
Adams went on to explain to Rhodes that, in fact, the "two
works are designed as one, but no one will ever find it out
except the author" (Letters, VI, 117).

As usual, Adams

described the work differently to different people. He wrote
William James that it was a "literary experiment," and "an
old story of an American drama." He explained what he called
the work's "failure" by claiming that form was an
unattainable ideal in the modern world.

254

Did you ever read the Confessions of St.
Augustine or of Cardinal de Retz, or of
Rousseau, or of Benvenuto Cellini, or
even of my dear Gibbon? Of them all, I
think St. Augustine alone has an idea of
literary form,— a notion of writing a
story with an end and an object, not for
the sake of the object, but for the
form, like a romance. I have worked ten
years to satisfy myself that the thing
cannot be done today. The world does not
furnish the contrasts or the emotion.
(Letters, VI, 118-20)
While

the form of Chartres, which Adams described as the

only thing he had written that was

worth reading, reflected

the final unity of the architecture it was intended to
mirror, the Education could reflect only the open form of
the triumph of the nominalist view of existence. Form is
only a relative thing in the narrative universe of the
twentieth century, and thus Adams describes the form of the
Education as either a failed form, or, more accurately, as a
"provisional form."
The most haunting claim about the Education is the
counterpart of Adams's humorous remark that "nieces are
fatal." In a

letter to Henry James that has since becomes

famous, Adams explained that the volume was a "mere shield
of protection in the grave," and that James should "take
[his] own life in the same way, in order to prevent
biographers from taking it in theirs." Adams also claimed
that the last three chapters of the volume were intended as
"a completion and mathematical working out to Q.E.D. of the
three concluding

chapters" of Mt. St. Michel and Chartres.

Adams's vitriolic response to his reading of James's
life of William Story which I have discussed in the previous
chapter seems to have reflected a preoccupation with lifewriting for Adams in late 1903, when he was preparing to
print Mt. St. Michel. In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres Adams
contrived to escape from the political arena which, as his
letters suggest, continued to be a primary focus of his
thought. As he worked away on Mt. St. Michel, he wrote
Charles Milnes Gaskell that he felt that he must perform the
•'pious duty" of writing a "letter of sympathy" about
"Morley's murder of Gladstone."

(Letters, V, 521). Adams was

referring not to Gladstone's actual death, which had
occurred in 1898, but to what Adams saw as a posthumous
murder and second entombment in

John Morley's three-volume

Life of William Ewart Gladstone which had just been
published.

Adams notes that his own "few remaining white

hairs" "stiffen[ed] with horror" at the biographical notes
that Gladstone himself had provided for Morley. In
particular, he notes Gladstone's willingness to tell Morley
that he had made a mistake in declaring in the midst of the
American Civil War that "Jefferson Davis had made a nation."
This, Adams notes, would only be an appropriate admission
"to a priest in the confessional, acting for a respectable
deity who can't be hurt"

(Letters. V, 517).

The focus of Adams's thoughts was in part a response to
contemporary political events and in part the result of his

first-hand encounters with imperialism in his travels in the
South Seas. His close friends, Henry Cabot Lodge and John
Hay, were living their lives at the forefront of American
politics.

As Secretary of State for Theodore Roosevelt, Hay

was more than aware of the military intelligence that had
aided Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the chief representative of
the Panama Canal Company, in the rebellion that separated
Panama from Colombia. The U.S. Navy, with the full knowledge
of Hay and Roosevelt, managed to block the sea lanes that
would have enabled Colombia to engage in the only military
response it could make, since the land routes to the isthmus
led through the tangled routes of an almost impenetrable
jungle. Hay managed not only to justify the rebellion, but
immediately recognized the new Republic, and within a matter
of days received Bunau-Varilla as its first ambassador.
While Ernest Samuels attests to Hay's doubts about his role
in "'stealing Panama," and Hay repeatedly attempted to resign
his office, the fact remains that he assisted Roosevelt in
his efforts to subdue what Roosevelt regarded as a lesser—
he was given to referring to the Colombians as "dagoes" and
"contemptible little creatures— "19 and inconveniently
located people. Unfortunately, the Colombians

happened to

stand in the way of the political aims of the latest version
of the Enlightenment Project— that of widening the sphere of
American commerce through an imperialistic endeavor that was
to facilitated through the use of technology.

Adams knew of
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the continual intrigues in the Roosevelt White House, and
repeatedly advised Hay that he should remain at his post.
Adams's reasoning was that Hay could temper Roosevelt's
tendency to make rash decisions. Nevertheless, within a week
of Hay's reception of Panama's new ambassador, and amid his
musings to other friends on the nature of biography, Adams
wrote Hay

that he should read both the Story and the

Gladstone biographies so that he could "reflect" on what his
own fate might be.
Please read Harry James's Life of Story!
Also Morley's Gladstone! And reflect—
wretched man!— that now you have
knowingly forced yourself to be
biographised! You cannot escape the
biographer. When I read,— standing
behind the curtain— these repetitions of
life, flabby and foolish as I am:— when
I try to glug-glug down my snuffling
mucous membrane these lumps of cold
calves'-head and boiled pork fat, then I
know what you will suffer for your sin,
and I see President Quiensabe of
Colombia revenged...I foresee plainly,
that the biographer's work on you will
be strychnine.
You will be convulsive.
You and the biographer together will
make eternity solemn. When I think how
all my friends are skewered, and how
dreary poor Lowell and Story and
Monckton Milnes and Motley and Sumner
and Lincoln and Seward and I look in our
cages with pins stuck through us to keep
the lively attitude of nature, I smile
grimly and see you turn ghastly green.
CLetters. V, 526)
Adams was seeing the brightest men of his generation
corrupted in the same way that statesmen like Washington and
Jefferson and John and John Quincy Adams and the characters

who were allegorized in Democracy

had each in their way

been either corrupted or destroyed by political life.
earlier generation had believed that

An

in inventing America

on the Enlightenment model they had somehow designed it so
that it might be freed

from the patterns of history.

Adams

seems to have seen Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy as
the certain proof that his generation was not to be freed
from the burdens of the past but rather that it was
condemned to repeat its mistakes. Hay's role in the Panama
Canal Crisis of 1903 recapitulated John Quincy Adams's role-and his change of party affiliation— in the affair of the
Essex Junto as well, and more subtly, the old issues of
masters and slaves and policy formulated on the basis of
property interests.

The question of subjugation and at

least a metaphorical slavery had moved in Adams's time away
from the American South and its "self-conscious" statesmen
who were also on stage (Letters, V, 455) into the grand
theater of the world. Unlike John Quincy Adams, however,
Henry Adams did not fear the pains of Hell or the label of
"wasted talent" that he had applied to John Randolph. He
only feared being gibbeted in the zoo of history.
Perhaps the most fascinating passage in Adams's letter
to Hay, however, is his claim that he envisions himself
"skewered" in a cage with "pins stuck through [him] to keep
the lively attitude of nature." Hay was probably Adams's
closest male friend, and twenty years before, in 1883, when
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Adams was completing his own stint as a biographer and
beginning the massive endeavor that was to become his
History of the United States, he had written Hay that Hay
"should write autobiography" in order to protect himself
from the same biographers that still threaten in 1903.
Trollope has amused me for two evenings.
I am clear that you should write
autobiography.
I mean to do mine. After
seeing how coolly and neatly a man like
Trollope can destroy the last vestige of
heroism in his own life, I object to
allowing mine to be murdered by any one
except myself. Every church mouse will
write autobiography in another
generation to prove that it never
believed in religion.
(Letters, II, 532)
The only "biographer" that had taken Adams's life-— and had
had the opportunity to "skewer" him— was Adams himself, who
as we have seen, had systematically destroyed his diaries
(except for the tantalizing fragments that remind presentday readers that they once existed) while he was overseeing
the proofreading and printing of his History, and taken on a
new name and identity in Tahiti.
The Education of Henry Adams is in part Adams's
response to the culture of imperialism, which, as I have
suggested earlier, is a perverse and sacralized extension of
the Church's assertion of pastoral power over the lives of
the faithful. Adams recognized that the imperial state and
its representatives in the guise of businessmen and
missionaries assumed diverse roles that were unified in
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their essential function as pastors of the "primitive"
cultures of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Adams's vehicle
for examining the political world of his time was not a
history at all, nor even a biography or autobiography, but a
critique of identity as a construct of power, in which he
himself replaces the Samoans of his earlier experiences as
the object of scientific scrutiny.
For the student of autobiography, The Education of
Henry Adams. taken together with Mt. St. Michel and Chartres
is both an interpretive nightmare, and an inescapable
"bridge of ages" between Victorian notions of self
representation, and the narrative experiments of Gertrude
Stein and Samuel Beckett. It is an interpretive nightmare
because Adams employs all the echoic and allusive tendencies
that are at play in his earlier works, and because it is
explicitly a record of a reification and murder of self, not
a work of self-affirmation.

The Education is nevertheless a

sort of set piece in the literature of self-representation
because Adams self-consciously framed it as an inescapable
monument to the idea of the subjectively constituted self.
He chose the Confessions of St. Augustine and Rousseau as
his models, and intended the Education to be a sequel to
them that would complete the arc of self-representation in
the West. Unlike his predecessors, who claimed public spaces
for the soul and the passions of the private self, Adams is
seeking in the Education not to affirm, but to escape
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whatever it is that he is. At the same time, he helplessly
demonstrates what the universe looks like when it collapses
into the mind of Henry Adams.
The map Adams draws for his readers in the Education is
deceptively clear as the introduction to Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres is deceptively reassuring. Lest we be lost, he tell
us both explicitly and implicitly who his models were, what
authors formed his taste, and what century made him. He even
tell us why and how he came to write the Education.
Nevertheless, the Education is a badly read book, partly
because Adams adopted the authorial veils that shield him
from us in all of his works, and partly because his readers
have tended to confuse autobiography with chronicle. As a
factual history of the enlightenment kind, the Education is
an exceedingly unsatisfactory text. As a construction and
annihilation of a double, and as a monument to the universe
of subjectivity,

it takes its place with Augustine's

Confessions. Petrarch's Secretum. the essays of Montaigne
and the Confessions of Rousseau as a marker in the history
of self-representation in the West.
Some of the difficulty that readers have had with the
Education is intimately related to the book's purpose. When
Adams says he wants to provide a guide for young men, he
means that he will offer his readers an exercise in the kind
of mental gymnastics that have engaged his readers before in
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The tone of the Education is

elegiac, and its frustrated motion is that of a would-be
quest romance. The book claims to mourn the loss of the
eighteenth century, but what it really laments is the
continuation of the eighteenth century's values,

in the

shape of the enlightenment project, into the twentieth
century. Nevertheless, the book does not celebrate
"failure," as so many critics have claimed.20 Rather, the
Education seeks to provide an escape from the sense of the
private self that was born with Augustine, reached a crisis
in Petrarch, and simultaneous disaster and deification in
Rousseau. Written in the third person, the Education tells
us very little about the homunculus scriptor that wrote it,
and readers ever since T.S. Eliot have claimed that the book
cannot be considered an autobiography because there is too
little of the author in it.

In a sense, Eliot was right;

there is very little of Henry Adams in the Education.

The

being that bears the name of Adams in that text is an object
for study that shares Adams's name, and is subject to him as
narrator, but it is a disembodied consciousness, not even a
complete literary character. Adams was as self-consciously
modern as Petrarch, and he believed that he was living
through the most important era of transition since the
Reformation. He was prepared to offer a redefinition of the
nature of identity as potentially paradigmatic as
Augustine's valorization of the private self, or Rousseau's
insistence on the value of the realm of the emotions. He

isolated Augustine as one of his two primary models because
the Education was intended to be an end-mark in the history
of self and history, perhaps more radical than that
presented by any philosopher since Augustine had written
The Confessions and The City of God with their assertion of
the idea of an essential order in human life and in history
that comforted western man as the Roman Empire was
splintering into chaos around him. Adams chose Rousseau
because he aimed at a general reform of the educational
system, and because he believed that, while Rousseau had
represented a kind of final collapse into the chaos of the
universe of subjectivity, he had also recognized the
limitations of a world and a self shaped in such isolation.
In Adams's eyes, Augustine had written the essential memoir
of the crisis of the classical world; Augustine marked the
boundary between the world shaped by the polis in classical
antiquity and

the world that was made by medieval

Christianity. Rousseau,

for his part, articulated the crisis

of the modern ego that Adams intended to explore and extend.
The Education of Henry Adams is Adams's demonstration
that he can "one can know the universe only as oneself"
(Education. 1114). If his primary task is to complete the
work of Rousseau and Augustine, he also links himself in one
of the books's two prefaces with the cosmic tailors of
Carlyle's Sartor Resartus and Swift's Tale of a T u b .

He

tells us that man in his day is possessed of a "shrunken
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ego." If Adams was a twelfth-century monk in Mt. St. Michel
and Chartres, he is a tailor and artisan in this narrative,
and the object of study is not Adams at all (the manikinego) but his education (the garment). The garment Adams
intends to offer is meant to "fit young men for life in the
modern world," and aims to "show the faults of the patchwork
fitted on their fathers"

(Education. 722) . Carlyle's hero in

his story of tailors and garments lends his name to a
crucial chapter in the Education, but Adams subverts
Carlyle's program for young men. Carlyle believed that the
philosophical clothes of the hero could be peeled off like a
second skin to reveal the essential man beneath them.
Carlyle as "editor" moves his readers "from those outmost
vulgar, palpable Woollen Hulls of Man; through his wondrous
Flesh-Garment, and his wondrous Social Garnitures; inwards
to the Garments of his very Soul's Soul, to Time and Space
themselves!1,21 Freed of its "wrappages," man's being stands
"safe in the far region of Poetic Creation...where that
Phoenix Death-Birth of Human Society and of all Human
Things, appears possible."22 For Adams, the clothes of
ideology are the only self and the only human reality that
is available to man within the frame of human history. When
his manikin's clothes are peeled away there are no absolute
ideas, no transcendent realm of meaning. There is nothing
but the cognitive capacity to perceive the singular and to
form abstractions from them. Adams's vision of his "manikin"
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and its capacities echoes Ockham's theory of cognition.23
Concepts for Ockham are located in the mind of individual
human beings. For him, concepts were "intentions" and they
functioned as "natural signs." Speech in this view is
reduced to a conventional social currency that facilitates
exchange between individuals. Similarly, while our concepts
are "natural" they do not necessarily mirror things in
nature. Our knowledge is thus entirely contingent on our
experience, and is restricted to us as individuals, though
we can reason from it to an assumption about shared
experience. Ockham posits a knowledge based on the
probability that our knowledge of the world is true rather
than the certainty that it is true that was available to
Aquinas or Augustine.24
Though it at first seems quite distant from Carlyle's
concern, Swift's Tale of a T u b , with its patchwork of
religions and its absent god treats the same dangers and
abuses in modern science and by modern authors that Carlyle
does. When the layers of authors and texts are peeled away
in the multiple prefaces of the Tale, only the

history of

the brothers who retailored the garment left them by their
dead father remains, with all of its resonances of the
Reformation's linguistic and spiritual legacy of
subjectivity and fragmentation to the modern world, embodied
most dangerously in Cartesian rationalism. Swift, too,
revisits the linguistic and cognitive dilemmas of Scotus and
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Ockham, exploring, as Adams did the destructive legacy of
the triumph of nominalism and the via moderna. Augustine,
Swift, and Carlyle thus serve as Adams's symbolic markers
for the history of subjectivity. What was a clearly
delineated path to certain recovery of truth through memory,
and meaning through history in Augustine, gives way in Swift
to the ill-fated birth of the Enlightenment Project. In
Carlyle, the hero is buried beneath his consciousness of the
weight of his history, and the possibility that he is
isolated within himself and separated from his fellow human
beings. In Adams, the hero has disappeared, and his absence
is not mourned.
The first problem we encounter in this work is a
Preface, dated September, 1918, in the original Houghton
Mifflin edition, six months after Adams's death, and
attributed to Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge did
write the

not, ofcourse,

Preface. Adams wrote it for him, and sent it to

him, with elaborate instructions on how Lodge was to treat
the manuscript of the Education after Adams's death. Adams
apparently did not want alien hands to touch his manikin.
I send you herewith a sealed packet
containing a copy of my Education
corrected and prepared for publication.
Should the question arise at any future
time, I wish that you, on behalf of the
Hist. Society, would take charge of the
matter, and see that the volume is
printed as I leave it. With this view, I
have written a so-called Editor's
Preface, which you have read, and which
I have taken the liberty, subject to
your assent, to stamp with your
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initials. Also, may I beg that you will
bar the introduction of all
illustrations of any sort. You know that
I do not consider illustrations as my
work, or having part in any correct
rendering of my ideas. Least of all do I
wish portraits. I have always tried to
follow the rule of making the reader
think only of the text, and I do not
want to abandon it here.
(Letters. VI, 725)
Adams's complaint with the Church may have been that it
sought to extend personal identity into eternity, but he was
quite anxious to see that his personal self was available
only in the overdetermined form he prescribed. By
appropriating Lodge's name, Adams assumes the role of
statesman, and Lodge's presence, however pretended,
announces the political aims of the Education.

In the Adams

files at the Massachusetts Historical Society, one can view,
on microfilm, a hand-written copy of the Preface. At the
end, in shaky letters, Adams has pencilled in the initials
"H.C.L.," followed by a question mark.

Lodge's Preface

states Adams's formal aims for the Education, but the great
statesman's historical presence infects our sense of things.
Lodge's signature fixes our expectations of an autobiography
after the fashion of Adams's own "life and letters"
biographies. The reader is confounded. Are we in the
narrative universe of Cervantes and Swift, or of Lodge and
John Hay? Adams's point, of course, is that the boundaries
between history and fiction have collapsed, and that his
work, in which he once again, as he had in Mt. St. Michel.
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speaks in the third person is like Montaigne's essays— a new
genre— a sort of anti-autobiography. Adams's use of the
third person in Mt. St. Michel reflects his alienation from
the world he described; in the Education, it reflects his
alienation from himself as subject of himself. Whereas his
model, St. Augustine, could directly address his God with
his "I," conjuring the presence of the Logos through the
articulation of the truth of his being, Adams is both
Subject and subject. Like a self-conscious Hawthorne, he
must create a shape for history. Like the omniscient god of
his own narrative universe Adams alters the sequences of
history, leaves out twenty years of his life, and reshapes
himself not as Henry Adams, but as the Subject of Modernity,
in whom all the tendencies of the modern world since Abelard
converge.
Along with the labyrinthine references to manikin and
tailor, the bogus preface is the reader's first indication
that this is an autobiography more concerned with artifice
than with life. In the Preface, Adams is tailor, manikin,
and garment— Subject, subject, and materia. If Lodge's
"preface"

lends the book a kind of historical authenticity,

it also turns the book into a parody of self-representation.
The first section of narrative is constructed upon a lie. On
the other hand, Adams had claimed that his generation of
Bostonians were "but one mind and spirit; the individual is
a facet of Boston." Perhaps part of his claim is that the
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manikin could just as easily be named "Lodge" as "Henry
Adams." The Education is framed within a world where all
words have lost their meanings. The preface not only reminds
us of multiple and confusing prefaces of Tale of a T u b , it
makes the text seem more like fiction than it is. The most
famous stepfathered and edited manuscript in history is Don
Ouiiote. a text in which Cervantes loses his story, finds
it, and continually admonishes his readers to remember that
their souls are in their own bodies and that neither they
nor Cervantes have much to do with the fate of Don Quijote.
In the Education. Adams blurs the boundaries of our
rationalistic sense of the order of things. We are not sure
that our souls are in our own bodies. We are somehow aware
that we are, at least for the time that we engage with him
on the shared ground of his account of himself, his
subjects.
In his own Preface, the one he claimed, Adams warns us
that his memoir deals not with the manikin-double of
himself, but with the garment of education. The Preface
begins with what Adams calls Rousseau's "appeal to the
Deity."
'I have shown myself as I was;
contemptible and vile when I was so;
good, generous, sublime, when I was so;
I have unveiled my interior such as Thou
thyself hast seen it, Eternal Father.
Collect about me the innumerable swarm
of my fellows; let them hear my
confessions; let them groan at my
unworthiness; let them blush at my
meannesses! Let each of them discover
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his heart in his turn at the foot of thy
throne with the same sincerity: and then
let any one of them tell thee if he
dares: — 'I was a better man.'
(Education. 721)
Confessing himself to his fellow men, carrying his book with
him to his God, Rousseau has managed to demonstrate Adams's
central thesis in Mt. St. Michel— that the concept of world
has collapsed into the idea of the personal self. Rousseau's
confessions provide not a hand-book for readers seeking
education, but an ironic "warning against the Ego."

Adams

points out that, since the time of Rousseau, the "Ego" has
"steadily tended to efface itself," and, "for purposes of
model to become a manikin on which the toilet of education
is to be draped in order to show the fit of misfit of the
clothes"

(Education. 722). As Theodor Adorno noted, in the

text that has haunted my own narrative of Henry Adams's
efforts at self-representation,

"the self, its guiding idea,

and its a priori object, has always, under its scrutiny,
been rendered at the same time non-existent."25 When man
becomes the measure of all things, he also becomes an object
for study. At the moment that he is thus objectified as
material for analysis, he is included among all the things
in the world outside the subject's private screening room
that are designated as unreal. The individual's autonomy is
renounced with his unity; he is alienated from himself, and
subjugated to the mechanistic processes or rationalization
which determine the order of things in the modern state. In
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such a world, which was born, as Adams had shown in M t . S t .
Michel. with the advent of medieval nominalism, the object
of study is necessarily a manikin, not a self. The "young
man" whom Adams as tailor is seeking to "outfit," is the
"subject of education," and in the greatest ironic moment of
a career built on irony Adams means that the self is the
final project of the enlightenment. Through the university
system, he would be reconstituted as the subject of the
"human sciences." Through the activity of life-writing, he
would be reduced first to a "geometrical figure of three or
more dimensions," and then "used" in the "study of
relation." Adams wants to kill off his manikin, and his
language confirms his intention.
The manikin...has the same value as any
other figure of three or more
dimensions, which is used for the study
of relation.For that purpose it cannot
be spared; it is the only measure of
motion, of proportion, of human
condition; it must have the air of
reality; must be taken for real; must be
treated as though it had life; — Who
knows? Possibly it had!
(Education, 722)
The "manikin" is Adams's last simulacrum that bears his
name, and it is inseparable from its original. It has as
much life as Adams has, and as little. Just as Adams kept
records of the measures of Tahitians and Samoans, he
measures, defines, and limits himself before beginning his
scientific history of himself.

Whether or not Adams as a

living being might have had life in a different world than
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that engendered by the Enlightenment project is the final
question of the open form of the Education, which leads from
the construction of the simulacrum in the Preface to its
exit in the final pages of the appropriately titled final
chapter— "Nunc Age."
Adams's choice of Rousseau for his primary model
undoubtedly held an additional attraction for Adams. By
Rousseau's own admission his being was constructed through
and mediated by his reading of romances, and he dates his
"unbroken consciousness of [his] existence from the time
that he first learned to read."26 Rousseau's selfconsciousness is thus mediated by literary texts, not by
relationships to the world of sense. Rousseau later replaced
novels with history and with readings from classical
antiquity. The habit of constructing a romantic vision of
the world through imagination was extended as Rousseau
became the "character whose life I was reading."27 As
Rousseau grew older his preference for the unnatural
pleasures of the imagination over the natural ones provided
by the world extended to sex.

Rousseau become enamored of

one Mile. Lambercier, the sister of the pastor who was his
tutor. Inadvertently, when punishing him for some misdeed,
she introduced him to the fatal joys of sexual pleasure
induced through pain at the hands of an older woman.
Thereafter Rousseau "feasted feverish eyes on lovely women"
not because he wanted to imagine himself taking his pleasure
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with each of them as distinct individuals, but because he
yearned to "make use of them in [his] own fashions as so
many Mile. Lamberciers."28

In the dominions of Rousseau's

imagination doubles of beautiful women could be constructed
as things of beauty, and discarded at will; all women were
thus his subjects. At the same time, Rousseau experienced a
painful discontinuity in his relationships with real women.
As he could never confess his desire to "fall of his knees
before a masterful mistress" and be punished and humiliated,
his actual sexual experiences were characterized by
unfulfilled longings which he suffered in silence.29

In

contrast to the role of helpless suppliant that he
constructs for himself as lover, he assumes a role of power
over the reader. Just as Rousseau fashions real women and
fictional characters into simulacra of themselves and
himself, he constructs the reader as a helpless audience,
constrained to listen to his confession.
I am well aware that the reader does not
require information, but I, on the other
hand, feel impelled to give it to him.
Why should I not relate the little
incidents of that happy time, that still
give me a flutter of pleasure to
recall...let us strike a bargain. I will
let you off five, and be content with
one..so long as I am allowed to take as
long as I like in telling it, in order
to prolong my pleasure.30
The reader becomes another of Rousseau's simulacra, a
creature

constructed as the subject of Rousseau's imperial

"I." Aswe move through the

Confessions. whole cities become

subject to Rousseau. In Rousseau's imagination, Paris, for
example, is a "city of a most imposing appearance, as
beautiful as it was large, where nothing was to be seen but
splendid streets and palaces of marble or gold." When he
goes to Paris, entering through the Faubourg Saint-Marceau,
he is overwhelmed by "dirty stinking little streets, ugly
black houses, a general air of squalor and poverty, beggars,
carters, menders of clothes, sellers of herb drinks and old
hats."31 Later on, he responds similarly to Versailles, and
to the sea. Tangible realities are always inferior to the
doubles shaped by Rousseau's imagination. Rousseau avoids
owning property, favoring money instead, because it promises
him freedom. He avoided ties with family, because, again, he
sought to have no ties to any material reality. His life is
bounded and determined by the text of self that he is
constantly engaged in updating. His is model of life founded
in discontinuity, and the narrative disarray of the final
sections of the Confessions attests to Rousseau's
imprisonment in a solipsistic universe. Adams's choice of
Rousseau as a model is a rueful admission that his own
manikin-self had been similarly entrapped, and that the
truncated narrative available through subjectivity was the
appropriate monument to the subject of modernity as well as
to the way he had chosen to live most of his life, as a sort
of childless vagabond. In such a world, as Adams was to note
later in his historical essays, one could only chronicle a

sort of mechanical dissolution of being. As Adams explains
in his Preface, "Jean Jacques erected a monument against the
Ego," and "since his time, and largely thanks to him, the
Ego has steadily tended to efface itself." (Education. 721).
Like Hawthorne's Old Esther, the self reinoved from any
participation in the life of the world of sense shrivels and
disappears. Adams's statement that "the object of study" in
the Education is the "garment not the figure" is his
acknowledgement of Althusser's recognition that the idea of
the personal self is an illusion, generated and perpetuated
through an ideology that, through the entrenched power
structures of western culture assumes the status of absolute
reality. The Education is thus a study of the ideologies
that constituted the simulacrum of Henry Adams as character
in the Education. In turn, the simulacrum is the subject of
Henry Adams as narrator, god, and creator of himself as a
shrivelled double. It has the "air of reality" because
Adams's readers constitute it as real, taking Adams's life
in the process of doubling him once again in the act of
interpretation and simultaneously revealing their own
imprisonment in the cave of personal identity. The Preface
is dated "February 16, 1907" because Adams was designating a
birthday for his own simulacrum, that ultimate monument to
a self that had been dead for twenty years before the
education was printed. Adams's biological and historical
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self, it will be remembered, had been killed off with his
diaries in 1888.
Adams begins his biography of himself in a fairly
conventional way, with his birth, but he is born in the
shadow of the great ideological constructs that had given
rise to the American Republic.

He is born "under the shadow

of Boston State House," in a house below the tellingly named
"Mt. Vernon Place," and he is "branded" and "crippled" by
the presences not only of the State House, but of the First
Church, Beacon Hill, John Hancock, John Adams, Mount Vernon,
and Quincy.

Adams is doomed to be crushed by the weight of

history from the start, even while he is still "ten pounds
of unconscious babyhood." The baby that was born on February
16, 1838, was destined to live a life in which he, in
Nietzsche's terms was "always attached to the past." No
matter "how far and fast he runs, he is doomed to "carry his
chain with him."32 Adams's dilemma was how to find what
Nietzsche called a "usable past." Like Nietzsche's
historical individual, he possessed "no trace of the power
to forget," and was thus "condemned everywhere to see
becoming."

Nietzsche rightly recognized, as Adams himself

did, that history was "a disguised theology,"33 which makes
impotent subjects of us all.
In keeping with the Adamses' historical investment in
the ideals of the Enlightenment, Adams "reached manhood
without knowing religion, and with the certainty that dogma,
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metaphysics, and abstract philosophy were not worth knowing"
(Education. 752). Adams grew up among brothers and sisters
whom he described in the same phrases he used to describe
the Bostonians of his entire generation.
...all were conscious that they would
like to control power in some
form...Their form was tied to politics
or literature. They amounted to one
individual with half-a-dozen sides or
facets; their temperaments reacted on
each other, and made each child more
like the other...What no one knew was
whether the individual who thought
himself a representative of this type,
was fit to deal with life.
(Education, 753)
For Adams and his brothers and sisters, "books remained as
in the eighteenth-century the source of life, and as they
came out,— Thackeray, Dickens, Bulwer, Tennyson, Macaulay,
Carlyle and the rest,— they were devoured."

Like Rousseau,

Adams's early sense of himself was formed through reading
and through listening to his father read. In addition to the
texts his father provided, he liked to lie "on a musty heap
of Congressional Documents in the old farm-house at Quincy,
reading Quentin Durward, Ivanhoe, and the Talisman." His
favorite activity, however, and the one from which he drew
most education involved "reading the garden at intervals for
peaches and pears"

(Education. 755). Novel-reading comes

from Rousseau; pear-stealing from Augustine's Confessions.
Nothing in Adams's existence bears a spontaneous
relationship to the material world. He lived in "the

atmosphere of the Stamp Act, the Tea Tax, and the Boston
Massacre"

(Education. 758). His first encounter with the

sensual world, which, as we have seen earlier, he always
associated with the American South, came in his encounter
with the nation's capital. There, "the want of barriers, of
pavements of forms, the looseness, the laziness, the
indolent southern drawl, the pigs in the streets; the negro
babies and their mothers with bandannas, the freedom,
openness, swagger, of nature and man"

(Education, 760) stood

in stark contrast to the Enlightenment ideals that formed
Adams's image of America. Adams claimed the duality of
America as his own, fabricating a southern ancestry through
his great-grandmother, Louisa Catherine Adams that the old
lady herself denied, and pairing it with his enlightenment
heritage. Even as a child Adams claims to have recognized
that Boston and Maryland were two worlds that could not live
together, but he also felt himself powerless to choose one
over the other. As in Adams's history, the blight over the
sultry South for Adams was slavery, and the early sections
of the Education recapitulate the horror that Adams
expressed in his letters before and during the Civil War.
Nevertheless, George Washington remained for

him a steady

figure, like the Pole Star, a "primary... an ultimate
relation" who alone remained steady in Adams's youthful
imagination. Adams's confrontation with the insoluble
dilemma of slavery and freedom, of North and South, of
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Virginian ideals and Virginian realities echoed his early
sense of the duality of all existence. At every turn in the
early chapters of the Education. Adams announces that
education had not begun. It seemed to him as a young
graduate of Harvard that Karl Marx was "standing there
waiting for him, and that sooner or later the process of
education would have to deal with Karl Marx"

(Education.

786) .
Adams's experiences with German education were as
limiting and as disappointing as his years at Harvard. In
his attempt to study Civil Law in Berlin, he found only the
"lecture-system in its deadliest form" (Education. 789). As
for the German model of state education, Adams found it
frightening.
All State-education is a sort of dynamo
machine for polarising the popular mind;
for turning and holding its lines of
force in the direction supposed to be
most effective for State-purposes. The
German machine was terribly efficient.
(Education, 792)
Like Louis Althusser, Adams acknowledged and feared the
complicity of education and the State, and in his rebellion,
found that education for him lay only outside the schoolroom
in "time wasted; studies neglected; vices indulged;
education reversed; — it came from the despised beer-garden
and music-hall; and it was accidental, unintended,
unforeseen." Only at one moment, when he finds himself
suddenly able to follow a Beethoven symphony does he feel
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that a "prison wall that had barred his senses" has fallen.
Adams has contacted the primal world of sense, and
experienced a "marvel of education;" the equivalent of
learning to "read a new language"

(Education. 793).

The unfailing sources of education in the Education are
music, the arts, and the realm of the senses. The
traditional quest for the aufklarunq. the progressive
"unfolding in history of the force of the foundation" is
dramatically abandoned, and with it, the ideas of even the
possibility of truth and historical foundation are
dissolved. What Nietzsche's calls a "philosophy of morning"
in Human All Too Human is in fact a reorientation of self
toward proximity rather than toward origins.34 The real
world posited by the enlightenment project and more
immediately by Adams's own ancestors had vanished, taking
the apparent world produced through subjectivity with it.
Adams was left with the realization that there is no self to
be recalled— that, as he said in his letters on the writing
of the Education— he cannot imitate Augustine's motion
toward unity. Adams can only replicate the abandonment of
the unifying vision of linear history in favor of a history
of discontinuity and dislocation that denies any claim to be
a universal history. The history that Adams came to espouse
as "multiplicity" is a productive of subjective recollection
which is also a distortion.
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Adams calls attention to the fact that his story is not
only the story of the production of a manikin, but also an
essay on the end of the enlightenment version of history by
structuring his narrative around successive returns to
the moment when Gibbon conceived of his history of the
decline and fall of Rome.
Anarchy lost no ground meanwhile. The
problem only became the more
fascinating. Probably it was more vital
in May, 1860 than it had been in
October, 17 64, when the idea of writing
the Decline and Fall of the city first
started to the mind of Gibbon, 'in the
close of the evening, as I sat musing in
the Church of the Zoccolanti...while
they were singing Vespers in the Temple
of Jupiter, on the ruins of the Capitol.
Murray's Handbook had the grace to quote
this passage from Gibbon's
autobiography, which led Adams more than
once to sit at sunset on the steps of
the Church of Santa Maria di Ara Coeli,
curiously wondering that not an inch had
been gained by Gibbon,— or all the
historians since,— towards explaining
the Fall. The mystery remained unsolved.
(Education. 804)
Adams, of course, had not read Gibbon in Murray. He had read
the Autobiography in Germany, and, as we have seen, it had
inspired him to become his family's historian, though in the
Education he claims never to have intended to set himself up
as a Gibbon.

(Education, 804). In later years, he claims to

have always returned to Rome, to sit "once more on the steps
of Ara Coeli,"

(Education, 935), but the moment of

revelation never came. Returning in 1868 he reflected that
he knew no more than he had known in 1858,

(Education. 936);
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in 1893, he sat down at the Chicago Exhibition, pondering
the mysteries of Richard Hunt's dome "almost as deeply as on
the steps of the Ara Coeli, and much to the same purpose."
Here was a breach of continuity,— a
rupture in historical sequence! Was it
real, or only apparent? One's personal
universe hung on the answer, for if the
rupture was real and the new American
world could take this sharp and
conscious twist toward ideals one's
personal friends would come in, at last,
as winners in the great American chariot
race for fame...
(Education, 1032)
Of course, Adams's friends had in fact come in as "winners"
in the "chariot race for fame," but their role in the
history of the early twentieth century had been solely that
of presiding over further folly. "Education ran riot in
Chicago," and Adams was forced to "sit down on the steps and
brood."
The historical mind can think only in
historical processes, and probably this
was the first time since historians
existed that any of them had sat down
helpless before a mechanical sequence.
Before a metaphysical or a theological
or a political sequence, most historians
had felt helpless, but the single clue
to which they had hitherto trusted was
the unity of natural force.
(Education, 1033)
In Chicago Adams saw his eighteenth century swept "into the
ash-heap." He had "stood up for his eighteenth-century, his
constitution of 1789, his George Washington, his Harvard
College, his Quincy, and his Plymouth Pilgrims, as long as

anyone would stand up with him" (Education, 1034-35). He was
faced with the recognition that "education must fit the
complex conditions of a new society, always accelerating its
movement, and its fitness could be known only from success"
(Education. 1037). The old world and its attendant ways of
seeing and being that had constituted Adams as a person had
vanished, as certainly as Adams's diaries had been
symbolically consigned to flames, almost in preparation for
the Exhibition. Just as Gibbon's Roman vigil had haunted
Adams in life, it haunts and informs the shape of the
Education. forcing its narrative motion into a cyclic motion
that declines to move forward. Adams as manikin perennially
winds up where he began. The principle of construction, as
we noted earlier, is an affirmation of the triumph of
nominalism. There is no progression here. The narrative of
Adams's education acknowledges the impossibility of a linear
conception of narrative.

As we noted before, the narrative

refuses and parodies the possibilities of education inherent
in the picaresque tradition. The illusion of continuity
first fostered by Augustine is abandoned by Adams.
Adams has two other unifying devices in the Education.
One is the image of the prototypic shark, Pteraspis. which
Adams discovered in 1867, and which had fascinated him
almost as much as Gibbon. The shark had managed to survive
through aeons of change. Pteraspis. the predator of the sea
serves in the Education as a kind of counterpoint to

Gibbon's eighteenth-century values. If Gibbon determined
Adams's investment of himself in historiography, he claimed
the shark and its relatives as his "cousins, great-uncles,
or grandfathers"

(Education. 929-930). The shark survives by

living life as a predator, and Adams saw no more evidence or
progress in the shark than he had seen in Gibbon's
progressive vision of history. For Adams, the shark becomes
an emblem of the modern subject, who is a predator of mind,
devouring and digesting all that it encounters, as Adams had
"devoured" the "boiled pork fat" of the biographies of
Gladstone and Story in 1903. The Pteraspis offered proof
that "uniformity...was not uniform; and Selection...did not
select"

(Education. 931). Pteraspis showed that even

Darwinism was a "form of religious hope," a "promise of
ultimate perfection," a "dogma to be put in the place of the
Athanasian creed." For himself, he "had no Faith." The "idea
of one Form, Law, Order, or Sequence had no more value for
him than the idea of none;...what he valued most was
Motion,...what attracted his mind was Change"

(Education.

931) .
Adams's other device of formal unity is provided by the
images of paralysis that he himself acknowledged were the
dominant symbols of his career.

The "broken caterpillar

that has lost its thread" of 1911 is America as "earthworm"
in the Education. trying to "realise and understand itself;
to catch up with its own head, and to twist about in search
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of its tail” (Education. 937) . Throughout the Education,
characters have their "historical necks broken," and Adams
himself perennially dangles on the lost thread of personal
identity.
His identity, if one could call a bundle
of disconnected memories an identity,
seemed to remain; but his life was once
more broken into separate pieces; he was
a spider, and had to spin a new web in
some new place with a new attachment.
(Education. 912)
The American people, like Adams himself, were "wandering in
a wilderness much more sandy than the Hebrews had ever
trodden about Sinai...They had lost the sense of worship"
(Education. 1020). Education for Adams resolve itself in the
ambiguities of the figure that St. Gaudens "had made for him
in his absence." And the figure has no meaning, except to
reflect the "response of the observer"

(Education. 1021).

If Adams recorded his "death" in the fragments of his
diaries, he also records his death by the narrative break in
the Education that spans the years between his wife's
suicide, his publication of the history, his journey to the
South Seas, and his return to Washington in 1892. In that
chapter, which he called "Twenty Years After," he begins to
refer to himself as a dead man. "Even dead men allow
themselves a few narrow prejudices,"

(Education. 1022).

Elsewhere Adams is a "dead American." The remaining
chapters, beginning with Adams's journey to the Chicago
Exhibition, record the erosion of the principle of the self,
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and its replacement by the recognition that "Unity is
chaos,"

(Education. 1091).

The final sections end with his

explanation of his writing of the Mt. St. Michel and
Chartres, and the Education itself. Adams had reached
Hegel's limits of contradiction (Education. 1134), and what
lay beyond the self that could be framed in narrative was am
embrace of the "supersensual universe."

The man of the

future "could be only a child born of contact between the
old and the new energies" (Education. 1177).
The idea of education is defined and redefined
throughout this text, and, as its meanings alter, Adams's
vistas of understanding, and ours implode . Indeed, the
shifting meanings Adams assigns to the word, which sometimes
means American history and sometimes means experience of the
world and sometimes means consciousness and sometimes means
sensory experience underscore his sense that Abelard's and
Ockham's radical doctrine of concepts had triumphed in the
modern world. When Adams finds himself poised between "The
Heights of Knowledge" and "The Abyss of Ignorance," he
reminds us, and his manikin-double, of what his letters
affirm over and over— that they come to the same thing--the
world collapsed into the self, or the self collapsed into
the world.
He seemed to know nothing— to be groping
in darkness— to be falling forever in
space, and the worst depth consisted in
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the assurance, incredible as it seemed,
that no one knew more.
(Education, 1108)
Adams's

revelation is that "one's psyche is like a"bicycle

rider,mechanically balancing himself, by
inferior personalities"

inhibiting all his

(Education. 1116). As a literary

artist, he engages himself in the construction of narrative
spaces which serve to free him from himself.
Eight or ten years of study had led
Adams to think he might use the century
1150-1250...as the unity from which he
might measure motion down to his own
time, without assuming anything as true
or untrue, except relation...He began a
volume which he mentally knew as 'Mt.
St. Michel and Chartres: A Study in
Thirteenth-Century Unity.' From that
point, he proposed to fix a position for
himself which he could label 'The
Education of Henry Adams: A Study in
Twentieth-Century Multiplicity.'
(Education. 1117)
Adams intended to use the force that had lurked on the edges
of his eighteenth-century childhood to symbolize the new
age. Adams, the child

of an alien century, who "got lost in

the study of the game

of life and never got to play it" did

manage to fix a point

in history from which he could

construct an identity

which could be replicated in print.

Taken together, Mt. St. Michel and the Education move the
reader from a world impelled by God and his angels to a
realm created by Henry Adams and modern science. Like
Nietzsche, the acrobat from whom he stole his metaphor,
Adams may have felt like "an acrobat with a dwarf on his

288

back, crossing a chasm on a slack rope, and commonly
breaking his neck," but his book paves the way toward a new
order of things, an order that lies beyond the perilous seas
of introspection in the realm of sense.
Late in the Education. Adams tells us that he is
writing in part because since "every man must bear his own
universe" he has decided to tell his readers how he bore
his. If there is a unifying thread in the Education, it is
in the idea of education itself. Adams is using the word in
its Latin sense, as the process which leads men out of
themselves and into communion with other human beings. Adams
assumed in youth that education lay all around him, and was
merely waiting to be claimed. By the time he wrote the
Education, he understood that the paths of reason do not
lead to the palace of wisdom. Abelard and Scotus and Ockham
had ensured that through philosophic doctrines that struck
at the heart of the ideal of community founded on a language
that contained signs of the infinite. As we move through the
chapters of the Education and the word "education" acquires
its series of altered significances, Adams demonstrates the
impossibility of the very universal enlightenment he claims
to espouse in his Preface. At first, Education is an
awareness of colors and sounds. Then it becomes an awareness
of duality— the perception, for example, that life in Quincy
and life in Boston are irreconcilable. In each succeeding
chapter, Adams looks

for education. He looks in Berlin and

Rome, and in Washington and London, and fails to find
anything beyond insoluble dilemmas.

In the course of the

Education, the word "education” is thus emptied of meaning.
If it comes to be synonymous with experience, with weighing
and testing experience it is also synonymous with self
creation. Above all, it becomes synonymous with what Deleuze
would call the quest for "nomadic thought." What Adams's
eighteenth-century childhood had regarded as a static
journey through fixed stations of learning had given way to
a process of mental gymnastics. When Adams describes the
mind poised over the abyss of the

conception of the

subconscious mind as a

engaged in the delicate

bicyclist

act of balancing himself, he counts on us to remember that,
several chapters earlier, he had idly remarked that "at the
age of fifty Henry Adams learned to ride a bicycle." The
mind in the new age, he observed,

would have to jump.

As

Adams dismisses truth (Education. 932) and claims an
identity as a "flotsam or jetsam of wreckage"

in a dead

world (Education. 938), he prepares his final voyage into a
mode of being that is chaotic, but not discontinuous.

Freed

of the principle of the personal self, the deterritorialized
being could range at will over whatever historical or
geographic terrain he wanted, oblivious of boundaries, and
contemptuous of the concepts of definition and analysis.
Adams's final essays in historiography and the theory of
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history prepare the way for a post-structuralist, if not a
postmodern conception of history and of existence.
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CHAPTER 5

ADAMS, HISTORY, AND THE SUBJECT OF MODERNITY
Thinking begins only when we have come
to know that reason, glorified for
centuries, is the most stiff-necked
adversary of thought.1
Martin Heidegger, "The Word of
Nietzsche"
As we have seen, Henry Adams's self-consciousness about
his role as an historian was present in his earliest letters
from his student days in Berlin.

His radical doubts about

the possibilities for locating an adequate stance for
narrating the past, along with his sense that traditional
historiography belonged to the sphere of the dead languages,
places him in the company of both modern and post-modern
theorists.

Adams seems always to have known that he was to

be something both more and less than the Gibbon he sought to
be, and that his chosen career of family historian would
take him far beyond the progressive historians of his own
day.

In our study, the idea that Adams became progressively

more convinced that such a thing as "history" did not and
could not exist as long as we conceived of the past as
recuperable or even a concrete entity has become a truism.
The sense he shared with Marx, that "everything solid melts
into air" is, of course, part of his stance as a selfconscious modernist.

At the same time, Adams believed that

he was a member of a long line of humanists. He found his
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rightful antecedents in Swift and the "Battle of the
Books,"2

and in Erasmus and Machiavelli and Petrarch.

them, Adams recognized the power of

Like

the historian's

narrative for shaping present-day reality. He also shared
with literary artists like Petrarch, and Spenser after him,
the notion that the historian must provide the mirror in
which the past is, if not recovered, at least conveniently
deformed, for a contemporary audience. Adam's humanism as an
historian is, as all of humanism has been, wedded to a
theory of education.

Adams recognized the necessary

complicity between the historian's narrative and the
university system he himself had brought back from Germany
to the United States and its complicity, in turn
mechanism of the State.

with the

The responsibility of the teacher

of history in Adams's view was awesome.
A parent gives life, but as parent,
gives no more. A murderer takes life,
but his deed stops there.A teacher
affects eternity.; he can never tell
where his influence stops. A teacher is
expected to teach truth, and may perhaps
flatter himself that he does so, if he
stops with the alphabet or the
multiplication table...A teacher must
either treat history as a catalogue, a
record, a romance; or as an evolution
and whether he affirms or denies
evolution, he falls into all the burning
fagots of the pit. He makes of his
scholars either priests or atheists,
plutocrats or socialists, judges or
anarchists, almost in spite of himself.
In essence incoherent and immoral,
history had either to be taught as
such— or falsified.
(Education. 994)

Adams, who "respected neither history nor method" had found
himself caught up in Harvard's attempts at educational
reform in the 1870s, and "he imposed Germany"— by which he
meant German historical method— "on his scholars with a
heavy hand...but he sometimes doubted whether they should be
grateful." For Adams, "history is a tangled skein that one
may take up at any point and break when one has unravelled
enough; but complexity precedes evolution. Pteraspis grins
horribly from the closed entrance"

(Education. 996-998). The

shark of subjectivity that threatens the world in the
Education threatens the university system in Adams's
historical essays in its thirst for more worlds to devour
and in its unconscious and, hence, unchecked quest for
power.

He wrote his brother Brooks that "the teaching

profession is, like the church and the bankers, a vested
interest. And the historians will fall on anyone who
threatens their stock in trade quite as virulently as do the
bankers on the silver men"

(Degradation. 97). Though Adams

"quitted the university" in 1877, his certainty about the
necessity of some kind of educational reform endured, as the
title of the Education. and the historical addresses from
1894 and afterward suggest.

Adams had seen the Church's

pastoral power as a positive force in the Middle Ages. To
see it secularized and wedded to the modern state was
disturbing, for, in Adams's eyes, the modern state exerted
the same pastoral force over the citizen through the agency
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of state-sponsored education that the catechism had exerted
in an earlier age. Unlike the medieval Church, however, the
modern state with its ties to the enlightenment project,
could claim only the quest for a great society as its aims.
It had no capacity to mediate between the individual and
eternity.
In 1894 as an "absent President" of the American
Historical Society, Henry Adams discussed the necessity of
devising a science of history that would "reduce history
under a law as clear as the laws which govern the material
world," and which would bring "order and the chaos" and
transform "the darkness into light."

Recalling the

"astonishing influence" of a "mere theorist" like Rousseau
or a "reasoner" like Adam Smith or a "philosopher... like
Darwin" Adams muses that the production of a "science of
history" would be vastly more violent in its effects than
the dissensions roused by anyone or by all three of these
great men" (Degradation. 127).

The address, which was read

by some nameless simulacrum of Adams, had already
internalized a condition of radical doubt about the
possibility of narrating a linear version of the past, and
had, as we have seen, lost faith in scientific history even
before he finished his History of the United States.

At the

same time, while he believed that the shape of historical
narrative in the future would not be linear or factual or
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"scientific," his language in "The Tendency of History" is
still that of the enlightenment historiographers.
The world is made up of a few immense
forces, each with an organization that
corresponds with its strength. The
church stands first...and cannot accept
any science of history, because science
by its definition must exclude the idea
of a personal and active providence.
The state stands next; and the hostility
of the state would be assured toward any
system or science that might not
strengthen its arm. Property is growing
more and more timid, and looks with
extreme jealousy on any new idea that
might weaken vested rights.
Labor is
growing more and more self-confident and
looks with contempt on all theories that
do not support its own. Yet we cannot
conceive of a history that would
not...affect all these vast social
forces.
(Degradation. 129)
Because he was aware of the political force inherent in
the narrative of history, Adams saw that in creating the
text of "history" we are agreeing on at least a temporary
shape for cultural identity. Thus, just as Adams believed
that "in biography we are taking life," and that in
autobiography we commit suicide, in writing history we drain
the essential life of the world, and replace it with a kind
of embalming fluid of interpretation. The historian's
narrative

at its best threatens the fabric of received

systems of value and knowledge by forcing renewal upon them.
A science cannot be played with. In an
hypothesis is advanced that obviously
brings into a direct sequence of cause
and effect all the phenomena of human
history, we accept it, and if we accept
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it we must teach it. The mere fact that
it overthrows social organizations
affects our attitude...we must follow
the new light no matter where it
leads...Even if we, like Galileo, should
be obliged by the religious or secular
authority to recant and repudiate our
science, we should still have to say, as
he did in secret if not in public, "E
pur si muove.'
(Degradation. 131)
Adams's complaint about the historians of his generation was
that they tended to fall back on the old

illusions of

continuity and sequence, rather than attempting to
articulate and analyze the new ground of what Heidegger
would soon define as a rejection of the idea of being as a
ground for existence.

If Petrarch's account of his ascent

of Mt. Ventoux records a break between the medieval and
modern worlds, one in which the religious category of
conversion is superimposed on a new consciousness of a
secularized nature from which the subject feels alienated,
Adams occupies another crack between worlds. In his late
essays, Adams engages in a ritualized writing of
enlightenment history, but he intentionally empties them of
the enlightenment's guiding ideas and justifications, thus
demonstrating the exhaustion of his own faith in reason and
in the power of the individual to find a generalized meaning
through the study of the fragments of the past. "History,"
like Petrarch's pilgrimage to the inaccessible mountain, has
become a hollow shell or fragment in which the historian, to
borrow Blumenberg's language, "reoccupies formal systems of
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positions" only to radicalize, parody, and transform them.3
The "meaning" in history thus consists only in establishing
a subjective connection with the past through
interpretation. It has nothing to do with facts or
chronology.
Part of Adams's point is made by his physical absence.
Adams was in Guadalajara when his address was delivered
elsehwere, by someone else.

Through his absence Adams

suggests that the historian and the university system must
be purified of the mystique of what Marx called the "cult of
personality" if they are to be of real service. His sense of
his power over the students he taught at Harvard and of the
damage he did them in making them "priests or atheists,"
"plutocrats or socialists" haunted him.

Thus he chooses to

be absent as a personal self not only in this address, but
explicitly in the "Rule of Phase" and "Letter to American
Teachers of History."

Reader and audience alike, confronted

on the one hand with a text, and on the other with speech
articulated by some nameless Not Adams are forced to deal
with the fragile vessel of words, not the manikin who
articulates them. Part of the explicit construction and
deconstruction of a self in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and
the Education seems to have been accomplished with the
terrible experience of writing and teaching in mind. Adams's
awareness of the teacher's power over language recalls his
model Augustine's De Maqistro. with its haunting reminder

301

that, since "speaking itself is a sign," there is
"absolutely nothing which can be taught without signs."4
For Augustine, of course, the danger was that the teacher
would draw attention to himself or his own words and point
the student away from the "universals of which we can have
knowledge [if] we do not listen to anyone speaking and
making sounds outside ourselves." These "universals" were
available only when we "listen to Truth which presides over
our minds within us," through the agency of "our real
Teacher who is said to dwell in the inner man."5
When the teachers have expounded by
means of words all the disciplines which
they profess to teach, the disciplines
also of virtue and wisdom, then their
pupils take thought within themselves
whether what they have told is true,
looking to the inward truth...And when
they find inwardly that what they have
been told is true they praise their
teachers, not knowing that they really
praise not teachers bur learned men if
the teachers really know what they
express in words. Men are wrong when
they call these teachers who are not.
But because... there is no interval
between the moment of speaking and the
moment of knowing, and because they
inwardly learn immediately after the
speaker has given his admonition, they
suppose that they have taught in an
external fashion by him who gave the
admonition.6

For Augustine, the rightly motivated teacher, while a mere
simulacrum of the great original provided by Christ, is at
least an agent of truth who can point his students toward
the mind's road to God.

Adams had a longing for universals,
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which seems in some finite moments— as when he wrote his
"Prayer to the Virgin," to have merged with a faith in their
existence.

Nevertheless, as educator and historian he is a

thoroughgoing nominalist to the end, though he maintains
that he is an Augustinian.

Adams sought to subvert the

historian's stance as a secularized priest, and his
masquerade as a purveyor of scientific truth.
Adams believed that the members of the Historical
Association of the future would have to deal with the
radical doubt about both pedagogy and history that had
assailed him, and that its members, would,

in the "span of a

century" be "torn by some such dilemma." Caught up in his
apocalyptic vision, Adams wrote of a coming "crisis" in the
university, the "shadow" of which

has "cast itself on me

both as a teacher and a writer," he says, and "kept me
silent."

Despite this characteristic disclaimer, Adams did

not remain silent, and, as we know, his later "fictional"
works, from Mt. St. Michel to "The Rule of Phase" attempt to
address the questions that have since been raised by
Heidegger's modernist critique of the possibilities of
language, and by modernist and postmodernist theorists as
disparate as Althusser, Adorno, and Deleuze.
Complicating our vision of Adam's progress as an
historian is the fascination with Marx that antedates his
writing of his autobiography. Though he never actually
called himself a Marxist historian, he approvingly
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identifies his brother Brooks as one (Letters. V, 54).
Adams had become interested in Marxist theory as early as
the 1880s, and the language and sensibility of his late work
is increasingly Marxist in orientation.

Adams owned a

translation of Capital. the first part of which is annotated
in his own hand, and which was published in London in 1887.
Typically, in his 1910 "Letter to American Teachers of
History," which is an attack on the Hegelian model of
history, and which is the most Marxist of his essays, he
does not mention Marx.

In June of 1894, however, he wrote

Charles Milnes Gaskell that, though he disagreed with Marx,
Marx had taught him a great deal.
In despair, I've taken to reading
history again...I have taken up the
story of the greater world, the Roman
Empire, which went so inexplicably to
the devil before us.
Socially I am
quite of the Roman empire...Did you ever
read Karl Marx? I think I never struck
a book which taught me so much, and with
which I disagreed so radically in
conclusion.
Anyway, these studies of
morbid society are not so amusing as
Petronius and Petrarch.
(Letters. V, 194-95)
Marx may not have been amusing, but Adams was writing his
brother Brooks five years later for more information on the
Marxist vision of history.
...try and find out for me what is the
best statement of the Economical Theory
of History in the works of Marks (sic.) .
Engels, and the socialists authorities.
Of course I've read Marx— at least
Capital— but I've not read Engels...I
may find it very convenient to know

about socialist theories; they seem to
be now on the verge of ousting all
others except the pure capitalistic.
(Letters. V, 49)
Brooks responded by immediately sending Eduard Bernstein/s
Die

Yoraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufqaben der

Sozialdemokratie (1899).

Within four days, Adams responded

that "Bernstein is very much in my intellectual condition."
What Adams means by that is, as usual, cryptic.
rejects the idea of a coming social cataclysm.

Bernstein
For Adams,

this means the "bankruptcy of the only idea that our time
has produced." "The machine could run many centuries on that
time schedule," he adds, while at the same time asserting
that "the old rules of Peel's time are now quite laid aside
and abandoned.

...I have every day to reeducate myself, and

try to forget all I was ever taught"
playfully— and cryptically— Adams

(Letters, V, 56). More

says that Bernstein has

taught him "what Hegelianism is."
I knew I was a Hegelian, but never knew
what it was. Now I see that a Hegelian
is one who agrees that every-body is
right, and who acts as if everybody but
himself were wrong. What a delightful
idea— so German— that Karl Marx thought
himself a Hegelian!" It is equal to
Wagner's philosophy.
(Letters. V, 57)
The language that describes a world moved by great
unnameable cultural forces and which characterizes the M t .
St. Michel, the Education. the "Letter to American Teachers
of History" and "The Rule of Phase" emerges for the first
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time in these letters of the 1890s.

Adams's vision of the

kingdom of force which permeates The Education may have been
born as he claims in The Education at the Chicago Exhibition
of 1893, but it was crystallized in his reading of Marx and
Bernstein.
...the law of economy as the law of
history is the only contribution that
the socialists have made to my library
of ideas, and I am curious to get their
best statement. They are a droll set of
plus que petits bourgeois, these
socialists; but they have all the truth
there is; that is, belief in themselves.
(Letters, V, 55).
Eleven years later, having completed his essay "The
Rule of Phase Applied to History," the supposed third part
of his

autobiography, Adams wrote again to Charles Milnes

Gaskell that he had been writing in the deeply pessimistic
vein of Malthus and Marx and Schopenhauer.
Throughout all the thought of Germany,
France and England, for there is no
thought in America— runs a growing
stream of pessimism which comes in a
continuous current from Malthus and Karl
Marx and Schopenhauer in our youth, and
which we were taught to reject then, but
which is openly preached now on all
sides.
Next week I sent you a little
volume I have written about it, not for
the improvement of humanity, but only to
prod up my historical flock. They are
all feeble-minded and should be all shut
up in your asylums; but I know no way of
telling them so...
(Letters, VI, 316)
Adams had already mourned the exhaustion of the autonomous
self in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and chronicled its
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demise in the Education when he wrote the "Rule of Phase
Applied to History" in 1909.

He was sending Gaskell a copy

of this along with "A Letter to American Teachers of
History."
In these late essays, Adams claimed to have written a
sequel to his autobiography, one in which the individual as
a thinking thing has been supplanted as the focus of study.
No entity that could be described as an individual is
present at all in the late essays. There is only the problem
of blind force, and its implications for mankind. "The Rule
of Phase" is an overt rejection of the powers of reason and
of the principle of identity. "Reason," Adams writes, "can
be only another phase of the energy earlier known as
Instinct or Intuition"

(Degradation. 192).

From the beginnings of philosophy and
religion, the thinker was taught by the
mere act of thinking, to take for
granted that his mind was the highest
energy of nature. Society still believes
it, as asserts its supremacy, on no
other ground, with a sustained force
which is the chief theme of history, and
which showed no sign of relaxation until
attacked in the eighteenth century in
its theological or supernatural
outposts.
Society must still continue
to act on it, as the Platonist, the
Stoic, and the Christian did, for the
obvious reason that it was and is their
only motive for existence— their
solitary title to their identity.
(Degradation.
Adams's

207)

"little volume" on the "Rule of Phase" is, in

reality, a meditation on subjectivity and an attack on
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philosophic idealism that is properly seen as his response
on the one hand to his belief that a modernist philosophy of
history was needed.

On the other hand, he sought to

articulate the sense, one

which he felt he shared with

Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and

Nietzsche, that any

credible philosophy of history must reconcile the kingdom of
force and the kingdom of mind. In doing so, it would
"threaten human history with fantastic revolution."
(Degradation. 196).
In his prefatory letter to the larger "Letter to
American Teachers of History" Adams explains his choice of
the epistolary form as his vehicle for his own forays in his
personal version a new science of man.
If I call this volume a letter it is
only because that literary form affects
to be more colloquial and more familiar
than the usual scientific treatise; but
such letters never require a response,
even when they invite one, and in the
present case, the subject of the letter
involves a problem which will certainly
exceed the limits of a life already far
advanced, so that is solution, if a
solution is possible will have to be
reached by a new generation.
(Degradation. 138-39)
Adams echoes his model Petrarch, who affected the use of
letters even when they were ostensibly addressed to the dead
in order to establish a more "familiar" ground with his
audience. The letter conjures the idea of absent presences
on both the part of the recipient and the audience. The
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letter— speech and gesture translated into the written word
by a speaker whom the reader contacts only in imagination—
provides a kind of ghostly company for the solitary Adams
and for his solitary reader.

To deepen our sense of

puzzlement about Adams's reforming mission, he claims that
the essay is not to be published, but is instead a document
"unofficial and personal".

His reasoning he says, is that

"touching as it does some of the most delicate relations of
University Instruction in rival departments, the book has
too much the air of provoking controversy."
I do not know that controversy would do
harm, but I see nothing to be gained by
provoking it. For the moment, the
problem is chiefly one of technical
instruction; of grouping departments; at
most, of hierarchy in the sciences. Some
day, it may become a question whether
one department, or another, is to impose
on the university a final law of
instruction; but, for the present, it is
a domestic matter, to be settled at home
before inviting the world to interfere.
Therefore the volume will not be
published, or offered for sale, or sent
to the press for notice.
(Degradation. 137-38)
Though Adams claims to despise the power vested in the
university and in historians, he nevertheless pens his
ruminations on reconceptualizing both pedagogy and
historiography for an elite audience made up of his fellow
men of letters. He addresses a group that is not very
different than the audience Petrarch addresses in his
letters and treatises.

Unlike Petrarch, however, Adams sees
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himself not as an anchor for history both past and present,
but rather a sort of floating consciousness. He desires no
response, and assumes his impotence as a reformer because of
his own uncertainty about his motives and his aims.
For the same reason, the volume needs no
acknowledgement. Unless the questions
which it raises or suggests seem to you
so personal as to need action, you have
probably no other personal interest than
that of avoiding the discussion
altogether. Few of us are required to
look ten, or twenty years, or a whole
generation ahead to realize what will
then be the relation of history to
physics or physiology, and even if we
make the attempt, we are met at the
outset by the difficulty of allowing for
our personal error, which is, in so
delicate a calculation, an element of
the first importance. Commonly, our
error takes the form of inertia, and is
more or less constant and calculable.
For myself, the preference of movement
over inertia is decided. The risk of
error in changing a long-established
course seems always greater to me than
the chance of correction, unless the
elements are known more exactly than is
possible in human affairs; but the need
of determining these elements is all the
greater on that account; and this volume
is only a first experiment toward
calculating their past, present, and
future values.
(Degradation. 138)
Adams's indication that the "Letter" is yet another sequel
to his autobiography is marked by the date he assigns it. He
dates the "Letter" "16 February, 1910," the birthday of yet
another fictional self.

Like the Education, this is a text

that records another version of self.

This time, the self
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has no name but is a mere troublesome and truncated selfconsciousness, referred to as "the historian" or "the
unscientific student." The "Letter" records Adams's embrace
of philosophic vitalism.
Since the Church had lost its authority
the historian's field had shrunk into
narrow limits of rigorously human
action; but...within those limits he was
clear that the energy with which history
had to deal could not ge reduced
directly to a mechanical or a physico
chemical process. He was therefore
either obliged to deny that social
energy was an energy at all, or to
assert that it was an energy independent
of physical laws. Yet how could he deny
that social energy was a true form of
energy when he had no reason for
existence, as professor, except to
describe and discuss its acts? He could
neither doubt nor dispute its existence
without putting an end to his own; and
therefore he was of necessity a
Vitalist, or adherent of the doctrine
that Vital Energy was independent of
mechanical law. Vitalists are of many
kinds.
(Degradation. 146)
Adams wants to know what thought is and what the subject
that produces it is, and he proposes to find out not by
turning inward, as his models Augustine and Petrarch had,
but by turning outward, to a study of
entropy (Degradation. 142).

the problem of

The late Adams, unlike the

Adams of the 1850s, regards thought as an "enfeebled
function of will."
The historian is required either
expressly to assert or surreptitiously
to assume...that the while function of
nature has been the ultimate production
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of this one-sided consciousness,— this
amputated Intelligence,— this degraded
Act, this truncated Will. As the
function of the crystal is to produce
the order of its cleavage, and that of
the rose, the beauty of its flower, and
that of the peacock the splendors of its
tail, and as, except for these purposes
neither crystal, nor rose, nor peacock
has as much human interest as a thistle
or a maggot, so the function of man
is,to the historian, the production of
Thought; but if all the other sciences
affirm that not Thought but Instinct is
the potential of Vital Energy, and if
the beauties of Thought-— shown in the
intuitions of artistic genius,— are to
be taken for last traces of an instinct
now wholly dead or dying, nothing
remains for the historian to describe or
develop except the history of a more or
less mechanic dissolution.
(Degradation. 209)
Adams's critique of identity anticipates Louis
Althusser's view of the problem of subjectivity in "Ideology
and Ideological State Apparatuses."

Althusser defines the

"superstructure" of a society as a spatial metaphor which
consists of two sections--the political-legal
State); and ideology (the
ideologies.7

(law and the

ethical, legal, and political

Ideological state apparatuses, on the other

hand, are those "realities which present themselves to the
immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized
institutions."

Althusser's definition includes lists of

ISA's that encompass the dimensions of religious,
educational, familial, political and cultural life.

His

treatment of the evolution of these structures is quite
similar to Adams's discussion of them in his 1910 analysis
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of the problem facing the modern historian. Ideology,
according to Althusser, has no history. Like Adams's vision
of reason and thought, it is an "imaginary construction
whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of dream
among writers before Freud."8 Ideology for Althusser is "the
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real
conditions of existence." Individuals,

in Althusser's view,

believe in God, Duty and Justice because they "live in an
ideological representation of ideology."

Modern subjects

conceive of themselves as living in the context of their
ideology.

More radically, Althusser claims that "there is

no ideology except by the subject and for its subjects."9
The category of the subject— which Althusser equates with
the soul— is the constitutive category of all ideology.
...the category of the subject is only
constitutive of all ideology insofar as all
ideology has the function (which defines it)
of 'constituting' concrete individuals as
subjects.10
Personal identity, then is determined by the
ideological matrix which is generated by the ideological
state apparatus which, solipsistically, is generated by the
subject itself.

For Althusser, St. Paul's claim that it is

in the Logos that we "live and move and have our being" is
in reality an affirmation that it is in ideology that we
live and move and have our names and our illusion of
identity.

Seen in this light, some of Adams's initial revelations
of the new

view of the human past that accompanied his

initial work on Tahiti acquire a variant significance. Adams
sent "The Tendency of History" to the members of the
American Historical Association as a "communication" from
the vantage point of his presidency of the Association. In
his "regret" for his "constant absence" epitomized in the
epistolary mode and captured in his actual physical absence,
Adams manages at least to escape the confines of the
personal self. In fact, Adams's absence is an extension of
his claim that he had died with the publication of his
history, and an announcement that he intended to remain
alienated from the members of his profession. The "Letter to
the American Teachers' of History" and "The Rule of Phase"
vacate, reoccupy, and redefine the spaces of identity in the
same way that Adams's assertions about teaching and history
vacate and reoccupy the idea of the historical past.
Sixteen years later, he presented another address, this
time in a letter— the "Letter to American Teachers of
History"— which developed the theories that had been present
in embryo in the "Tendency." With "The Rule of Phase," the
two essays completed the autobiographical efforts that had
occupied Adams since the Tahiti. He hoped that they would
complete his textual self-transformation from historian to
theorist.
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Adams's contact with philosophic vitalism, mediated by
his reading of Henri Bergson, colors these last essays.
Bergson, whom he later met and entertained at his salon in
Washington, offered an affirmation for Adams's own sense,
gleaned in Tahiti, that there were other ways of organizing
self and community than through the idea of consciousness,
historical sense, and personal identity.
...I have been amusing myself with a
fable for instructors of history. I've a
notion of printing a Letter to
Professors. Pure malice! but History
will die if not irritated. The only
service I can do to my profession is to
serve as a flea. I like best Bergson's
frank surrender to the superiority of
the Instinct over Intellect. You know
how I have preached that principle, and
how I have studied the facts of it. In
fact, I wrote a whole volume— called my
Education— which no one ever saw, and
which you must some day look into,—
borrow William James's copy, in hopes
that he may have marginally noted his
contempt for me,— in order to recall how
Education may be shown to consist in
following the intuitions of Instinct.
Lobe calls it 'Tropism,' I believe,
which means that a mother likes to nurse
her own child.
(Letters. VI, 272)
Adams's conviction that the riches of existence lay in the
realm of sense became progressively stronger. He wrote
Albert Stanburrough Cook, a professor of English at Yale,
that

he had himself taken on a new identity

as an

emeritus, a "teacher of teachers," but that in his efforts
to avoid overburdening his "students" he had "not even
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published [his] books of late." He had aimed, in his
privately circulated works, to refigure the shape of
history.
The Chartres volume was the second in
the series, and intended to fix the
starting point, since I could not get
enough material to illustrate primitive
society, or the society of the seventh
century B.C., as I would have liked. I
wanted to show the intensity of the
vital energy of a given time, and of
course that intensity had to be stated
in its two highest terms— religion and
art. As our society stands, this way of
presenting a subject can be felt only by
a small number of persons. My idea is
that the world outside— the so-called
modern world— can only pervert and
degrade the conceptions of the primitive
instinct of art and feeling, and that
our only chance is to accept the limited
number of survivors... and to intensify
the energy of feeling within that
radiant center. In other words, I am a
creature of our poor old calvinistic,
St. Augustinian fathers, and am not
afraid to carry out my logic to the
rigorous end of regarding our present
society, its ideals, and purposes, as
dregs and fragments of some primitive,
essential instinct now nearly lost. If
you are curious to see the theory stated
as official instruction, you have only
to look over Bergson's 'Evolution
Creatrice,"...The Tendencies of thought
in Europe seem to me very strongly that
way.
(Letters, VI, 357)
Of course, Adams had taught no students since 1877 in any
conventional classroom, and his oft-proclaimed hopelessness
about the profession of teaching and the state of
historiography makes his remarks even more cryptic than they
are ordinarily. There is, nevertheless, as there always is,
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a coherence in Adams's sense of his place in the history of
thought. Adams conceived of himself as a point of mediation
in the history of self-construction in the west. He looks
backward to the Stoics of the ancient world, to Scotus's
statement of the problem of meaning in language, and to
Ockham's nominalism. At the end of his life, he is at one
with Nietzsche in his vision of an identity based on
something other than consciousness and interiority, and his
theorizing can be seen as a vital link between Bergson and
Gilles Deleuze.
In his anti-Hegelian stance, Adams runs the danger that
Francois Chatelet identifies in failing to take "our Plato"-Hegel— into account. Chatelet points out that Hegel
"determined a horizon, a language, a code that we are still
at the very heart of today. Hegel by this fact, is our
Plato; the one who delimits... the theoretical possibilities
of theory."11 Rejecting Hegel and the model of mind and
consciousness as the locus of reality, Adams nevertheless
revisits

Hegel's hierarchy of value when he declares that

his new model of history will look at art and religion as
indices of culture. This was partly what Adams meant when he
announced that he felt like Childe Roland. He had come to
the Dark Tower only to find himself entrapped. Adams's final
pessimism stems from his belief that the self is
simultaneously the product and the victim of its ideologies.
Adams cites Eduard Meyer's belief that "the whole mental
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development of mankind has for its preliminary assumption,
the existence of separate social groups."
'Above all, the weightiest instrument of
men, Speech— which first makes the Man,
and first makes possible the growth of
our systematic Thought,-— has not been a
casual creation of individuals,... but
has grown out of the common need of
equals, bound together by common
interests and regulated intercourse. But
even the invention of tools...the
settlement in Residence... are possible
only within a Group; or, at least have
meaning only so far as what has first
and immediately benefitted one, becomes
the property of the whole community .,n
Following Meyer, Adams believes that "even the child is the
creature of the State Organism, not of the Family." In
Adams's view, the "social Organism...is the cause, creator,
and end of the Man, who exists only as a passing
Representative of it, without rights or functions except
what it imposes"

(Degradation. 2 60). For Adams, the

dissolution of modern society, which leads it to entropy, is
the process by which the "vital energy" of a society becomes
focused on individual desires and capacities, rather than on
the undifferentiated body of society. His hope for education
is that "the departments of biology, sociology, and
psychology" will find "some common formula" which will allow
them to study the problem of "vital energies" and escape the
replication of the second law of thermodynamics in social
evolution— -that is, the moment of the modern subject, when
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the world has been divided into the spheres of infinite
universes of individual mind.
That which formed a people, a unity, a
block ends by becoming an agglomeration
of individuals without cohesion, still
held together for a time by its
traditions and institutions. This is the
phase when men, divided by their
interests and aspirations, but no longer
knowing how to govern themselves, ask to
be directed in their smallest acts; and
when the State exercises its absorbing
influence. With the definitive loss of
the old ideal, the race ends by entirely
losing its soul; it becomes nothing more
than a dust of isolated individuals, and
returns to what it was at the start, — a
crowd.1,13
The world of sense may be a new possibility, but it is
not one that he can actively embrace.

Adams is too enamored

of the idea of absence, too much a part of the Platonic
traditions that flower in Augustine and in Petrarch in a
sense of inwardness and solitude so full that the subject
knows social privation and loneliness only in the company of
others.14 Adams's stance as historian, as biographer, and
as autobiographer is mediated by his desire for the
knowledge he lacks, for the people whose presence he
conjures in letters, and for the escape from the sense of a
duality of being that had haunted him since his student days
in Berlin. What Adams seeks— with self-acknowledged
futility--is a reversal of this conception of desire, and
his motion away from his characteristic idealism finds an
accidental echo in Gilles Deleuze.

In his collaborations with Felix Guattari, Deleuze
perforins the analogue in the realm of psychoanalysis and the
linguistic field of semantics of Adams's reoccupation and
transformation of the normative terms and forms of
historiography and autobiography. In Anti-Oedipus and A
Thousand Plateaus, the two volumes of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari reverse our sense of the
rational order of things, as well as our internalized notion
of the nature of desire.

In these works, desiring machines

replace Adams's depiction of the perpetually ravenous
subject of modernity which was, in turn, his altered version
of the Cartesian cogito.

Desiring machines,

like Adams's

pteraspis. are involved in all human processes, and they are
constantly engaged in the production of other desires:
"Desire constantly couples continuous flows and partial
objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented.
Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and
breaks the flows."15 Desire becomes diseased in Deleuze, as
it does in Adams, only when it becomes self-reflexive; that
is, when the economy of the individual and the personal self
displaces that of the group.

In this configuration, the

individuated self is not a goal to be attained, but a fate
to escape. Thus Deleuze and Guattari call the schizophrenic
the "universal producer" because he has managed to escape
the disease inherent in existence as an isolated ego, and
"the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of
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disjunctions."16

Deleuze and Guattari invoke Beckett's The

Unnamable as the exemplar of the schizoid's dilemma.
The ego, however is like daddy-mommy:
the schizo has long since ceased to
believe in it. He is somewhere else,
beyond or behind, or below these
problems, rather than immersed in
them...There are those who will maintain
that the schizo is incapable of uttering
the word 'I , ' and that we must restore
his ability to utter this hallowed word.
All of which the schizo sums up by
saying: they're fucking me over again;'I
won't say 'I' any more, I'll never utter
that word again, it's just too damn
stupid. Every time I hear it, I'll use
the third person instead, if I happen to
remember to. If it amuses them. And it
won't make one bit of difference.17
The problem with versions of Platonic desire for Deleuze is
that from the moment we align desire with acquisition by
defining it as "absence" or "lack" we "make desire an
idealistic (dialectical, nihilistical) conception" that
exists in pure mind as something that has only a "psychic
reality" and thus leaves us perpetually dissatisfied. The
object of desire in Platonic terms is never present, and
never really available, and thus it is always fantastical or
illusory.

In the world of sense, desire produces, and its

products are real.18
Deleuze is far from believing that he is alone in
conceiving of the world in these terms.

Rather, he proposes

an entire alternative history of philosophy which
exemplifies "expressionism" rather than subjectivity, and
which leads from the Stoics to the nominalists to Leibniz,
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Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, and Bergson.19

For Deleuze the

fascination with each of these philosophers lies in their
emphasis on man's capacity to order his reality through
reference to the world outside the self. For example,
Bergson's belief that "we become conscious of an act sui
generis

by which we detach ourselves from the present in

order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general,
then in a certain region of the past— a work of adjustment,
something like the focusing of a camera" involves a belief
that we "place ourselves at once in the past; we leap into
the past" through a creative act of will and desire.20
Most significant for our study of Adams is Deleuze's
view of history which he explores with Felix Guattari in A
Thousand Plateaus. There, Deleuze proposes to replace what
he calls the "arborescent" model of culture with one founded
in the idea of the rhizome which connects and unites rather
than creating divisions.

The problem with notions of

reality and of learning based on the image of the tree is
that they are hierarchical.
The tree and root inspire a sad image of
thought that is forever imitating the
multiple on the basis of a centered or
higher segmented unity.... Arborescent
systems are hierarchical systems with
centers of significance and
subjectification, central automata like
organized memories.21
In such a model of thinking, memory is, as we have seen,
specially privileged.

Long-term memory, which traces the
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branches of family trees, and the versions of the shared
past of civilizations is the real muse of western concepts
of history.

And history is what imprisons Quentin Compson,

and ultimately Henry Adams, who, as we have seen, could not
escape his identity as an Adams even in Tahiti.

Deleuze

proposes a "de-centered," transpersonal vision of history,
in which short-term memory is privileged over long-term
memory precisely because one of the characteristics

of

short-term memory is that it "includes forgetting as a
process."
In the hierarchical models of thought that have
dominated western culture's conceptions of itself, the idea
of the personal self is as privileged as the memory that
makes unified conceptions of self possible. The individual,
after all, must engage in ordering the hierarchy of his
world. He must engage in interpreting the tasks of the
composite cultural memory we accept as history.

Most

privileged of all is the secularized priesthood of
historians and literary artists who choose to make their
visions of the past accessible to the community, and who
bind the community together through the fruits of their
long-term memory as they are preserved in writing— that
living symbol of our alienation from one another. The
literary artist, the historian, the philosopher are each, in
their several ways, what Deleuze, following Rosenstiehl and
Petitot, calls the "universal friend," mediating between the
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members of his audience through the agency of the text,
while at the same time announcing a necessary absence.
Who is the friend of humankind? Is it
the philo-sopher as he appears in
classical thought, even if he is an
aborted unity that makes itself felt
only through absence or subjectivity,
saying all the while I know nothing, I
am nothing. Thus the authors [Deleuze
and Guattari] speak of dictatorship
theorems. Such is indeed the principle
of root-trees, or their outcome: the
radicle solution, the structure of
Power.22
But the universal friend does not unite; rather, he
separates, because he can only communicate with his audience
through absence.

Adams's celebrated absences from his texts

and from scheduled public appearances alike dramatize his
own prescient sense that language could resonate only in the
silences of the individual consciousness.

For Adams, the

idea that the "whole of the function of nature has been the
ultimate production of this one-sided Consciousness,— this
Degraded Act, this truncated Will,...that the function of
man is, to the historian the production of thought"
(Degradation. p. 205) was a deforming one, and, as he
recognized,

it lay at the heart of the western sense of the

order of things.
Adams thus moves toward what Deleuze called a
"nomadology" of thought— the opposite of a history— in which
history comes to encompass what neither it nor the artifact
of the book have ever accomplished— the world outside the
perceiving consciousness.

324

History has never comprehended nomadism,
the book has never comprehended the
outside. The State as the model for the
book and for thought has a long history:
logos, the philosopher-king, the
transcendence of the Idea, the
interiority of the concept, the republic
of minds, the court of reason, the
functionaries of thought, man as
legislator and subject. The State's
pretensions to be a world order, and to
root man. The war machine's relation to
an outside is not another 'model;' it is
an assemblage that makes thought itself
nomadic, and the book a working part in
every mobile machine, a stem for a
rhizome (Kleist and Kafka against
Goethe) .23
Henry Adams's decision to erase himself through
representing himself acquires its real significance when we
consider his critique of history and historiography. His
"suicide in print," was part of his embrace of vitalism; it
was his way of naming a future that was not

circumscribed

by the personal self and its history. His "failure" was that
he concluded that he could only point the way toward the
alternative selves and the alternative history of the
future.
By rights, Henry Adams should have been a high
modernist, claiming for himself the capacities for
engendering order that would later be claimed by a William
Faulkner or a Gertrude Stein as artist. Instead, Adams, like
his haunting image of the caterpillar, remains suspended
between the textual world where he refuses to say "I," and
the epistolary world where he perpetually constitutes a

community founded in absence, but ordered and connected by
his own modernist imagination.

Adams is hamstrung between

an instinctive high modernism, and a prescient groping
toward the postmodern realm of Warhol's diaries, which were
dictated moment by moment over the electronic fields
provided by the telphone.

In his discussion of

postmodernism, Fredric Jameson notes that postmodernism
differs from high modernism in that the former is possessed
of a "new kind of flatness or depthlessness." For Jameson,
this kind of "death of the world of appearances" is no
longer a matter of content, but rather "of some more
fundamental mutation both in the object world itself— now
become a set of texts or simulacra— and in the disposition
of the subject."24 Adams's high modernist vision of a
"crisis in the university— "a crisis of mind that was
invented and interpreted by "men of letters"— is borne out
in the postmodern outpourings of Deleuze and Warhol, but it
is interpreted by the modernism of Adorno and Jameson, who
still lend narrative coherence and a conventional linguistic
shape to the absent selves and the absent order that both
mourn.
From the nominalists to Petrarch, and from Petrarch to
the Reformation, to Descartes and Pascal, and to Nietzsche
and Bergson, Adams traces the emergence and disappearance of
the subject of modernity and the history without which the
individual subject has no meaning.

Amid the bankruptcy of

his vision of the Cartesian and Hegelian models of mind, he
experiments with a new world, one founded on sense and
desire which moves us toward the neo-Scholasticism of
Deleuze, the late twentieth century and postmodernism. That
his quest ends in questionings is perhaps the mark of the
true nomad.
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